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A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man

This archival document is a scholarly treatise titled *A Comparative Study of Catholic Doctrine and the Confucian Concept of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity*, published as *Hengyi Series*, No. 5, and attributed to Zhao Bingshi (also recorded as Zhao Binshi and Chao Pin-shih), identified in the text...

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Main Author: Chao, Pin-shih, Rev.
Format: Books
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Catholic Doctrine ; Catholic-Confucian dialogue ; Chao Pin-shih ; Comparative Religious Studies ; Confucian Philosophy ; Confucian-Catholic Comparative Theology ; Convergence of Catholicism and Confucianism ; Fr José Onate SJ ; Heaven and Humanity unity ; Hengyi Series ; Imprimatur of Msgr. Cai Wenxing ; Kuangchi Press ; Msgr Cai Wenxing ; St Joseph’s Seminary Macau ; Taichung ; Taichung 1957 Edition ; Taichung Apostolic Prefecture ; Tianren Heyi ; Zhao Bingshi ; Macau. University of Saint Joseph ; Books
Online Access:https://macau-legacy.usj.edu.mo/docs/A8VTU3IX/viewer_A8VTU3IX.html
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author Chao, Pin-shih, Rev.
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Chao, Pin-shih, Rev.
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building Macau. University of Saint Joseph
description This archival document is a scholarly treatise titled *A Comparative Study of Catholic Doctrine and the Confucian Concept of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity*, published as *Hengyi Series*, No. 5, and attributed to Zhao Bingshi (also recorded as Zhao Binshi and Chao Pin-shih), identified in the text as a Reverend holding the degree C.D.D. The work is physically associated with St Joseph’s Seminary and its *Yuan Ruosheng Shu Tu* (Institute of Sacred Scripture and Bibliographic Studies) Library, as confirmed by official seals. Marginal annotations and multiple signatures—including “Submitted by Jia Jingde”—indicate collaborative or institutional submission processes. The treatise engages in a rigorous comparative analysis of the Confucian concept of *tian–ren heyi* (*unity of Heaven and humanity*) and Catholic theological conceptions of the divine–human relationship, with explicit reference to Mencius’s articulation of moral agency, Neo-Confucian developments, and Catholic doctrines of creation *ex nihilo*, grace, Incarnation, and *theosis*. It foregrounds the philosophical question of human agency within divine–human unity, positioning the work as a methodologically grounded, historically informed contribution to interreligious and cross-traditional theological discourse. The document reflects late imperial or early Republican-era Chinese Catholic intellectual engagement with classical Confucian thought, and serves as primary evidence of indigenised theological scholarship in East Asia.
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fulltext [transcription] {{PAGE:1}} **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家 天人合一比較觀 **[Anotações marginais]** 賈景德題 **[Selos]** [No canto inferior direito] (Selo ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** 賈景德題 {{PAGE:2}} **[Texto Principal]** A Comparison of Catholic and Confucian Concepts on Relations between God and Man by Rev. Chao Pin-shih, C.D.D. **[Selos]** [No centro, à direita]: (Selo ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:3}} **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 恆毅叢書之五 趙賓實著 **[Selos]** [No topo, à esquerda]: SEMINARIO DE S. JOSE 院若聖修書圖 BIBLIOTECA [No centro, à esquerda]: (Selo ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:4}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:5}} **[Page 4]** **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 前言 關於「天人合一」問題，古今中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 人之非。關於「天人合一」問題，古今中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 子｜於諸家之中，是「入者主之」問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 說。到了宋儒、孟子之中，對這主之問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 日，這種問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 際談這種問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 解決。但這問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 是孰非，今人是有靈落伍懸因孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 誰對誰錯，我將儒家有靈落伍懸因孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 判若天淵，各派的動物因決佛對問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 若「天人合一」的動物因決佛對問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 人不能多有一些影響大感影響於，國竟各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 令人一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 人一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 行別則繼之之神雖少論及 別則繼之之神雖少論及 則繼之之神雖少論及 繼之之神雖少論及 之之神雖少論及 之神雖少論及 神雖少論及 雖少論及 少論及 論及 及 **[Assinaturas]** 趙賓實 {{PAGE:6}} **[Page 5]** **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 目 錄 前言 蔣序 壹 孔子對於天人合一的態度 一、孔子的天人合一說 二、子思、孟子的天人合一說 三、漢儒的天人合一說 貳 思、孟派的天人合一說 參 漢儒的天人合一說 二、王者成了天意的化身，來統制人群 一、人是個小宇宙 **[Anotações marginais]** (Ilegível) **[Carimbos]** (Ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** (Ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:7}} **[Page 6]** **[Texto Principal]** 肆 肆 伍 唐代儒家天人合一觀念的薄弱 六 宋代的儒家的天人合一說 一、宋代儒家道學的興起與派別 二、濂洛關閩四大學派的天人合一說 三、濂派周敦頤的天人合一說 四、關派張子橫渠的天人合一說 五、洛派程顥程頤二子的天人合一說 六、朱熹同王守仁二大儒家的天人合一說 七、對於歷代儒家各學派的綜合與評價 八、天主教對於天人合一的基本理論 一、天人實際是否能和一 二、天人兩觀念的取意 三、從各個觀點上來看天主教的天人合一 一、朱熹的天人合一說 二、王守仁的天人合一說 **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:8}} **[Page 7]** **[Texto Principal]** 二、人如何與天主合一 玖天主教與儒家天人合一的異同 一、相同之點 二、同異之點 三、相異之點 拾結論 **[Referências arquivísticas]** 三六三八三八三九四〇四一 {{PAGE:9}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:10}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:11}} **[Page 10]** **[Texto Principal]** **說，則未提及。** **孔子在生時，特別警告人不可去諂媚神，因那太自私了，且失了敬神的意義，但對於「天人合一」之** **思、孟子在孔子以後，對這問題的徒弟，甚對於這個問題，他的感興趣，亦很少提及，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **貳 思、孟派的天人合一說** **一、曾子的天人合一說** **在孝經上說：「這個人若能照裁判，要注重實際問題，徒去身際，先不尚玄談，注意這個問題，他的倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **在父母若能彀配之天行化於自己，修實一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **止於至善人，使它的下人，以後** **曾子至善，按着天下人，** **曾子說主張人若能彀配之德止着判要對這** **若：「這若人能照裁但注** **能「這若人能照裁但注** **能彀配之德止着判要對這** **天行化於自己，修實一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **莫大的現善的作，，榜一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **才算達於世，榜一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **達到嚴父目標心滿作惡心** **到人生嚴父是足這標準他的倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **生最後莫使而就準他所說倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **最後莫使而就準他所說倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **的大人不叫，而說「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **目標於都他做「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **標配能求「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **。天孝了新再心，以** **這「」親推己，以** **是。親及人是指身** **曾子在而亦可稱由的本。** **子這孝親可稱由的本。** **所說所的稱由的本。** **說所的稱由的本。** **的說最為近「良心」主張惟對** **天說最為近「良心」主張惟對** **天配後德及良心他有能** **人天目化遠心」張惟對** **合的標，這個親他有能** **一「天」，這個親他有能** **觀。天」就是德及以能** **，是化疏為修** **亦就親的，人** **是能彀最後漸漸若的** **大學配目標的有了君** **所說天標去感一，** **說。就是化正直能** **的因此是他人直齊家** **「此使人的良** **至他** **[Anotações marginais]** **善」。** **在** **孝經** **父母說** **若：** **能** **配之** **天，** **才** **算** **達** **到** **生** **最** **後** **的** **目** **標** **。** **這** **是** **曾** **子** **所** **說** **的** **天** **人** **合** **一** **觀** **。** **，** **亦** **是** **大** **學** **所** **說** **的** **「** **至** **他** **[Carimbos]** **(Nenhum carimbo visível)** **[Assinaturas]** **(Nenhuma assinatura visível)** **[Referências arquivísticas]** **(Nenhuma referência arquivística visível)** {{PAGE:12}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:13}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:14}} **[Page 13]** **[Texto Principal]** 一、人是一個小宇宙 肢有其氣，心臟百骸，生理心理，以及各種的姿態天，心情，都可以偶地，都有一定所象，並與天地間陰陽、五行、四時的變化相符，因此五官，各 從董子春秋繁露人副天數篇裏，我們知道董子把人與天地，彷彿成了列成天地三個單位，並與天地間陰陽、五行、四時的變化相符，因此五官，各 現在我們再研究董子的天人合一說： 用一個「天」字，對於「天」字，更弄的玄了。因此「天」字，使人頭暈腦昏，時言，不能天地確知」，他指的「天氣」究竟是什麼？再加上有後世的註疏家，不顧客觀，只用時主 言「天」是「天威」，偶地的天人統一錯綜腦有亂用，，不能「天」沒有一定標準，「天氣」有時言「天數」，再加上有後世的註疏家，不顧客觀，並用意 數也，形體骨肉，有形的天。」說：「天，與地為對待名詞：在人副天數篇有「天道」，在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 刑物，不得兩起……」又說的原則：「天，也是人之道，王者終而所取法的標準。」在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 物，不得兩起……」又說的原則：「天，也是人之道，王者終而所取法的標準。」在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 主宰之天相同了。是人動作的原則：「天，也是人之道，王者終而所取法的標準。」在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 之元也……故元者，萬物之本，而人之元在焉，安在乎？乃在乎天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 **[Anotações marginais]** [No topo, à esquerda]: · 13 · **[Carimbos]** [Sem carimbos visíveis] **[Assinaturas]** [Sem assinaturas visíveis] **[Referências arquivísticas]** [Sem referências arquivísticas visíveis] {{PAGE:15}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:16}} **[Page 75]** **[Texto Principal]** 肆 唐代儒家天人合一觀念的薄弱 君這種人又的 子的種又的 綜合董子天人合一之說說 人完全人生合 歡天人合受觀 心，合制而論 使一於天， 他之說天， 的權，，他 位既王把一 更不是者人之 鞏固是代說 就是家行一而 了，，小知 。又有宇他以 不是統宙「天 陰人同人感應」 陽一一天 家切地 的的並 ，全立的原 完全。三則 是這，， 董種彷作他 子矛盾借可解 借着的以決 這種現離人 象天而觀 「天恐獨及 人怕立政 感連。治觀 應董以觀 」子他的惟 之亦的 說不政一 ，能治的法 以自觀門。 取圓而論。 當其說， 時說， 人。 則 以董 人。 士並認他們、濫乏雖本着兩漢以後，中國哲學思潮的主流 大夫人事對於至、洛學的儒漢基本的後，劉四論場，，國 所重視的事於於、關的柳關基本家以使一制而論天，他 的神存的宗元閩理立，他之於論，國 亡觀念劉四論場，中 並得念劉禹學，，國 無失，禹學，，國 形，非錫派又不哲學思 中對常二的無遺學餘 形成了天薄二位奠政餘 了無毫弱文基治力的的 宋無關。豪人力的的 代係們雖他後對流 道，以係們援佛，不 學這天儒對，家不入於道 中末為家於故，入於道 唯一一個但人影以上道，即入於佛 物來，大因合於上承堯、於佛 派，大因合於上承堯、入於佛 的根自他一當時堯、入於佛 遠然們的時社、舜佛 影抹的的觀會舜佛 。殺天政治念會舜佛 了，政治，人舜佛 天根觀馬心禹儒 人本，馬馬甚少，湯僅佔 合一無歸虎少，湯僅佔 一賞於虎，僅開文、武的 的罰法，僅開文、武的 觀的家無僅開文、武的 念意，所足了武、地位 。志他們足了宋周公、唐代大文豪韓 這；們道儒道學的孔、孟自居愈李 種他們的。 思想們宇宙學的先河 ，以觀 在人力，上承王充。更好說是 當時定承王充。更好說是 頗能王充。更好說是 為勝天，故是缺 一般，，故是缺 **[Anotações marginais]** None **[Carimbos]** None **[Assinaturas]** None **[Referências arquivísticas]** None {{PAGE:17}} **[Page 16]** **[Texto Principal]** 伍 一、宋代儒家道學的興起與派別 道術道路 道主及關在世的農工商到了 法，及，故挽當的進工政，代，日， 提救思潮，中國 倡在 四子曾故能回派當的農工到了 子子能生風張蔚儒展商業宋 書、產士以時大進商 一，思新為橫然，。業代 二、因此、頴宗渠興乘政府日，代， 濂、孟的旨為起機府日，代， 洛、於的思想。主的設立應趨又又 關、天理，們他派了付展得 閩，人性這雖們中許社，了 ，合一哲種受皆，多會因大 四的的，思想道繼濂、院心形一統 大學觀故不家承、，的成，漢 派閩、無記響家舜關開需許民的 的的的當薰禹閩講，盛能揚眉 亦以一大社，湯四和著成市吐氣 大學會但、大學派的許又於異族 四子人基文述了、又風官活族之 子及心、的、武，文多因 為中且思想周公這。立字之 宗。庸成想公這。 二篇中國儒、孔大學校的。 ，以家曾的仍，發明當 和後，、的仍，時的 「孟學不思中心不造會 子的他孟人物滿紙經 「論語」又佛己派，人發，漸 」因家任以於直走上復 並他的，周是接興 列們分並敦一促成學 而稱特析以頤些衛的 別方衛為衛 **[Anotações marginais]** 二、濂、洛、關、閩，四大學派的天人合一說 **[Carimbos]** (Selo ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** (Ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:18}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:19}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:20}} - 19 - **[Texto Principal]** 四、關派張子橫渠的天人合一說 張子橫渠在西銘篇裏比天地好似父母，而人成了天地的子女，所以人的體質是天地賦的，人的理性亦是 理上的神體在上與天地切同，周子天人合一以物說孔子作義證說正萬說：一道德道行，教化順正無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 能當屬於陰陽同，仁育相又萬以孔以義說正萬說：一道德道行，教化順正無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 當上以天地切陰同，是純配以善，周子能的其是天地人，聖人其德人有高厚而仁物中月而無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 屬於陰陽同，全相以善也，能的其是天地人，聖人其德人有高厚而仁物中月而無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 理，人，但萬以聖而誠因是與有，又太而仁與止濁是周子體已明，德修，能與的物有合正有貞，固能，廊與鬼神的了不見天地其吉廣之。又，因，故聖謂 行，或陽氣做認為無聲再無臭是一個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 其，但五氣兩儀為無聲再無臭是一個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 神，人本萬物的以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 體，全為萬物，以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 在，是諸物，以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 上，純諸物，以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 與，善也，是太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 天，切，所，周，能，是，與，有，又，而，仁，周，聖，能，與，的，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 地，陰，配，聖，子，的，其，與，性，太，是，有，這，具，極，彼，此，又，的，再，參，雜，創，造，者，上，陰，陽，及，佛，家，宇，宙，的，思，想，，於，是，產，生，了，他，的，太，極，圖，說，及，通，書，二，書。 切，同，以，而，誠，其，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 陰，，周，善，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 同，是，配，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 周，純，所，周，能，是，與，性，太，是，有，這，具，極，彼，此，又，的，再，參，雜，創，造，者，上，陰，陽，及，佛，家，宇，宙，的，思，想，，於，是，產，生，了，他，的，太，極，圖，說，及，通，書，二，書。 子，諸，相，子，的，其，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 敦，萬，以，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 頤，物，善，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，萬，配，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，全，以，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，人，善，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，但，也，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，萬，物，的，以，太，之，靈，理，後，再，由，因，着，的，個，道，化，外，本，元，素，變，合，宇，宙，，彼，此，又，的，再，參，雜，創，造，者，上，陰，陽，及，佛，家，宇，宙，的，思，想，，於，是，產，生，了，他，的，太，極，圖，說，及，通，書，二，書。 **[Anotações marginais]** 無 {{PAGE:21}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:22}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:23}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:24}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:25}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:26}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:27}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:28}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:29}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:30}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:31}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:32}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:33}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:34}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:35}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:36}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:37}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:38}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:39}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:40}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:41}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:42}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:43}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:44}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] [translation] {{PAGE:1}} **[Main Text]** Catholicism and Confucianism: A Comparative Study of the Concept of ‘Unity between Heaven and Humanity’ **[Marginal Annotations]** Submitted by Jia Jingde **[Seals]** [Bottom right corner] (Illegible seal) **[Signatures]** Submitted by Jia Jingde {{PAGE:2}} **[Main Text]** A Comparative Study of Catholic and Confucian Conceptions of the Relationship between the Divine and Humanity by the Reverend Chao Pin-shih, C.D.D. **[Seals]** [Centrally positioned, right-aligned]: (Illegible seal) **[Archival References]** (Illegible) {{PAGE:3}} **[Main Title]** A Comparative Study of Catholic Doctrine and the Confucian Concept of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity *Hengyi Series*, No. 5 By Zhao Bingshi **[Seals]** [Top left]: St Joseph’s Seminary *Yuan Ruosheng Shu Tu* (‘Institute of Sacred Scripture and Bibliographic Studies’) Library [Centre left]: (Illegible seal) **[Archival References]** (Illegible) {{PAGE:4}} **[Page 4]** **[Main Text]** A Comparative Study of *Tianzhu Jiao* (Catholicism) and the Confucian Concept of *Tian–Ren Heyi* (*Unity of Heaven and Humanity*) **Preface** The concept of *tian–ren heyi* (*unity of Heaven and humanity*) has long been the subject of diverse interpretations—across historical periods, cultural traditions, and philosophical schools—generating extensive, often conflicting, scholarly debate without achieving consensus. Participants in this discourse frequently affirm their own positions while vigorously contesting those of others. Among the various schools of thought, the central question concerns *who or what constitutes the ‘agent’ (or ‘subject’)* within this unity: is it the human being who actively participates in and realises the unity, or is the human being subordinated—rendered passive or even servile—in relation to Heaven (*Tian*)? This question was already central to the Confucian tradition, notably in the thought of Mencius (Mengzi), who affirmed the inherent moral agency and self-cultivating capacity of the human person in relation to *Tian*. Yet even in later Neo-Confucian thought of the Song dynasty, the issue remained unresolved—recurring persistently across centuries without definitive resolution. Contemporary scholars, too, continue to grapple with the question: *Who is right, and who is wrong?* In order to clarify this fundamental issue, we shall first outline the principal Confucian understanding of *tian–ren heyi*, with particular attention to Mencius’s articulation of moral agency and innate virtue (*ben xing*). We shall then examine how divergent interpretations—especially those that risk reducing the human subject to a merely passive or instrumental role—have arisen, and assess their philosophical coherence and historical development. It is essential to stress that the concept of *tian–ren heyi* has exerted profound influence—not only upon ethical and metaphysical thought in East Asia, but also upon political theory, education, and religious practice. Its implications for anthropology, cosmology, and soteriology remain deeply consequential. To render the discussion accessible and methodologically rigorous, we shall first provide a concise, historically grounded exposition of the Confucian position. Thereafter, we shall turn to the Catholic theological understanding of the relationship between the Creator (*Deus*, ‘the Lord of Heaven’—a term historically adopted in Chinese Catholic discourse) and the human person—a relationship grounded in creation *ex nihilo*, divine grace, and the Incarnation. While Catholic theology does not employ the phrase *tian–ren heyi*, it engages, in its own doctrinal terms, with analogous questions concerning divine–human communion, participation (*koinōnia*), and the deification (*theosis*) of the human person through grace—concepts which, though rooted in the Greek patristic and Latin scholastic traditions, invite careful comparative analysis. **[Signatures]** Zhao Binshi {{PAGE:5}} [Page 32] III. The Rationalist School Song-dynasty rationalist philosophers placed considerable emphasis on questions concerning the origin of the cosmos and the doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi*). Yet they rarely employed the term *tian* (‘Heaven’) to denote a sovereign, personal cosmic ruler. Instead, they typically understood *tian* as the visible, azure vault of heaven—the material, corporeal sky—and even interpreted the term *tian* as it appears in classical texts in this same concrete, phenomenal sense. In their accounts of the fundamental ontological principle (*benti*) of the cosmos, rationalist philosophers may be divided into two broad schools: (1) The monist school, which held that the cosmos originates from a single ultimate principle. Within this monist tradition, two further strands emerged:  • The *Li* (‘Principle’) School, which identified *li* as the foundational, generative principle of the cosmos; its foremost representative was Zhu Xi (1130–1200).  • The *Qi* (‘Vital Breath’ or ‘Material Force’) School, which posited *qi* as the primary cosmogonic substance; its principal exponent was Zhang Zai (1020–1077), also known by his literary name Zhang Hengqu. (2) The dualist school, represented by Cheng Yi (1033–1107), styled Cheng Yichuan, who treated *li* and *qi* as two co-constitutive, irreducible principles of cosmic existence. I shall now expound these positions in turn: (1) Monist rationalism: Zhu Xi’s system was synthesised from Zhou Dunyi’s (1017–1073) monistic *Taiji* (‘Supreme Ultimate’) theory and Cheng Yi’s own *li–qi* dualism. Zhou Dunyi maintained the principle of *‘one reality, myriad manifestations’* (*yi shi wan fen*). He regarded the *Taiji* as the singular, undivided source of all things, from which the myriad phenomena of the cosmos emanate. Thus, the substance (*ti*) of all things—Heaven, Earth, and the ten thousand things—is itself a manifestation or differentiation of the *Taiji*. Though the *Taiji* is infinite in scope, the things derived from it are likewise infinite in number; their phenomenal diversity arises solely from the dynamic interplay and transformation of *yin* and *yang* *qi*. Yet, ultimately, all phenomena remain inseparable from the *Taiji* as integral, undivided manifestations—what Zhang Zai termed *‘one root, myriad branches’* (*yi ben wan shu*). From this, it becomes clear why Zhu Xi asserted: *‘The Supreme Ultimate is none other than the principle (*li*) inherent in Heaven and Earth and all things; thus, in reference to Heaven and Earth, the *Taiji* resides within them; and in reference to the myriad things, each possesses the *Taiji* within itself.’* This doctrine closely parallels the philosophical position known as *panentheism* (‘all-in-God’)—though it must be distinguished from *pantheism* (*‘all-is-God’*). Indeed, Zhu Xi’s formulation anticipates Cheng Yi’s famous dictum *‘the one principle (*li*) manifests itself in myriad forms (*fen*)’* (*li yi fen shu*). It follows, therefore, that the rationalist school’s doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi*) is fundamentally distinct from the theological doctrine of *‘all things are divine’* (*omnium esse divinum*), as understood in medieval Scholastic theology. The latter affirms that humanity was created *in the image and likeness of God* (*ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*), yet neither the essence (*essentia*) of human beings nor that of other creatures constitutes the divine essence itself, nor does it proceed as a literal ‘part’ or ‘emanation’ thereof; rather, each creature possesses its own distinct, created substance (*substantia propria*). The principal distinction between human beings and other non-rational creatures lies precisely in the fact that humans alone were made *in the divine image*, endowed with rational intellect (*intellectus*) and free will (*voluntas*), thereby rendering them more closely analogous to the Divine. It is precisely on account of this heightened resemblance to God that human beings are called to employ their rational faculty to apprehend the divine. [Archival references] AHU_CU_Índia, Cx. 14, D. {{PAGE:6}} [Page 33] [Main Text] IV. The ‘Mind-Oriented’ School The philosophical doctrines of the two Confucian scholars Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) stand in direct opposition to those of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Whereas Zhu Xi posited *li* (principle, or cosmic-ethical order) as transcendent and objective—requiring investigation of external things (*gewu*) to apprehend it—Lu and Wang identified *xin* (the mind–heart) itself with *li*. Consequently, *xin* becomes the sovereign principle of the cosmos, the root of the unity of knowledge and action (*zhi-xing heyi*), and the ultimate locus wherein all things are enfolded. Hence, it is held that, by preserving this ‘mind–heart’ in its original purity and spontaneity, ‘all things are complete within me’. This position draws, on the one hand, upon Mencius’s (c. 372–c. 289 BCE) introspective psychological claim—‘When one turns inward and attains sincerity, all things are complete within me’ (*Mencius* 7A.4)—and, on the other, upon the cosmological anthropology of Dong Zhongshu (c. 179–c. 104 BCE) of the Western Han dynasty, who described the human being as a ‘microcosm’ (*xiao yu zhou*). These strands coalesced into the Lu–Wang school’s celebrated doctrine: ‘The universe *is* my mind; my mind *is* the universe’. Its adherents are thus designated ‘Mind-Oriented’ (*xin xue*) philosophers. From a strictly rational standpoint, however, this doctrine cannot be logically sustained. For if ‘my mind’ *is* the universe, and the universe *is* ‘my mind’, then a fundamental ontological question arises: How does ‘my mind’ itself come into being? Is the universe *created by* my mind? Or does the universe pre-exist my mind? If the universe precedes my mind, then is my mind itself a product of the universe? Conversely, if my mind precedes the universe, what was the state of the universe *before* my mind existed? Moreover, if the universe is generated by my mind, how can the two coexist simultaneously? If the universe *is* my mind, the proposition reduces to ‘I think, therefore the universe exists’—a radical idealism that mirrors, yet predates, Descartes’s *cogito*. By the same logic, were I not to think, then neither ‘I’ nor the universe would exist—a conclusion that is patently untenable. Such reasoning, in fact, demonstrates that *I*—as the thinking subject—must precede ‘my mind’ as an object of reflection; and further, that ‘my mind’, as the conscious agent, must precede the universe as its purported ground. Yet if ‘my mind’ is ontologically prior to the universe, then it cannot *be* the universe; rather, ‘my mind’ and the universe must be ontologically distinct—two separate entities. The foregoing constitutes my personal scholarly assessment of the principal Confucian schools throughout Chinese intellectual history. I have addressed this issue because the doctrine of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tian ren he yi*) has long occupied a central place in the Chinese intellectual tradition—particularly in antiquity, when it served as the cornerstone of philosophical inquiry and the ultimate horizon of ethical and existential self-understanding. Accordingly, pre-modern thinkers devoted themselves to its rigorous examination, and competing schools engaged in sustained, often polemical, debate on its meaning and implications. It follows that pre-modern scholars possessed a deeper and more nuanced grasp of this question than many of their modern counterparts, who—absorbed by material concerns and oriented towards pragmatic, empirical realities—have tended to neglect or misunderstand its philosophical significance. It is in this spirit—not without a sense of scholarly humility, nor unmindful of the limitations of my own perspective—that I offer these preliminary reflections for critical discussion and collective scholarly deliberation. [Margin Notes] No marginal annotations visible. [Stamps] No visible stamps or seals. [Signatures] No visible signature. [Archival References] No archival reference numbers or provenance markings visible. {{PAGE:7}} [Page 39] [Main Text] The ultimate standard for human moral action is the divine will of God: that which conforms to this standard is good; that which contravenes it is evil. The Confucian concept of *liangzhi* (‘innate moral knowledge’) and *liangneng* (‘innate moral capacity’)—to put it another way—is none other than a faculty bestowed upon humanity by God, whereby the divine will is made known to us. Thus, any human action consonant with *liangzhi* and *liangneng* is good; conversely, any action at variance with them is evil. In this respect, the moral standard held by Confucianism and that of Roman Catholicism are, in substance, identical. Put differently, with regard to the doctrine of the unity of Heaven (Tian) and humanity (ren)—that is, the ethical conception of *tianren heyi*—Confucianism and Roman Catholicism are in full accord. II. Points of Convergence and Divergence With regard to the doctrine of *tianren heyi*, Confucianism and Roman Catholicism share not only common ground in ethics, but also certain points of partial agreement, as well as terms that are nominally identical yet semantically distinct. These are here collectively categorised as ‘points of convergence and divergence’. (1) *Humanity as a microcosm*: Confucian thinkers refer to the human person as a *xiaoyu* (‘microcosm’); Roman Catholic theology does not reject this designation *per se*. However, the Han-dynasty Confucians’ use of the term *xiaoyu* situates humanity between Heaven and Earth, thereby establishing a correlative, analogical relationship—grounded in the *yin–yang* cosmology of the ‘School of Yin–Yang’ (*Yinyang jia*)—that is fundamentally metaphorical and based on sympathetic resonance (*ganying*), rather than ontological identity. By contrast, the Catholic understanding of ‘man as microcosm’ rests upon a scientific (i.e., philosophically rigorous and empirically informed) foundation: the human person incorporates, in integrated fashion, all the perfections found throughout the cosmos. Moreover, on the supernatural plane, humanity is not merely a natural microcosm, but also a *supernatural* microcosm: through the grace (*gratia*) of God, human beings are capacitated to participate in the divine life (*divina vita*), that is, to live *deiformly* (*deiformiter*). Thus, although the term *xiaoyu* (‘microcosm’) is shared, its underlying meaning differs fundamentally between the two traditions. (2) *Heaven ‘humanised’*: The Song-dynasty Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai (Chang Heng-ch’ü, 1020–1077) metaphorically described Heaven and Earth as ‘parents’ (*tian di zhi fu mu*), human beings as their ‘children’ (*zi nu*), and interpersonal relations among humans as those of ‘fellow siblings’ (*tong bao xiong di*). Roman Catholicism likewise employs analogous familial language: God is addressed as ‘Heavenly Father’ (*Pater caelestis*), human beings as ‘children of God’ (*filii Dei*), and Jesus Christ as our ‘Elder Brother’ (*frater maior*), while believers are styled His ‘younger brothers’ (*fratres minores*). Yet Catholic usage of ‘Heavenly Father’, ‘Elder Brother’, ‘children’, and ‘brothers’ is strictly metaphorical (*per modum similitudinis*), not literal (*per modum realitatis*). This must be carefully distinguished from the Confucian notion of ‘parent’, which—though also figurative in its cosmological application—carries distinct philosophical and ritual connotations rooted in *qin qin* (‘kinship reverence’) and *xiao* (‘filial piety’), and thus operates within a different conceptual and soteriological framework. [Margin Notes] (Centre, left margin) (Centre, right margin) [Seals] (Wax seal bearing heraldic arms) (Top right corner) [Signatures] [UNREADABLE] [Archival References] (AHU_CU_Índia, Box 14, Doc.) {{PAGE:8}} [Page 41] [Main Text] One school grounds its metaphysics in the material *qì* (vital breath/energy), while another grounds it in the spiritual *xīn* (mind–heart). Yet if these two are in fact aspects of a single, unified reality, why should any ‘union’ between them even be necessary? (2) Cosmic dualism: The Confucian ‘principle–vital-energy’ (*lǐ–qì*) school of cosmology posits that the universe originates from two co-primal and co-eternal sources—*lǐ* (principle, pattern, or moral order) and *qì* (vital substance or energy). This doctrine is fundamentally incompatible with the Catholic doctrine of *unicity of the true God* (*unus verus Deus*), for how could a human person enter into unity with two entirely distinct and ontologically opposed divine principles? The foregoing points constitute the most significant points of divergence—and partial convergence—between Confucian and Catholic conceptions of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tiān–rén hé yī*). They are set forth here expressly for scholarly comparison. The principal aim of this essay is to demonstrate, through a comparative analysis of the Confucian and Catholic understandings of ‘Heaven–human unity’, that the Chinese people in antiquity were, in fact, monotheistic—affirming a single, transcendent, sovereign deity. Subsequent generations, however, failed to discern this truth. Owing to conceptual conflation across schools of thought, and to the metaphysical obscurantism introduced by Buddhist and Daoist doctrines, the original monotheistic consciousness of the Chinese people gradually devolved into polytheistic and animistic belief systems. Most gravely, during the May Fourth Movement, atheistic and communist ideologies exploited this intellectual vacuum; through their sophistical and erroneous doctrines, they succeeded in sowing widespread religious scepticism among the populace. Leading intellectuals and self-proclaimed ‘progressive’ figures, in turn, rallied en masse to these positions—echoing them uncritically and amplifying their influence. Consequently, China’s millennia-old monotheistic tradition was, almost imperceptibly, eroded by the prevailing intellectual currents. In its wake followed a profound collapse of ethical and moral consensus—engendering widespread social anxiety, especially among the young, who found themselves disoriented and bereft of moral bearings. This vacuum, in turn, afforded communism an unprecedented opportunity to dominate the intellectual and spiritual life of the nation, precipitating the moral and social disintegration of the entire polity. Compounding this crisis, the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan enabled the Chinese Communist Party to consolidate power. Far-sighted observers viewed this development with deep foreboding; the tide of ideological decay proved difficult to stem, and the national predicament grew increasingly dire. Fortunately, timely assistance from the United States—a friendly ally—secured ultimate victory. Today, those who have taken refuge on the offshore islands remain divided: some continue in a state of moral lethargy and political apathy, while the livelihood of the people grows ever more precarious and ethical decline accelerates—a matter truly lamentable. To remedy this condition, restore social cohesion, revive national integrity, and pursue the just aims of resisting communism and Soviet hegemony, recovering the mainland, and renewing China, the foremost necessity is to awaken the people: to re-emphasise moral cultivation, enact ethical practice in daily life, and accord due respect to religious faith—so that, in the minds of the people, [Conclusion] [Marginal Annotations] [None visible] [Seals / Stamps] [None visible] [Signatures] [None visible] [Archival References] [None visible] {{PAGE:9}} [Page 1] *Hengyi Series, No. 5*: A Comparative Study of Catholicism and the Confucian Family © Copyright Reserved. Reproduction Prohibited without Permission Author: Zhao Bingshi Imprimatur Granted by: Bishop Joseph Cai Wenxing, Apostolic Administrator of the Apostolic Administration of Taichung Publisher: Kuangchi Press Distributor: Kuangchi Press Printer: Chung-hua Kuang-hua Xavier Press Price: NT$2.50 [Archival Reference] Registration Certificate with the Ministry of the Interior (Republic of China): Nei-Jing-Tai-Ye No. 08 [Seals] [Illegible] [Signatures] *Imprimi potest* J. Onate, S.J. Vicar Apostolic for Missions in China {{PAGE:10}} **[Page 75]** • 75 • **[Main Text]** By synthesising Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*), one discerns that he employed the principle of ‘correspondence between Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren ganying*) as his sole methodological framework for resolving questions concerning both ethics and political philosophy. Regarding his ethical outlook, Dong conceived of the human being as a microcosm—standing alongside Heaven and Earth as one of the ‘Three Powers’ (*san cai*)—and thus seemingly capable of existing independently of Heaven. Yet, in his political theory, humanity is wholly subject to Heaven: the sovereign acts as Heaven’s vicar, wielding absolute authority over all human affairs. This apparent contradiction—where humanity is simultaneously autonomous and wholly subordinate—was arguably one that even Dong Zhongshu himself could not fully reconcile. His formulation of ‘Heaven–human unification’, therefore, was neither authentically Confucian nor properly aligned with the cosmological doctrines of the Yin–Yang School (*Yinyang jia*); rather, it constituted a rhetorical and strategic appropriation of ‘Heaven–human correspondence’, designed primarily to curry favour with the ruling monarch and thereby consolidate Dong’s own political influence and institutional authority. **IV. The Attenuation of the Confucian ‘Heaven–Human Unification’ Concept in the Tang Dynasty** Following the Han dynasty, the dominant currents of Chinese philosophical thought gravitated either towards Daoism or Buddhism, while Confucianism occupied a distinctly subordinate position. Although the eminent Tang-dynasty literary figures Han Yu and Li Ao staunchly upheld Confucian orthodoxy—vigorously opposing Buddhist doctrines and explicitly claiming intellectual descent from the sage-kings Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, the Duke of Zhou, Confucius, and Mencius—their efforts lacked a rigorous philosophical foundation and were unsupported by sustained political patronage. Consequently, their impact upon contemporary society and intellectual life was comparatively limited; their principal historical significance lies in laying the groundwork for Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism (*Daoxue*), or, more precisely, in serving as precursors to the four major Neo-Confucian schools—the Lian (associated with Zhou Dunyi), Luo (associated with Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao), Guan (associated with Zhang Zai), and Min (associated with Zhu Xi). With regard to the concept of ‘Heaven–human unification’, however, their treatment was perfunctory and philosophically underdeveloped—meriting little scholarly attention. As for the two other eminent Tang literati, Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi, although they identified as Confucians, their political thought leaned decisively towards Legalist (*Fajia*) principles, while their cosmology drew directly upon the naturalistic materialism of Wang Chong (c. 27–c. 100 CE). Consequently, their conception of the divine was markedly attenuated: they regarded ‘Heaven’ (*tian*) not as a sentient, moral agent but as an impersonal, natural order—devoid of intentional reward or punishment. Moreover, they maintained that human agency could, and indeed must, triumph over natural constraints; they held that human affairs—whether in terms of survival, decline, success, or failure—bore no causal relationship to Heaven whatsoever. In this way, they effectively negated the very premise of ‘Heaven–human unification’. This line of thought found considerable resonance among Tang-dynasty literati-officials and, imperceptibly yet significantly, anticipated the materialist strand later discernible within Song Neo-Confucian discourse. {{PAGE:11}} [Page 21] [Main Text] The scholarly influence of these two traditions upon later generations also diverged significantly. The Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) school derives from Cheng Yi (Ch’eng I, styled *Yichuan*), while the Wang Yangming (Wang Yang-ming) school traces its lineage to Cheng Hao (Ch’eng Hao, styled *Mingdao*). To the present day, the intellectual frameworks of these two schools continue to shape ethical consciousness and social thought in China. Below, I provide a concise exposition of their respective doctrines of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*): I. Cheng Hao’s (Mingdao’s) Doctrine of the Unification of Heaven and Humanity Cheng Hao posited *qi* (‘vital force’ or ‘material force’; rendered in Neo-Confucian cosmology as *Qianyuan*, the ‘Primordial Qian’) as the fundamental substance of the cosmos. This *qi* differentiates into *yin* and *yang*, whose dynamic interaction and mutual resonance give rise to the myriad things. Hence he wrote: ‘The supreme virtue of Heaven and Earth is *sheng* (“generation” or “life-giving activity”); Heaven and Earth, in their profound and inseparable *yinyun* (a term denoting the dense, interpenetrating fusion of *yin* and *yang*), bring forth the myriad things through transformation and generation. These two vital forces—*yin* and *yang*—are mutually opposed yet intrinsically interdependent, and cannot exist in isolation.’ However, owing to variations in the balance and orientation (*pian* ‘partiality’ versus *zheng* ‘rectitude’) within this interaction, differentiated phenomena arise: the ‘partial’ manifestations include mountains, rivers, plants, trees, birds, and beasts; the ‘rectified’ manifestation is humanity. Thus, human beings—like mountains, rivers, plants, trees, birds, and beasts—originate from the same *Qianyuan qi*. Since humanity arises from *qi*, human nature (*xing*) *is* *qi*; Cheng Hao therefore asserted: ‘*Sheng* (life-generation) constitutes nature; nature *is* *qi*; *qi* *is* nature.’ As *qi* itself is morally neutral—neither inherently good nor evil—human nature, considered absolutely, is likewise devoid of intrinsic moral quality. Yet, relative to human conduct, distinctions between good and evil arise from the application of *li* (‘principle’, ‘pattern’, or ‘coherent order’), which possesses objective standards of right and wrong, straightness and crookedness. It is against this standard that human actions are assessed, yielding judgments of excess (*guo*) or deficiency (*buji*); such excess and deficiency constitute evil (*e*). Conversely, ‘good’ (*shan*) denotes conduct consonant with the principle of the *zhongdao* (‘Middle Way’ or ‘Way of Equilibrium’). Nevertheless, the sage (*shengren*) is not absolutely good, nor is the evildoer (*xiaoren*) absolutely evil. Cheng Hao likened moral potentiality in human nature to the clarity or turbidity of flowing water: just as turbid water may be clarified through deliberate purification, so too may human moral character be transformed from evil to good—yet this transformation depends upon disciplined moral cultivation in action. He termed this external cultivation *yi yi fang wai* (‘righteousness rectifies the external’). Moreover, Cheng Hao observed that human nature is readily swayed by external stimuli and objects of desire, thereby inducing instability and moral vacillation. Accordingly, one must undertake the inward work of *dingxing* (‘stabilising the nature’)—suppressing selfish impulses (*siyu*)—in order to attain the state of *kuoran dagong* (‘vast, impartial equanimity’), wherein one responds spontaneously and fittingly (*wu lai shun ying*) to all phenomena. This state constitutes, for Cheng Hao, the realised condition of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’. II. Cheng Yi’s (Yichuan’s) Doctrine of the Unification of Heaven and Humanity Cheng Yi held that the cosmos arises from two co-constitutive principles: *li* (‘principle’, ‘coherent pattern’, or ‘transcendent order’) and *qi* (‘vital force’, ‘material energy’). *Qi* constitutes the phenomenal, concrete aspect—the outward, tangible substance—of all things; *li*, by contrast, constitutes their inner, intelligible structure—the normative, formative principle that organises and informs *qi*. *Qi* belongs to the realm of *xing* (‘form’ or ‘material manifestation’), [Marginal Annotations] [None visible] [Seals] [None visible] [Signatures] [None visible] [Archival References] [None visible] {{PAGE:12}} [Page 22] [Main Text] That which is below (the phenomenal realm) is grounded in that which is above (the metaphysical realm): *qi* (vital breath or material force) constitutes the particular principle, whereas *li* (principle or rational pattern) constitutes the universal principle. All things arise from the dynamic interaction of *yin* and *yang*, yet *yin* and *yang* themselves are manifestations of *qi*. The process by which the myriad things come into being follows an inherent order—this order itself *is* *li*. Though *li* and *qi* mutually condition and sustain one another, they are inseparable in reality. *Li*, as manifested in human beings, is termed *xing* (human nature); *qi*, as manifested in human beings, is termed *cai* (endowment or native capacity). Since human nature (*xing*) originates in *li*, and *li* is inherently good, human nature is likewise good. *Qi*, however, varies in purity—some being clear (*qing*), others turbid (*zhuo*)—and thus native capacity (*cai*) may manifest as either good or evil. To eliminate evil tendencies, one must undertake moral cultivation (*xiuyang*). The path of cultivation rests upon the triad of *sincerity* (*cheng*), *reverence* (*jing*), and *extension of knowledge* (*zhizhi*). *Sincerity* and *reverence* denote inward concentration and moral focus, thereby preventing the intrusion of perverse thoughts; *extension of knowledge* refers to the investigation of things (*gewu*) and the exhaustive study of *li*, which constitutes the method for attaining *cheng* and *jing*. Cheng Yi (1033–1107) considered this latter pursuit especially crucial; he therefore maintained that ‘to know is difficult, whereas to act is not difficult’. Once genuine understanding (*zhi*) is attained, right action (*xing*) necessarily follows; failure to act upon knowledge indicates that one’s understanding remains incomplete. Hence, *zhizhi*—the rigorous pursuit of knowledge grounded in moral principle—is the most essential task. Cheng Yi held that *li*, *xing*, *dao* (the Way), *tian* (Heaven), and *xin* (mind–heart) are not distinct ontological entities but rather different aspects of a single, unified reality. He thus declared: ‘Each thing possesses its own *li*, yet all *li* emanate from a single origin.’ He identified the inherently good aspect of human nature (*xing*) as *dao*; the spontaneous, natural expression of *xing* as *tian*; the *li* endowed in human beings as *xin*; and affirmed that *xin* shares the same essential nature as *tian* and *di* (Earth)—that is, as the cosmos itself. Furthermore, he maintained that *xin*, *xing*, *li*, *dao*, and *tian* are ultimately identical: though designated by different terms, they constitute a single, undivided reality (*benyi*). Thus, to fully realise the mind–heart (*jin xin*) is to achieve unity of Heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi*); to embody impartiality (*gong*) and selflessness (*wuwo*) is to realise universal solidarity (*datong*)—whereby, though one may be but a single, frail individual situated within the vast cosmos, one is, in essence, indistinguishable from Heaven and Earth. Hence Cheng Yi stated: ‘The benevolent person regards Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as a single, unified body—none of it lies outside the self.’ This constitutes Cheng Yi’s doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity. Here, I deliberately juxtapose Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Shouren (1472–1529, known as Wang Yangming) as two pre-eminent Neo-Confucian thinkers, not only because their respective schools exerted profound and lasting influence upon later Confucian thought, but also because their teachings significantly shaped Chinese social ethics and moral psychology. Zhu Xi stands as the synthesiser and culminating figure of Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism and may thus be regarded as the representative exponent of the Song Neo-Confucian tradition. Subsequent Confucian scholars, broadly speaking, aligned themselves either with the Zhu Xi school (*Zhuxi xuepai*) or with the Wang Yangming school (*Yangming xuepai*). Those who praised Zhu Xi’s teachings were often contrasted with adherents of the *xinxue* (Mind–Heart School), of which Wang Yangming was the definitive synthesiser and most influential exponent—that is, the representative figure of the Ming-dynasty idealist (or Mind–Heart) tradition. Wang Yangming was… [Signatures] [None visible] [Seals] [None visible] [Margin Annotations] [None visible] [Archival References] [None visible] {{PAGE:13}} · 23 · I. Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity Zhu Xi (1130–1200) placed central emphasis on the concept of *li* (principle, or cosmic pattern). On the one hand, he adopted Zhou Dunyi’s (1017–1073) ‘Taiji monism’ (‘Supreme Ultimate monism’), identifying *li* with the Taiji itself; thus, *li* constitutes the ultimate, generative source (*benyuan*) of the entire cosmos and all phenomena therein. This source is atemporal, non-spatial, and transcendent—beyond all empirical determination. On the other hand, Zhu Xi inherited Cheng Yi’s (1033–1107) ‘dual-source theory of *li* and *qi*’ (*li-qi er yuan lun*), substituting *li* and *qi* for Zhou Dunyi’s earlier cosmological pair of *yin* and *yang*. According to Zhu Xi, the *li* in this *li-qi* dyad functions as the first, initiating impetus (*yuan dong li*) for all phenomena; the *qi* (vital force, or material energy), by contrast, serves as the instrument (*gongju*) through which the Taiji actualises and constitutes the myriad things of the universe. Thus, the *li* of ‘Taiji monism’ denotes the *essence* (*ben ti*) of the Taiji—its metaphysical ground—whereas the *li* of ‘*li-qi* dualism’ refers to the *operation* (*yong*, or functional activity) of the Taiji. As Zhu Xi himself states: ‘Within Heaven and Earth there exists *li* and *qi*: *li* is the metaphysical *Dao* (Way), the formless, transcendent principle that constitutes the ontological substance (*shengwu zhi ti*) of all things; *qi*, by contrast, is the concrete, material *qi* (‘instrument’ or ‘vessel’), the form-immanent agency (*shengwu zhi gongju*) through which all things are generated.’ Yet *li* and *qi* are never separable in the ontological constitution (*ben ti*) of the myriad phenomena; consequently, Zhu Xi further observes: ‘The Taiji…’ [The text breaks off at this point.] The intellectual rivalry between Zhu Xi’s school and the Wang Yangming (1472–1529) school was intense and mutually antagonistic: Zhu’s followers rigorously criticised Wang’s teachings, while Wang’s adherents, in turn, mounted vigorous counter-arguments against Zhu’s system. This opposition crystallised into the two dominant schools of Neo-Confucian thought (*lixue*) in late imperial China. In the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), thinkers such as Sun Qifeng (1584–1675), Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), Li Yu (1611–1680), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) variously advocated reconciliation (*zhonghe*), rejected Ming-dynasty interpretations in favour of Song-dynasty orthodoxy (*chu Ming zun Song*), or pursued other refinements. Although their positions diverged in detail, none ultimately transcended the conceptual framework established by Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. For the purpose of concluding the millennium-long scholarly debate within Confucianism concerning the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’, we therefore treat these two thinkers together in a single analytical section. Chronologically, Zhu Xi belonged to the Southern Song (1127–1279) ‘Min school’ (*Min pai*) of rationalist Neo-Confucianism. His most incisive contemporary critic was the idealist philosopher Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193); however, since Lu’s thought constitutes the direct intellectual antecedent (*yuan yuan*) of the Yangming school, and in the interests of analytical economy, we here take Wang Yangming—whose philosophy represents the systematic culmination (*ji da cheng*) of this line—as the representative figure. We now present an exposition of the respective doctrines of ‘the unity of Heaven and humanity’ propounded by these two schools. {{PAGE:14}} [Page 24] The term *li* (principle) alone suffices: the *Taiji* (Supreme Ultimate) is none other than the universal principle (*li*) underlying Heaven and Earth and all things. Speaking of Heaven and Earth, the *Taiji* resides within them; speaking of the myriad things, each possesses its own *Taiji*. Indeed, this principle preceded Heaven and Earth—its existence is logically and metaphysically prior. From this we may deduce the following conclusion: since human beings constitute one of the most distinguished members of the myriad things, they are, *a fortiori*, intrinsically aligned with the *Taiji* and cannot be separated from it. This constitutes Zhu Xi’s metaphysical doctrine of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*). We now turn to Zhu Xi’s ethical conception of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’. Regarding human nature (*xing*), Zhu Xi distinguishes between *benran zhi xing* (the ‘original, inherent nature’) and *qizhi zhi xing* (the ‘nature conditioned by *qi*’, or vital force). The original nature issues forth from *li* and is therefore wholly good; the nature conditioned by *qi*, by contrast, arises from the concrete, material substrate (*qi*) and is thus variegated—some aspects being *qing* (clear, pure) and others *zhuo* (turbid, impure). Purity corresponds to goodness; turbidity to moral deficiency or vice. With regard to the human heart-mind (*xin*), Zhu Xi distinguishes between the *daoxin* (‘Way-heart’, i.e., the morally oriented, principle-grounded aspect of the mind) and the *renxin* (‘human-heart’, i.e., the empirically conditioned, desire-responsive aspect). Though the *daoxin* is inherently good, it is readily obscured by private desires (*siyu*); the *renxin*, meanwhile, is morally indeterminate—capable of either virtue or vice, depending upon how it is directed and cultivated. As the sovereign of the entire person, the heart-mind contains all principles (*li*) and is thus equipped to respond appropriately to all affairs. Yet Zhu Xi identifies the essential substance (*benti*) of the heart-mind with *xing* (nature), which is inherently good; its dynamic manifestations—its affective and volitional responses—he terms *qing* (emotions/affections), which may be either good or bad. It is therefore incumbent upon the moral agent to regulate *qing* through the guiding authority of *xing*. From this framework we understand Zhu Xi’s conception of the sage (*shengren*): on the one hand, the sage is one who aligns *all* inner dispositions and outer actions—without exception—with the original, inherent nature, that is, with the cardinal virtues of *ren* (benevolence), *yi* (righteousness), *li* (ritual propriety), and *zhi* (wisdom), and with the *daoxin*, which issues directly from *li*; on the other hand, all human beings possess *qizhi*-conditioned, morally impure desires (*renyu*), and to attain sagehood, these must be thoroughly subdued and purified. To this end, Zhu Xi prescribes two complementary disciplines: *jujing* (‘maintaining reverence’) and *qiongli* (‘exhaustively investigating principle’). These methods clearly derive from Cheng Yi’s maxim: ‘Cultivation of moral character requires reverence; advancement in virtue depends upon the extension of knowledge’ (*hanyang xu yong jing, jin de zai zhi zhi*). Zhu Xi’s understanding of *jujing*, however, specifically denotes ‘concentrating the mind and remaining unmoved by external enticements or material desires’—precisely echoing Cheng Yi’s notion of *zhi yi wu shi* (‘undivided singularity, with no distraction’). The practice of *jujing* is further subdivided into two modes: *ti cha* (‘introspective self-examination’) and *jingzuo* (‘quiet sitting’). *Ti cha* is a rigorous, self-reflective discipline designed to bring all inner states and outer conduct into conformity with rational principle (*li*). *Jingzuo*, for its part, involves the inward gathering and calming of the mind’s energies, thereby dispelling idle thoughts (*xianlü*); yet it emphatically does *not* entail the cessation of thought as in Buddhist *zazen* (seated meditation). As Zhu Xi observes in the *Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi* (*Zhuzi yulei*): ‘Reverence ought to be cultivated chiefly through stillness (*jing*); yet one must also frequently practise self-examination (*ti cha*) even when not formally engaged in cultivation. With sustained effort, this becomes second nature… Should one find oneself speaking excessively, one must cultivate reticence; should one’s intentions seem vague or diffuse, one must render them precise and meticulous; should one’s bearing appear frivolous or superficial, one must deepen it with gravity and substantiality.’ The foregoing outlines Zhu Xi’s programme for the ethical cultivation of the will. As for *qiongli*, this constitutes the cultivation of the rational faculty (*zhi*). Zhu Xi maintains that knowledge (*zhi*) is attained through the practice of *gewu* (‘investigating things’), for every phenomenon—every ‘thing’ (*wu*)—embodies a specific principle (*li*). Only when one has apprehended the principle inherent in a given matter does one develop genuine motivation (*xingqu*) to act upon it; only then can one act effectively and successfully. Hence, the extension of knowledge (*zhizhi*) is paramount to human life—a point consonant with the Western philosophical dictum ‘ignorance excludes love’ (*ignorantia amoris excludit*), and equivalent in substance to Cheng Yi’s formulation that ‘advancement in virtue depends upon the extension of knowledge’. {{PAGE:15}} [Page 30] [Main Text] Zisi’s theory of the unity of Heaven and humanity—grounded in ethical cultivation—differs fundamentally from the mystical conception of such unity advanced by Han-dynasty Confucian scholars. II. The Mystical School By the Han period, major Confucian thinkers—including Gongsun Hong, Dong Zhongshu, and Ban Gu—emerged successively. Influenced by Huang–Lao Daoist and Yin–Yang cosmological currents, their conception of *Tian* (Heaven) became ambiguous. Consequently, their doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity proved obscure and conceptually incoherent. Dong Zhongshu’s formulation serves here as the representative expression of this mystical interpretation. Dong, building upon earlier Confucian thought, affirmed *Tian* as the generative source of all things in the cosmos. Regarding the unity of Heaven and humanity, he proposed that the human being constitutes a *microcosm* (*xiao tian di*, ‘small Heaven-and-Earth’), standing alongside Heaven and Earth as one of three co-ordinate cosmological principles. Each of these three—Heaven, Earth, and humanity—possesses its own *de* (virtue or normative power) and its own *qi* (vital energy or pneuma). Situated between Heaven above and Earth below, humanity may ‘correspond’ (*ou*) to Heaven above and to Earth below. This notion of correspondence may derive, in part, from Mencius’s statement that ‘above and below, one flows together with Heaven and Earth’ (*Mengzi* 7A:25); yet whereas Mencius’s formulation is principally psychological—resting upon the introspective premise of ‘turning inward and attaining sincerity’ (*fan shen er cheng*)—Dong’s version is distinctly concrete and structural, centring on the doctrine of the ‘correspondence (*ou*) between humanity and Heaven-and-Earth’. In my view, this idea of ‘correspondence’ draws primarily upon two canonical passages: the *Liji* (*Record of Rites*), specifically the *Liyun* (‘The Operation of Ritual’) chapter, which states, ‘Humanity is the virtue (*de*) of Heaven and Earth, and the heart-mind (*xin*) of Heaven and Earth’; and the *Zhongyong* (*Doctrine of the Mean*), with its reference to ‘the nature (*xing*) of Heaven and Earth’. We may therefore conclude that for Dong Zhongshu, the *Tian* in his doctrine of ‘the unity of Heaven and humanity’ is *Tian* conceived in its contrastive, material sense—as the visible, azure vault of heaven (*cangcang zhi tian*), a concrete, corporeal sphere devoid of conscious awareness or volition. How, then, could a seven-chi-tall human being—possessing a rounded skull and square feet, endowed with rational intellect and moral will—ever ‘unify’ (*he yi*) with such a vast, insentient, spherical firmament? Dong himself recognised the impossibility of literal unification; accordingly, he substituted the principle of ‘mutual resonance between Heaven and humanity’ (*tian ren gan ying*), drawing upon the esoteric cosmology of the Yin–Yang school to resolve the conceptual impasse. To sustain his argument, he systematically mapped human anatomy—eyes, ears, limbs, heart, viscera—and psychological states—dispositions, emotions, postures—onto natural phenomena: the four seasons, the Five Phases (*wu xing*), years, months, and calendrical divisions. This idiosyncratic and highly speculative system is wholly materialist in its foundations; even Dong appears to have regarded its correspondences as heuristic rather than ontologically binding—hence its character as forced analogy (*qiang ci fu hui*). His underlying motive, in my assessment, was not metaphysical coherence but political utility: he deployed the doctrine of ‘Heaven–human unity’ as a rhetorical instrument—a ‘foot-in-the-door’ (*qiao men zhuan*)—designed to commend himself to the sovereign, consolidate his official standing, and safeguard his institutional influence. Otherwise, why insist that only the ‘Wang’ (the sovereign, or ‘kingly ruler’) alone possesses the authority to ‘model himself upon Heaven’ (*fa tian*)? [Margin Notes] No marginal annotations visible. [Stamps] No visible archival stamps. [Signatures] No visible signatures. [Archival References] No archival references visible. {{PAGE:16}} [Page 33] [Main Text] IV. The ‘Mind-Oriented’ School The philosophical doctrines of the two Confucian scholars Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) stand in direct opposition to those of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Whereas Zhu Xi identified *li* (principle, or cosmic pattern) as transcendent and objective—grounded in external reality and apprehended through investigation of things (*gewu*), Lu and Wang identified the *xin* (mind–heart) itself as *li*. Consequently, the *xin* was held to be the sovereign principle of the cosmos, the source of the unity of knowledge and action (*zhi-xing heyi*), and the ultimate repository of all things. Thus, it was maintained that if one preserves and fully realises this *xin*, ‘all things are complete within me’. This position draws, on the one hand, from Mencius’s introspective psychological claim—‘When one turns inward and attains sincerity, all things are complete within me’ (*Mencius* 7A.4)—and, on the other, from the Han-dynasty cosmological theory of Dong Zhongshu (c.179–c.104 BCE), who described the human being as a ‘microcosm’ (*xiao yuzhou*). These strands coalesced into the Lu–Wang doctrine that ‘the universe is the mind–heart; the mind–heart is the universe’. Adherents of this ‘mind-oriented learning’ (*xinxue*) thereby elevated subjective consciousness to the status of metaphysical ground. From a rational–philosophical standpoint, however, this doctrine is fundamentally untenable. If the mind–heart *is* the universe, and the universe *is* the mind–heart, then a series of irreconcilable questions arise: How does the mind–heart itself come into being? Is the universe *created* by the mind–heart? If the universe existed prior to the mind–heart, then what was its status before the emergence of the mind–heart? Conversely, if the mind–heart preceded the universe, was the universe, prior to the mind–heart’s existence, a singular, undifferentiated whole? And if the universe is indeed the product of the mind–heart, how can it coexist simultaneously with the mind–heart? If the universe *is* the mind–heart, the doctrine may be reduced to the solipsistic assertion, ‘I think, therefore the universe exists’; conversely, ‘I do not think, therefore I do not exist—and therefore the universe does not exist’. How, then, is this to be explained? Precisely this line of reasoning demonstrates that *I*—the thinking subject—must precede the mind–heart itself; and further, that the mind–heart must precede the universe. Yet if the mind–heart is logically prior, it cannot *be* the universe; rather, the universe and the mind–heart must be ontologically distinct—two separate entities. The above constitutes my personal scholarly assessment of the principal schools of Confucian thought across Chinese intellectual history. I have been prompted to offer these reflections by the enduring significance of the concept of ‘the unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*) within the Chinese intellectual tradition—particularly in pre-modern discourse, where it occupied a central position in philosophical inquiry and served as the ultimate foundation of ethical and existential orientation. For this reason, classical thinkers devoted exhaustive effort to its elucidation, and rival schools engaged in sustained, rigorous debate upon it. Consequently, pre-modern scholars possessed a far deeper and more nuanced understanding of this issue than do contemporary thinkers, whose attention has increasingly turned toward material concerns and immediate pragmatic ends. It is in this spirit—not without a sense of humility, and fully aware of the limitations of my own perspective—that I venture these provisional observations, in the hope of inviting scholarly discussion and critical exchange. [Marginal Annotations] No marginal annotations visible. [Seals] No visible archival seals or stamps. [Signatures] No visible signature or personal rubric. [Archival References] No archival reference numbers or provenance markers visible. {{PAGE:17}} [Page 85] [Main Text] Love is the Lord; it manifests the Holy Spirit. (This is purely an analogy—the reality is not identical.) In the divine order, the Son is the principal agent of initiation, while the Holy Spirit is the principal agent of consummation; likewise, in the human person, the intellect serves as the discerning faculty of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, whereas the will is the faculty that brings actions to completion. From these two points, it follows that the human person is the authentic image of God. III. The Human Person as the *Consubstantial Image* of God In the supernatural order, after creating humanity, God bestowed upon human beings a supernatural life—namely, sanctifying grace—elevating them to a supernatural plane and thereby constituting them as His *consubstantial image* (*imago consubstantialis*). Moreover, He granted them supernatural faculties—the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity—enabling them to exercise these capacities in pursuit of the end He has ordained for them: the beatific vision of His divine essence, participation in His goodness, and sharing in His divine life—a state termed *deification* (*theosis*). Those who live this deified life are designated *saints*. IV. God’s Purpose in Creating Humanity: Communion and Mutual Fulfilment From the divine perspective, God created humanity, first, that He might be glorified, and second, that humanity might partake in His glory. Yet, since God’s glory is absolutely immutable—neither augmented nor diminished by any external cause—He has no need of glory conferred by creatures; even had He not created us, His perfection and beatitude would remain wholly unaffected. It follows, therefore, that God’s primary motive in creation is oriented *ad hominem*: namely, that humanity might attain eternal beatitude and be united with Him in perfect communion. To this end, He specially endowed human nature with an innate, supernatural inclination (*inclinatio*) towards Himself; it is precisely through this disposition that the desire for the vision of God—the *spes visionis Dei*—arises within the human heart. The greater the sincerity and fervour of this hope, the greater the joy and beatitude experienced in the eschatological fulfilment of that vision. Hence, the person who ardently hopes in God may already, in this present life, attain real union with Him. From the human perspective, since God is our ultimate end (*finis ultimus*), we bear a strict moral obligation to attain Him; since He has loved us unconditionally, we are bound in justice and charity to love Him unconditionally in return; and since He has abundantly bestowed upon us the graces necessary for salvation, we have a corresponding duty—grounded in gratitude and stewardship—to employ these gifts faithfully and fruitfully. Thus, we not only may— [Seals] [Top left corner] — (Illegible seal) [Signatures] [Centre right] — (Illegible signature) [Archival references] [Bottom right margin] — AHU_CU_Índia, Cx. 14, D. {{PAGE:18}} [Page 89] [Main Text] The ultimate criterion for the moral conduct of human beings is the divine will of God: that which conforms to this standard is good; that which deviates from it is evil. What Confucianism terms *liangzhi* (innate moral consciousness) and *liangneng* (innate moral capacity) may, in other words, be understood as a faculty bestowed upon humanity by God—through which the divine will is made known. Thus, any human action aligned with *liangzhi* and *liangneng* is morally good; conversely, any action contrary to them is morally evil. In this respect, Confucian ethics and Catholic moral theology are in agreement. Regarding the doctrine of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*), Confucianism and Catholicism share common ground not only in ethics but also in certain other respects—though some concepts bear identical terminology while embodying fundamentally divergent meanings. For analytical clarity, these points are here grouped under the rubric of ‘points of convergence and divergence’. (1) *Humanity as a ‘microcosm’*: Confucian thinkers refer to the human person as a ‘microcosm’ (*xiaoyu*); Catholic theology does not reject this designation *per se*. However, the Han Confucian conception of the ‘microcosm’ situates humanity between Heaven and Earth, establishing a correlative, analogical relationship—rooted in the cosmological framework of the Yin-Yang school—wherein human beings and the cosmos interact through sympathetic resonance (*ganying*). This is a metaphorical and phenomenological, not an ontological, claim. By contrast, the Catholic understanding of the human person as a ‘microcosm’ rests upon a scientific and theological anthropology: the human being, as a composite of body and soul, integrates within itself all the perfections found in creation. Moreover, in the order of grace (*supernatural order*), humanity is not merely a natural microcosm but also a *supernatural* microcosm—since, by virtue of divine grace (*gratia*), human beings are enabled to participate in the divine life (*vita divina*). Thus, although the term ‘microcosm’ is shared, its meaning in the two traditions is radically distinct. (2) *The ‘humanisation of Heaven’*: The Song-dynasty Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai (Chang Heng-ch’ü) metaphorically designates Heaven and Earth as ‘parents’ and human beings as their ‘children’. Within this framework, he refers to Jesus Christ as our ‘Elder Brother’ and to ourselves as His ‘younger brothers’. Superficially, this nomenclature appears to parallel Catholic usage—yet the underlying referents differ substantially. In Confucian discourse, terms such as ‘Heavenly Father’ (*tianfu*), ‘Elder Brother’ (*dage*), and ‘children’ or ‘brothers’ are strictly metaphorical and symbolic, expressing cosmological or ethical relationships rather than ontological realities. In Catholic doctrine, by contrast, the titles ‘God the Father’, ‘Jesus Christ our Elder Brother’, and ‘children of God’ (*filii Dei*) and ‘brothers in Christ’ denote objective, revealed truths grounded in divine revelation and sacramental grace: they signify real, filial and fraternal relationships established through adoption in Christ (*adoptionis filii*), conferred by the Holy Spirit. [Archival Reference] Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), Conselho Ultramarino, Índia, Caixa 14, Documento. {{PAGE:19}} [Page 30] [Main Text] Zisi’s ethical theory of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’ is fundamentally distinct—rather, it is the Han-dynasty Confucian mystical school’s conception of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ that is under discussion here. II. The Mystical School By the Han dynasty, major Confucian scholars—including Gongsun Hong, Dong Zhongshu, and Ban Gu—emerged successively. Influenced by Huang–Lao Daoist thought and the Yin–Yang school, their conception of ‘Heaven’ (Tian) became ambiguous and imprecise; consequently, their doctrine of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ proved obscure and difficult to comprehend. Dong Zhongshu’s formulation may be taken as representative. While building upon earlier Confucian tradition, Dong acknowledged ‘Heaven’ as the ultimate generative principle of the cosmos and all things therein. Regarding ‘Heaven–humanity unity’, he advanced the view that the human being constitutes a ‘microcosm’, standing alongside Heaven and Earth as one of the ‘Three Powers’ (san cai). Each of these three entities possesses its own characteristic virtue (de) and vital qi; humanity, situated between Heaven and Earth, may ‘correspond’ (ou) with Heaven above and with Earth below. This conception of ‘correspondence between humanity and Heaven–Earth’ may well derive from Mencius’s phrase ‘flowing in unison with Heaven and Earth above and below’; yet whereas Mencius’s formulation is predominantly psychological—grounded in the premise of ‘turning inward to attain sincerity’ (fan shen er cheng)—Dong’s is markedly concrete and structural, emphasising a systematic ‘correspondence’ (ou) between human beings and the cosmic order. In my view, Dong’s notion of ‘human–cosmic correspondence’ draws primarily upon the *Liji* (*Record of Rites*), specifically the *Liyun* chapter’s assertion that ‘humanity embodies the virtue and serves as the heart-mind of Heaven and Earth’, or upon the *Zhongyong* (*Doctrine of the Mean*)’s reference to ‘the nature bestowed by Heaven and Earth’ (*tian di zhi xing*). It therefore follows that the ‘Heaven’ to which Dong refers in his doctrine of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ is not the transcendent, moral, or metaphysical Heaven of classical Confucianism, but rather the ‘Heaven’ opposed to Earth—a tangible, azure, corporeal Heaven, devoid of consciousness or volition. How, then, could a seven-chi-tall human being—endowed with a rounded skull and square feet, rational intellect, and moral will—possibly ‘unify’ with such a vast, insentient, spherical Heaven? Dong himself recognised the conceptual impossibility of literal unification; he therefore adopted the principle of ‘mutual resonance between Heaven and humanity’ (*tian ren gan ying*), drawing upon the mystical cosmology of the Yin–Yang school to resolve the difficulty. In order to sustain his argument, he forcibly aligned human anatomy—the five sense organs, the four limbs, the heart, the hundred bones and sinews—as well as psychological states, postures, and emotions, with natural phenomena: the four seasons, the Five Phases (wuxing), years, months, and solar terms. His theory, consequently, is wholly materialist in its foundations; indeed, it is so patently contrived and arbitrary that even Dong himself appears to have lacked genuine conviction in its validity. Its underlying motivation, however, seems clear: to deploy the doctrine of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ as a rhetorical instrument—‘a key to enter the political arena’—designed to flatter the reigning monarch, consolidate ministerial authority, and safeguard political influence. Otherwise, how is one to explain his insistence that only the ‘Sovereign’ (Wang) possesses the capacity to ‘model himself upon Heaven’? [Margin Notes] No marginal annotations visible. [Seals] No visible archival seals. [Signatures] No visible signatures. [Archival References] No archival references visible. {{PAGE:20}} **[Main Title]** *Volume Five of the Hengyi Series*: A Comparative Study of the Catholic Doctrine of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity and Confucian Thought on the Same Theme **[Central Box]** © Copyright Reserved. Reproduction Prohibited without Permission **[Vertical Columns, Right to Left]** Author: Zhao Bingshi Imprimatur Granted by: Msgr. Cai Wenxing, Apostolic Prefect of the Apostolic Prefecture of Taichung Publisher and Distributor: Kuangchi Press, No. 4 Zhongxiao Road, Taichung City Retail Outlets: — Kuangchi Press, No. 4 Zhongxiao Road, Taichung City — Huaming Bookstore, No. 4 Zhongshan North Road, Section I, Taipei City — St Francis Xavier College, 167 Argyle Street, Hong Kong — Catholic Truth Society, Emperor Building, Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong — Kuangchi Philosophical Institute, P.O.B. 1815, Manila, Philippines — Catholic South Seas Mission Promotion Society, No. 31 Victoria Street, Singapore Printer: Zhongtai Printing Press, No. 13 Gongyuan Road, Taichung City Price: NT$2.50 **[Leftmost Vertical Column]** First Edition: August 1957 (Year 46 of the Republic of China) Registration Certificate No. Nei-Jing-Tai-Ye-308, issued by the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China **[Footnote]** *Imprimi potest*: José Onate, S.J., Apostolic Visitor to the Missions in China
fulltext_transcription {{PAGE:1}} **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家 天人合一比較觀 **[Anotações marginais]** 賈景德題 **[Selos]** [No canto inferior direito] (Selo ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** 賈景德題 {{PAGE:2}} **[Texto Principal]** A Comparison of Catholic and Confucian Concepts on Relations between God and Man by Rev. Chao Pin-shih, C.D.D. **[Selos]** [No centro, à direita]: (Selo ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:3}} **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 恆毅叢書之五 趙賓實著 **[Selos]** [No topo, à esquerda]: SEMINARIO DE S. JOSE 院若聖修書圖 BIBLIOTECA [No centro, à esquerda]: (Selo ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:4}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:5}} **[Page 4]** **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 前言 關於「天人合一」問題，古今中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 人之非。關於「天人合一」問題，古今中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 子｜於諸家之中，是「入者主之」問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 說。到了宋儒、孟子之中，對這主之問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 日，這種問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 際談這種問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 解決。但這問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 是孰非，今人是有靈落伍懸因孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 誰對誰錯，我將儒家有靈落伍懸因孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 判若天淵，各派的動物因決佛對問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 若「天人合一」的動物因決佛對問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 人不能多有一些影響大感影響於，國竟各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 令人一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 人一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 行別則繼之之神雖少論及 別則繼之之神雖少論及 則繼之之神雖少論及 繼之之神雖少論及 之之神雖少論及 之神雖少論及 神雖少論及 雖少論及 少論及 論及 及 **[Assinaturas]** 趙賓實 {{PAGE:6}} **[Page 5]** **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 目 錄 前言 蔣序 壹 孔子對於天人合一的態度 一、孔子的天人合一說 二、子思、孟子的天人合一說 三、漢儒的天人合一說 貳 思、孟派的天人合一說 參 漢儒的天人合一說 二、王者成了天意的化身，來統制人群 一、人是個小宇宙 **[Anotações marginais]** (Ilegível) **[Carimbos]** (Ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** (Ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:7}} **[Page 6]** **[Texto Principal]** 肆 肆 伍 唐代儒家天人合一觀念的薄弱 六 宋代的儒家的天人合一說 一、宋代儒家道學的興起與派別 二、濂洛關閩四大學派的天人合一說 三、濂派周敦頤的天人合一說 四、關派張子橫渠的天人合一說 五、洛派程顥程頤二子的天人合一說 六、朱熹同王守仁二大儒家的天人合一說 七、對於歷代儒家各學派的綜合與評價 八、天主教對於天人合一的基本理論 一、天人實際是否能和一 二、天人兩觀念的取意 三、從各個觀點上來看天主教的天人合一 一、朱熹的天人合一說 二、王守仁的天人合一說 **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:8}} **[Page 7]** **[Texto Principal]** 二、人如何與天主合一 玖天主教與儒家天人合一的異同 一、相同之點 二、同異之點 三、相異之點 拾結論 **[Referências arquivísticas]** 三六三八三八三九四〇四一 {{PAGE:9}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:10}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:11}} **[Page 10]** **[Texto Principal]** **說，則未提及。** **孔子在生時，特別警告人不可去諂媚神，因那太自私了，且失了敬神的意義，但對於「天人合一」之** **思、孟子在孔子以後，對這問題的徒弟，甚對於這個問題，他的感興趣，亦很少提及，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **貳 思、孟派的天人合一說** **一、曾子的天人合一說** **在孝經上說：「這個人若能照裁判，要注重實際問題，徒去身際，先不尚玄談，注意這個問題，他的倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **在父母若能彀配之天行化於自己，修實一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **止於至善人，使它的下人，以後** **曾子至善，按着天下人，** **曾子說主張人若能彀配之德止着判要對這** **若：「這若人能照裁但注** **能「這若人能照裁但注** **能彀配之德止着判要對這** **天行化於自己，修實一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **莫大的現善的作，，榜一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **才算達於世，榜一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **達到嚴父目標心滿作惡心** **到人生嚴父是足這標準他的倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **生最後莫使而就準他所說倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **最後莫使而就準他所說倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **的大人不叫，而說「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **目標於都他做「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **標配能求「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **。天孝了新再心，以** **這「」親推己，以** **是。親及人是指身** **曾子在而亦可稱由的本。** **子這孝親可稱由的本。** **所說所的稱由的本。** **說所的稱由的本。** **的說最為近「良心」主張惟對** **天說最為近「良心」主張惟對** **天配後德及良心他有能** **人天目化遠心」張惟對** **合的標，這個親他有能** **一「天」，這個親他有能** **觀。天」就是德及以能** **，是化疏為修** **亦就親的，人** **是能彀最後漸漸若的** **大學配目標的有了君** **所說天標去感一，** **說。就是化正直能** **的因此是他人直齊家** **「此使人的良** **至他** **[Anotações marginais]** **善」。** **在** **孝經** **父母說** **若：** **能** **配之** **天，** **才** **算** **達** **到** **生** **最** **後** **的** **目** **標** **。** **這** **是** **曾** **子** **所** **說** **的** **天** **人** **合** **一** **觀** **。** **，** **亦** **是** **大** **學** **所** **說** **的** **「** **至** **他** **[Carimbos]** **(Nenhum carimbo visível)** **[Assinaturas]** **(Nenhuma assinatura visível)** **[Referências arquivísticas]** **(Nenhuma referência arquivística visível)** {{PAGE:12}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:13}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:14}} **[Page 13]** **[Texto Principal]** 一、人是一個小宇宙 肢有其氣，心臟百骸，生理心理，以及各種的姿態天，心情，都可以偶地，都有一定所象，並與天地間陰陽、五行、四時的變化相符，因此五官，各 從董子春秋繁露人副天數篇裏，我們知道董子把人與天地，彷彿成了列成天地三個單位，並與天地間陰陽、五行、四時的變化相符，因此五官，各 現在我們再研究董子的天人合一說： 用一個「天」字，對於「天」字，更弄的玄了。因此「天」字，使人頭暈腦昏，時言，不能天地確知」，他指的「天氣」究竟是什麼？再加上有後世的註疏家，不顧客觀，只用時主 言「天」是「天威」，偶地的天人統一錯綜腦有亂用，，不能「天」沒有一定標準，「天氣」有時言「天數」，再加上有後世的註疏家，不顧客觀，並用意 數也，形體骨肉，有形的天。」說：「天，與地為對待名詞：在人副天數篇有「天道」，在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 刑物，不得兩起……」又說的原則：「天，也是人之道，王者終而所取法的標準。」在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 物，不得兩起……」又說的原則：「天，也是人之道，王者終而所取法的標準。」在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 主宰之天相同了。是人動作的原則：「天，也是人之道，王者終而所取法的標準。」在王道通三篇五在天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 之元也……故元者，萬物之本，而人之元在焉，安在乎？乃在乎天地之前。故王之篇中說：「天人有三百六十節，偶天之 **[Anotações marginais]** [No topo, à esquerda]: · 13 · **[Carimbos]** [Sem carimbos visíveis] **[Assinaturas]** [Sem assinaturas visíveis] **[Referências arquivísticas]** [Sem referências arquivísticas visíveis] {{PAGE:15}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:16}} **[Page 75]** **[Texto Principal]** 肆 唐代儒家天人合一觀念的薄弱 君這種人又的 子的種又的 綜合董子天人合一之說說 人完全人生合 歡天人合受觀 心，合制而論 使一於天， 他之說天， 的權，，他 位既王把一 更不是者人之 鞏固是代說 就是家行一而 了，，小知 。又有宇他以 不是統宙「天 陰人同人感應」 陽一一天 家切地 的的並 ，全立的原 完全。三則 是這，， 董種彷作他 子矛盾借可解 借着的以決 這種現離人 象天而觀 「天恐獨及 人怕立政 感連。治觀 應董以觀 」子他的惟 之亦的 說不政一 ，能治的法 以自觀門。 取圓而論。 當其說， 時說， 人。 則 以董 人。 士並認他們、濫乏雖本着兩漢以後，中國哲學思潮的主流 大夫人事對於至、洛學的儒漢基本的後，劉四論場，，國 所重視的事於於、關的柳關基本家以使一制而論天，他 的神存的宗元閩理立，他之於論，國 亡觀念劉四論場，中 並得念劉禹學，，國 無失，禹學，，國 形，非錫派又不哲學思 中對常二的無遺學餘 形成了天薄二位奠政餘 了無毫弱文基治力的的 宋無關。豪人力的的 代係們雖他後對流 道，以係們援佛，不 學這天儒對，家不入於道 中末為家於故，入於道 唯一一個但人影以上道，即入於佛 物來，大因合於上承堯、於佛 派，大因合於上承堯、入於佛 的根自他一當時堯、入於佛 遠然們的時社、舜佛 影抹的的觀會舜佛 。殺天政治念會舜佛 了，政治，人舜佛 天根觀馬心禹儒 人本，馬馬甚少，湯僅佔 合一無歸虎少，湯僅佔 一賞於虎，僅開文、武的 的罰法，僅開文、武的 觀的家無僅開文、武的 念意，所足了武、地位 。志他們足了宋周公、唐代大文豪韓 這；們道儒道學的孔、孟自居愈李 種他們的。 思想們宇宙學的先河 ，以觀 在人力，上承王充。更好說是 當時定承王充。更好說是 頗能王充。更好說是 為勝天，故是缺 一般，，故是缺 **[Anotações marginais]** None **[Carimbos]** None **[Assinaturas]** None **[Referências arquivísticas]** None {{PAGE:17}} **[Page 16]** **[Texto Principal]** 伍 一、宋代儒家道學的興起與派別 道術道路 道主及關在世的農工商到了 法，及，故挽當的進工政，代，日， 提救思潮，中國 倡在 四子曾故能回派當的農工到了 子子能生風張蔚儒展商業宋 書、產士以時大進商 一，思新為橫然，。業代 二、因此、頴宗渠興乘政府日，代， 濂、孟的旨為起機府日，代， 洛、於的思想。主的設立應趨又又 關、天理，們他派了付展得 閩，人性這雖們中許社，了 ，合一哲種受皆，多會因大 四的的，思想道繼濂、院心形一統 大學觀故不家承、，的成，漢 派閩、無記響家舜關開需許民的 的的的當薰禹閩講，盛能揚眉 亦以一大社，湯四和著成市吐氣 大學會但、大學派的許又於異族 四子人基文述了、又風官活族之 子及心、的、武，文多因 為中且思想周公這。立字之 宗。庸成想公這。 二篇中國儒、孔大學校的。 ，以家曾的仍，發明當 和後，、的仍，時的 「孟學不思中心不造會 子的他孟人物滿紙經 「論語」又佛己派，人發，漸 」因家任以於直走上復 並他的，周是接興 列們分並敦一促成學 而稱特析以頤些衛的 別方衛為衛 **[Anotações marginais]** 二、濂、洛、關、閩，四大學派的天人合一說 **[Carimbos]** (Selo ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** (Ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:18}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:19}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:20}} - 19 - **[Texto Principal]** 四、關派張子橫渠的天人合一說 張子橫渠在西銘篇裏比天地好似父母，而人成了天地的子女，所以人的體質是天地賦的，人的理性亦是 理上的神體在上與天地切同，周子天人合一以物說孔子作義證說正萬說：一道德道行，教化順正無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 能當屬於陰陽同，仁育相又萬以孔以義說正萬說：一道德道行，教化順正無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 當上以天地切陰同，是純配以善，周子能的其是天地人，聖人其德人有高厚而仁物中月而無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 屬於陰陽同，全相以善也，能的其是天地人，聖人其德人有高厚而仁物中月而無窮，聖德實與天地參而四時同，大順大化，其惟孔子乎！這莫是知周子然就倫謂 理，人，但萬以聖而誠因是與有，又太而仁與止濁是周子體已明，德修，能與的物有合正有貞，固能，廊與鬼神的了不見天地其吉廣之。又，因，故聖謂 行，或陽氣做認為無聲再無臭是一個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 其，但五氣兩儀為無聲再無臭是一個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 神，人本萬物的以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 體，全為萬物，以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 在，是諸物，以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 上，純諸物，以太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 與，善也，是太極之靈理後再由因着的個道化外本元素變合宇宙，此又的再參雜創造者上陰陽及佛家宇宙的思想，於是產生了他的太極圖說及通書二書。 天，切，所，周，能，是，與，有，又，而，仁，周，聖，能，與，的，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 地，陰，配，聖，子，的，其，與，性，太，是，有，這，具，極，彼，此，又，的，再，參，雜，創，造，者，上，陰，陽，及，佛，家，宇，宙，的，思，想，，於，是，產，生，了，他，的，太，極，圖，說，及，通，書，二，書。 切，同，以，而，誠，其，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 陰，，周，善，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 同，是，配，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 周，純，所，周，能，是，與，性，太，是，有，這，具，極，彼，此，又，的，再，參，雜，創，造，者，上，陰，陽，及，佛，家，宇，宙，的，思，想，，於，是，產，生，了，他，的，太，極，圖，說，及，通，書，二，書。 子，諸，相，子，的，其，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 敦，萬，以，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 頤，物，善，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，萬，配，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，全，以，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，人，善，而，誠，因，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，但，也，是，與，有，又，太，而，仁，與，止，濁，是，周，子，體，已，明，德，修，，能，與，的，物，有，合，正，有，貞，固，能，廊，與，鬼，神，的，了，不，見，天，地，其，吉，廣，之，。又，因，故，聖，謂 ，萬，物，的，以，太，之，靈，理，後，再，由，因，着，的，個，道，化，外，本，元，素，變，合，宇，宙，，彼，此，又，的，再，參，雜，創，造，者，上，陰，陽，及，佛，家，宇，宙，的，思，想，，於，是，產，生，了，他，的，太，極，圖，說，及，通，書，二，書。 **[Anotações marginais]** 無 {{PAGE:21}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:22}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: 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fulltext_translation {{PAGE:1}} **[Main Text]** Catholicism and Confucianism: A Comparative Study of the Concept of ‘Unity between Heaven and Humanity’ **[Marginal Annotations]** Submitted by Jia Jingde **[Seals]** [Bottom right corner] (Illegible seal) **[Signatures]** Submitted by Jia Jingde {{PAGE:2}} **[Main Text]** A Comparative Study of Catholic and Confucian Conceptions of the Relationship between the Divine and Humanity by the Reverend Chao Pin-shih, C.D.D. **[Seals]** [Centrally positioned, right-aligned]: (Illegible seal) **[Archival References]** (Illegible) {{PAGE:3}} **[Main Title]** A Comparative Study of Catholic Doctrine and the Confucian Concept of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity *Hengyi Series*, No. 5 By Zhao Bingshi **[Seals]** [Top left]: St Joseph’s Seminary *Yuan Ruosheng Shu Tu* (‘Institute of Sacred Scripture and Bibliographic Studies’) Library [Centre left]: (Illegible seal) **[Archival References]** (Illegible) {{PAGE:4}} **[Page 4]** **[Main Text]** A Comparative Study of *Tianzhu Jiao* (Catholicism) and the Confucian Concept of *Tian–Ren Heyi* (*Unity of Heaven and Humanity*) **Preface** The concept of *tian–ren heyi* (*unity of Heaven and humanity*) has long been the subject of diverse interpretations—across historical periods, cultural traditions, and philosophical schools—generating extensive, often conflicting, scholarly debate without achieving consensus. Participants in this discourse frequently affirm their own positions while vigorously contesting those of others. Among the various schools of thought, the central question concerns *who or what constitutes the ‘agent’ (or ‘subject’)* within this unity: is it the human being who actively participates in and realises the unity, or is the human being subordinated—rendered passive or even servile—in relation to Heaven (*Tian*)? This question was already central to the Confucian tradition, notably in the thought of Mencius (Mengzi), who affirmed the inherent moral agency and self-cultivating capacity of the human person in relation to *Tian*. Yet even in later Neo-Confucian thought of the Song dynasty, the issue remained unresolved—recurring persistently across centuries without definitive resolution. Contemporary scholars, too, continue to grapple with the question: *Who is right, and who is wrong?* In order to clarify this fundamental issue, we shall first outline the principal Confucian understanding of *tian–ren heyi*, with particular attention to Mencius’s articulation of moral agency and innate virtue (*ben xing*). We shall then examine how divergent interpretations—especially those that risk reducing the human subject to a merely passive or instrumental role—have arisen, and assess their philosophical coherence and historical development. It is essential to stress that the concept of *tian–ren heyi* has exerted profound influence—not only upon ethical and metaphysical thought in East Asia, but also upon political theory, education, and religious practice. Its implications for anthropology, cosmology, and soteriology remain deeply consequential. To render the discussion accessible and methodologically rigorous, we shall first provide a concise, historically grounded exposition of the Confucian position. Thereafter, we shall turn to the Catholic theological understanding of the relationship between the Creator (*Deus*, ‘the Lord of Heaven’—a term historically adopted in Chinese Catholic discourse) and the human person—a relationship grounded in creation *ex nihilo*, divine grace, and the Incarnation. While Catholic theology does not employ the phrase *tian–ren heyi*, it engages, in its own doctrinal terms, with analogous questions concerning divine–human communion, participation (*koinōnia*), and the deification (*theosis*) of the human person through grace—concepts which, though rooted in the Greek patristic and Latin scholastic traditions, invite careful comparative analysis. **[Signatures]** Zhao Binshi {{PAGE:5}} [Page 32] III. The Rationalist School Song-dynasty rationalist philosophers placed considerable emphasis on questions concerning the origin of the cosmos and the doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi*). Yet they rarely employed the term *tian* (‘Heaven’) to denote a sovereign, personal cosmic ruler. Instead, they typically understood *tian* as the visible, azure vault of heaven—the material, corporeal sky—and even interpreted the term *tian* as it appears in classical texts in this same concrete, phenomenal sense. In their accounts of the fundamental ontological principle (*benti*) of the cosmos, rationalist philosophers may be divided into two broad schools: (1) The monist school, which held that the cosmos originates from a single ultimate principle. Within this monist tradition, two further strands emerged:  • The *Li* (‘Principle’) School, which identified *li* as the foundational, generative principle of the cosmos; its foremost representative was Zhu Xi (1130–1200).  • The *Qi* (‘Vital Breath’ or ‘Material Force’) School, which posited *qi* as the primary cosmogonic substance; its principal exponent was Zhang Zai (1020–1077), also known by his literary name Zhang Hengqu. (2) The dualist school, represented by Cheng Yi (1033–1107), styled Cheng Yichuan, who treated *li* and *qi* as two co-constitutive, irreducible principles of cosmic existence. I shall now expound these positions in turn: (1) Monist rationalism: Zhu Xi’s system was synthesised from Zhou Dunyi’s (1017–1073) monistic *Taiji* (‘Supreme Ultimate’) theory and Cheng Yi’s own *li–qi* dualism. Zhou Dunyi maintained the principle of *‘one reality, myriad manifestations’* (*yi shi wan fen*). He regarded the *Taiji* as the singular, undivided source of all things, from which the myriad phenomena of the cosmos emanate. Thus, the substance (*ti*) of all things—Heaven, Earth, and the ten thousand things—is itself a manifestation or differentiation of the *Taiji*. Though the *Taiji* is infinite in scope, the things derived from it are likewise infinite in number; their phenomenal diversity arises solely from the dynamic interplay and transformation of *yin* and *yang* *qi*. Yet, ultimately, all phenomena remain inseparable from the *Taiji* as integral, undivided manifestations—what Zhang Zai termed *‘one root, myriad branches’* (*yi ben wan shu*). From this, it becomes clear why Zhu Xi asserted: *‘The Supreme Ultimate is none other than the principle (*li*) inherent in Heaven and Earth and all things; thus, in reference to Heaven and Earth, the *Taiji* resides within them; and in reference to the myriad things, each possesses the *Taiji* within itself.’* This doctrine closely parallels the philosophical position known as *panentheism* (‘all-in-God’)—though it must be distinguished from *pantheism* (*‘all-is-God’*). Indeed, Zhu Xi’s formulation anticipates Cheng Yi’s famous dictum *‘the one principle (*li*) manifests itself in myriad forms (*fen*)’* (*li yi fen shu*). It follows, therefore, that the rationalist school’s doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi*) is fundamentally distinct from the theological doctrine of *‘all things are divine’* (*omnium esse divinum*), as understood in medieval Scholastic theology. The latter affirms that humanity was created *in the image and likeness of God* (*ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*), yet neither the essence (*essentia*) of human beings nor that of other creatures constitutes the divine essence itself, nor does it proceed as a literal ‘part’ or ‘emanation’ thereof; rather, each creature possesses its own distinct, created substance (*substantia propria*). The principal distinction between human beings and other non-rational creatures lies precisely in the fact that humans alone were made *in the divine image*, endowed with rational intellect (*intellectus*) and free will (*voluntas*), thereby rendering them more closely analogous to the Divine. It is precisely on account of this heightened resemblance to God that human beings are called to employ their rational faculty to apprehend the divine. [Archival references] AHU_CU_Índia, Cx. 14, D. {{PAGE:6}} [Page 33] [Main Text] IV. The ‘Mind-Oriented’ School The philosophical doctrines of the two Confucian scholars Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) stand in direct opposition to those of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Whereas Zhu Xi posited *li* (principle, or cosmic-ethical order) as transcendent and objective—requiring investigation of external things (*gewu*) to apprehend it—Lu and Wang identified *xin* (the mind–heart) itself with *li*. Consequently, *xin* becomes the sovereign principle of the cosmos, the root of the unity of knowledge and action (*zhi-xing heyi*), and the ultimate locus wherein all things are enfolded. Hence, it is held that, by preserving this ‘mind–heart’ in its original purity and spontaneity, ‘all things are complete within me’. This position draws, on the one hand, upon Mencius’s (c. 372–c. 289 BCE) introspective psychological claim—‘When one turns inward and attains sincerity, all things are complete within me’ (*Mencius* 7A.4)—and, on the other, upon the cosmological anthropology of Dong Zhongshu (c. 179–c. 104 BCE) of the Western Han dynasty, who described the human being as a ‘microcosm’ (*xiao yu zhou*). These strands coalesced into the Lu–Wang school’s celebrated doctrine: ‘The universe *is* my mind; my mind *is* the universe’. Its adherents are thus designated ‘Mind-Oriented’ (*xin xue*) philosophers. From a strictly rational standpoint, however, this doctrine cannot be logically sustained. For if ‘my mind’ *is* the universe, and the universe *is* ‘my mind’, then a fundamental ontological question arises: How does ‘my mind’ itself come into being? Is the universe *created by* my mind? Or does the universe pre-exist my mind? If the universe precedes my mind, then is my mind itself a product of the universe? Conversely, if my mind precedes the universe, what was the state of the universe *before* my mind existed? Moreover, if the universe is generated by my mind, how can the two coexist simultaneously? If the universe *is* my mind, the proposition reduces to ‘I think, therefore the universe exists’—a radical idealism that mirrors, yet predates, Descartes’s *cogito*. By the same logic, were I not to think, then neither ‘I’ nor the universe would exist—a conclusion that is patently untenable. Such reasoning, in fact, demonstrates that *I*—as the thinking subject—must precede ‘my mind’ as an object of reflection; and further, that ‘my mind’, as the conscious agent, must precede the universe as its purported ground. Yet if ‘my mind’ is ontologically prior to the universe, then it cannot *be* the universe; rather, ‘my mind’ and the universe must be ontologically distinct—two separate entities. The foregoing constitutes my personal scholarly assessment of the principal Confucian schools throughout Chinese intellectual history. I have addressed this issue because the doctrine of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tian ren he yi*) has long occupied a central place in the Chinese intellectual tradition—particularly in antiquity, when it served as the cornerstone of philosophical inquiry and the ultimate horizon of ethical and existential self-understanding. Accordingly, pre-modern thinkers devoted themselves to its rigorous examination, and competing schools engaged in sustained, often polemical, debate on its meaning and implications. It follows that pre-modern scholars possessed a deeper and more nuanced grasp of this question than many of their modern counterparts, who—absorbed by material concerns and oriented towards pragmatic, empirical realities—have tended to neglect or misunderstand its philosophical significance. It is in this spirit—not without a sense of scholarly humility, nor unmindful of the limitations of my own perspective—that I offer these preliminary reflections for critical discussion and collective scholarly deliberation. [Margin Notes] No marginal annotations visible. [Stamps] No visible stamps or seals. [Signatures] No visible signature. [Archival References] No archival reference numbers or provenance markings visible. {{PAGE:7}} [Page 39] [Main Text] The ultimate standard for human moral action is the divine will of God: that which conforms to this standard is good; that which contravenes it is evil. The Confucian concept of *liangzhi* (‘innate moral knowledge’) and *liangneng* (‘innate moral capacity’)—to put it another way—is none other than a faculty bestowed upon humanity by God, whereby the divine will is made known to us. Thus, any human action consonant with *liangzhi* and *liangneng* is good; conversely, any action at variance with them is evil. In this respect, the moral standard held by Confucianism and that of Roman Catholicism are, in substance, identical. Put differently, with regard to the doctrine of the unity of Heaven (Tian) and humanity (ren)—that is, the ethical conception of *tianren heyi*—Confucianism and Roman Catholicism are in full accord. II. Points of Convergence and Divergence With regard to the doctrine of *tianren heyi*, Confucianism and Roman Catholicism share not only common ground in ethics, but also certain points of partial agreement, as well as terms that are nominally identical yet semantically distinct. These are here collectively categorised as ‘points of convergence and divergence’. (1) *Humanity as a microcosm*: Confucian thinkers refer to the human person as a *xiaoyu* (‘microcosm’); Roman Catholic theology does not reject this designation *per se*. However, the Han-dynasty Confucians’ use of the term *xiaoyu* situates humanity between Heaven and Earth, thereby establishing a correlative, analogical relationship—grounded in the *yin–yang* cosmology of the ‘School of Yin–Yang’ (*Yinyang jia*)—that is fundamentally metaphorical and based on sympathetic resonance (*ganying*), rather than ontological identity. By contrast, the Catholic understanding of ‘man as microcosm’ rests upon a scientific (i.e., philosophically rigorous and empirically informed) foundation: the human person incorporates, in integrated fashion, all the perfections found throughout the cosmos. Moreover, on the supernatural plane, humanity is not merely a natural microcosm, but also a *supernatural* microcosm: through the grace (*gratia*) of God, human beings are capacitated to participate in the divine life (*divina vita*), that is, to live *deiformly* (*deiformiter*). Thus, although the term *xiaoyu* (‘microcosm’) is shared, its underlying meaning differs fundamentally between the two traditions. (2) *Heaven ‘humanised’*: The Song-dynasty Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai (Chang Heng-ch’ü, 1020–1077) metaphorically described Heaven and Earth as ‘parents’ (*tian di zhi fu mu*), human beings as their ‘children’ (*zi nu*), and interpersonal relations among humans as those of ‘fellow siblings’ (*tong bao xiong di*). Roman Catholicism likewise employs analogous familial language: God is addressed as ‘Heavenly Father’ (*Pater caelestis*), human beings as ‘children of God’ (*filii Dei*), and Jesus Christ as our ‘Elder Brother’ (*frater maior*), while believers are styled His ‘younger brothers’ (*fratres minores*). Yet Catholic usage of ‘Heavenly Father’, ‘Elder Brother’, ‘children’, and ‘brothers’ is strictly metaphorical (*per modum similitudinis*), not literal (*per modum realitatis*). This must be carefully distinguished from the Confucian notion of ‘parent’, which—though also figurative in its cosmological application—carries distinct philosophical and ritual connotations rooted in *qin qin* (‘kinship reverence’) and *xiao* (‘filial piety’), and thus operates within a different conceptual and soteriological framework. [Margin Notes] (Centre, left margin) (Centre, right margin) [Seals] (Wax seal bearing heraldic arms) (Top right corner) [Signatures] [UNREADABLE] [Archival References] (AHU_CU_Índia, Box 14, Doc.) {{PAGE:8}} [Page 41] [Main Text] One school grounds its metaphysics in the material *qì* (vital breath/energy), while another grounds it in the spiritual *xīn* (mind–heart). Yet if these two are in fact aspects of a single, unified reality, why should any ‘union’ between them even be necessary? (2) Cosmic dualism: The Confucian ‘principle–vital-energy’ (*lǐ–qì*) school of cosmology posits that the universe originates from two co-primal and co-eternal sources—*lǐ* (principle, pattern, or moral order) and *qì* (vital substance or energy). This doctrine is fundamentally incompatible with the Catholic doctrine of *unicity of the true God* (*unus verus Deus*), for how could a human person enter into unity with two entirely distinct and ontologically opposed divine principles? The foregoing points constitute the most significant points of divergence—and partial convergence—between Confucian and Catholic conceptions of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tiān–rén hé yī*). They are set forth here expressly for scholarly comparison. The principal aim of this essay is to demonstrate, through a comparative analysis of the Confucian and Catholic understandings of ‘Heaven–human unity’, that the Chinese people in antiquity were, in fact, monotheistic—affirming a single, transcendent, sovereign deity. Subsequent generations, however, failed to discern this truth. Owing to conceptual conflation across schools of thought, and to the metaphysical obscurantism introduced by Buddhist and Daoist doctrines, the original monotheistic consciousness of the Chinese people gradually devolved into polytheistic and animistic belief systems. Most gravely, during the May Fourth Movement, atheistic and communist ideologies exploited this intellectual vacuum; through their sophistical and erroneous doctrines, they succeeded in sowing widespread religious scepticism among the populace. Leading intellectuals and self-proclaimed ‘progressive’ figures, in turn, rallied en masse to these positions—echoing them uncritically and amplifying their influence. Consequently, China’s millennia-old monotheistic tradition was, almost imperceptibly, eroded by the prevailing intellectual currents. In its wake followed a profound collapse of ethical and moral consensus—engendering widespread social anxiety, especially among the young, who found themselves disoriented and bereft of moral bearings. This vacuum, in turn, afforded communism an unprecedented opportunity to dominate the intellectual and spiritual life of the nation, precipitating the moral and social disintegration of the entire polity. Compounding this crisis, the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan enabled the Chinese Communist Party to consolidate power. Far-sighted observers viewed this development with deep foreboding; the tide of ideological decay proved difficult to stem, and the national predicament grew increasingly dire. Fortunately, timely assistance from the United States—a friendly ally—secured ultimate victory. Today, those who have taken refuge on the offshore islands remain divided: some continue in a state of moral lethargy and political apathy, while the livelihood of the people grows ever more precarious and ethical decline accelerates—a matter truly lamentable. To remedy this condition, restore social cohesion, revive national integrity, and pursue the just aims of resisting communism and Soviet hegemony, recovering the mainland, and renewing China, the foremost necessity is to awaken the people: to re-emphasise moral cultivation, enact ethical practice in daily life, and accord due respect to religious faith—so that, in the minds of the people, [Conclusion] [Marginal Annotations] [None visible] [Seals / Stamps] [None visible] [Signatures] [None visible] [Archival References] [None visible] {{PAGE:9}} [Page 1] *Hengyi Series, No. 5*: A Comparative Study of Catholicism and the Confucian Family © Copyright Reserved. Reproduction Prohibited without Permission Author: Zhao Bingshi Imprimatur Granted by: Bishop Joseph Cai Wenxing, Apostolic Administrator of the Apostolic Administration of Taichung Publisher: Kuangchi Press Distributor: Kuangchi Press Printer: Chung-hua Kuang-hua Xavier Press Price: NT$2.50 [Archival Reference] Registration Certificate with the Ministry of the Interior (Republic of China): Nei-Jing-Tai-Ye No. 08 [Seals] [Illegible] [Signatures] *Imprimi potest* J. Onate, S.J. Vicar Apostolic for Missions in China {{PAGE:10}} **[Page 75]** • 75 • **[Main Text]** By synthesising Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*), one discerns that he employed the principle of ‘correspondence between Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren ganying*) as his sole methodological framework for resolving questions concerning both ethics and political philosophy. Regarding his ethical outlook, Dong conceived of the human being as a microcosm—standing alongside Heaven and Earth as one of the ‘Three Powers’ (*san cai*)—and thus seemingly capable of existing independently of Heaven. Yet, in his political theory, humanity is wholly subject to Heaven: the sovereign acts as Heaven’s vicar, wielding absolute authority over all human affairs. This apparent contradiction—where humanity is simultaneously autonomous and wholly subordinate—was arguably one that even Dong Zhongshu himself could not fully reconcile. His formulation of ‘Heaven–human unification’, therefore, was neither authentically Confucian nor properly aligned with the cosmological doctrines of the Yin–Yang School (*Yinyang jia*); rather, it constituted a rhetorical and strategic appropriation of ‘Heaven–human correspondence’, designed primarily to curry favour with the ruling monarch and thereby consolidate Dong’s own political influence and institutional authority. **IV. The Attenuation of the Confucian ‘Heaven–Human Unification’ Concept in the Tang Dynasty** Following the Han dynasty, the dominant currents of Chinese philosophical thought gravitated either towards Daoism or Buddhism, while Confucianism occupied a distinctly subordinate position. Although the eminent Tang-dynasty literary figures Han Yu and Li Ao staunchly upheld Confucian orthodoxy—vigorously opposing Buddhist doctrines and explicitly claiming intellectual descent from the sage-kings Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, the Duke of Zhou, Confucius, and Mencius—their efforts lacked a rigorous philosophical foundation and were unsupported by sustained political patronage. Consequently, their impact upon contemporary society and intellectual life was comparatively limited; their principal historical significance lies in laying the groundwork for Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism (*Daoxue*), or, more precisely, in serving as precursors to the four major Neo-Confucian schools—the Lian (associated with Zhou Dunyi), Luo (associated with Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao), Guan (associated with Zhang Zai), and Min (associated with Zhu Xi). With regard to the concept of ‘Heaven–human unification’, however, their treatment was perfunctory and philosophically underdeveloped—meriting little scholarly attention. As for the two other eminent Tang literati, Liu Zongyuan and Liu Yuxi, although they identified as Confucians, their political thought leaned decisively towards Legalist (*Fajia*) principles, while their cosmology drew directly upon the naturalistic materialism of Wang Chong (c. 27–c. 100 CE). Consequently, their conception of the divine was markedly attenuated: they regarded ‘Heaven’ (*tian*) not as a sentient, moral agent but as an impersonal, natural order—devoid of intentional reward or punishment. Moreover, they maintained that human agency could, and indeed must, triumph over natural constraints; they held that human affairs—whether in terms of survival, decline, success, or failure—bore no causal relationship to Heaven whatsoever. In this way, they effectively negated the very premise of ‘Heaven–human unification’. This line of thought found considerable resonance among Tang-dynasty literati-officials and, imperceptibly yet significantly, anticipated the materialist strand later discernible within Song Neo-Confucian discourse. {{PAGE:11}} [Page 21] [Main Text] The scholarly influence of these two traditions upon later generations also diverged significantly. The Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) school derives from Cheng Yi (Ch’eng I, styled *Yichuan*), while the Wang Yangming (Wang Yang-ming) school traces its lineage to Cheng Hao (Ch’eng Hao, styled *Mingdao*). To the present day, the intellectual frameworks of these two schools continue to shape ethical consciousness and social thought in China. Below, I provide a concise exposition of their respective doctrines of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*): I. Cheng Hao’s (Mingdao’s) Doctrine of the Unification of Heaven and Humanity Cheng Hao posited *qi* (‘vital force’ or ‘material force’; rendered in Neo-Confucian cosmology as *Qianyuan*, the ‘Primordial Qian’) as the fundamental substance of the cosmos. This *qi* differentiates into *yin* and *yang*, whose dynamic interaction and mutual resonance give rise to the myriad things. Hence he wrote: ‘The supreme virtue of Heaven and Earth is *sheng* (“generation” or “life-giving activity”); Heaven and Earth, in their profound and inseparable *yinyun* (a term denoting the dense, interpenetrating fusion of *yin* and *yang*), bring forth the myriad things through transformation and generation. These two vital forces—*yin* and *yang*—are mutually opposed yet intrinsically interdependent, and cannot exist in isolation.’ However, owing to variations in the balance and orientation (*pian* ‘partiality’ versus *zheng* ‘rectitude’) within this interaction, differentiated phenomena arise: the ‘partial’ manifestations include mountains, rivers, plants, trees, birds, and beasts; the ‘rectified’ manifestation is humanity. Thus, human beings—like mountains, rivers, plants, trees, birds, and beasts—originate from the same *Qianyuan qi*. Since humanity arises from *qi*, human nature (*xing*) *is* *qi*; Cheng Hao therefore asserted: ‘*Sheng* (life-generation) constitutes nature; nature *is* *qi*; *qi* *is* nature.’ As *qi* itself is morally neutral—neither inherently good nor evil—human nature, considered absolutely, is likewise devoid of intrinsic moral quality. Yet, relative to human conduct, distinctions between good and evil arise from the application of *li* (‘principle’, ‘pattern’, or ‘coherent order’), which possesses objective standards of right and wrong, straightness and crookedness. It is against this standard that human actions are assessed, yielding judgments of excess (*guo*) or deficiency (*buji*); such excess and deficiency constitute evil (*e*). Conversely, ‘good’ (*shan*) denotes conduct consonant with the principle of the *zhongdao* (‘Middle Way’ or ‘Way of Equilibrium’). Nevertheless, the sage (*shengren*) is not absolutely good, nor is the evildoer (*xiaoren*) absolutely evil. Cheng Hao likened moral potentiality in human nature to the clarity or turbidity of flowing water: just as turbid water may be clarified through deliberate purification, so too may human moral character be transformed from evil to good—yet this transformation depends upon disciplined moral cultivation in action. He termed this external cultivation *yi yi fang wai* (‘righteousness rectifies the external’). Moreover, Cheng Hao observed that human nature is readily swayed by external stimuli and objects of desire, thereby inducing instability and moral vacillation. Accordingly, one must undertake the inward work of *dingxing* (‘stabilising the nature’)—suppressing selfish impulses (*siyu*)—in order to attain the state of *kuoran dagong* (‘vast, impartial equanimity’), wherein one responds spontaneously and fittingly (*wu lai shun ying*) to all phenomena. This state constitutes, for Cheng Hao, the realised condition of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’. II. Cheng Yi’s (Yichuan’s) Doctrine of the Unification of Heaven and Humanity Cheng Yi held that the cosmos arises from two co-constitutive principles: *li* (‘principle’, ‘coherent pattern’, or ‘transcendent order’) and *qi* (‘vital force’, ‘material energy’). *Qi* constitutes the phenomenal, concrete aspect—the outward, tangible substance—of all things; *li*, by contrast, constitutes their inner, intelligible structure—the normative, formative principle that organises and informs *qi*. *Qi* belongs to the realm of *xing* (‘form’ or ‘material manifestation’), [Marginal Annotations] [None visible] [Seals] [None visible] [Signatures] [None visible] [Archival References] [None visible] {{PAGE:12}} [Page 22] [Main Text] That which is below (the phenomenal realm) is grounded in that which is above (the metaphysical realm): *qi* (vital breath or material force) constitutes the particular principle, whereas *li* (principle or rational pattern) constitutes the universal principle. All things arise from the dynamic interaction of *yin* and *yang*, yet *yin* and *yang* themselves are manifestations of *qi*. The process by which the myriad things come into being follows an inherent order—this order itself *is* *li*. Though *li* and *qi* mutually condition and sustain one another, they are inseparable in reality. *Li*, as manifested in human beings, is termed *xing* (human nature); *qi*, as manifested in human beings, is termed *cai* (endowment or native capacity). Since human nature (*xing*) originates in *li*, and *li* is inherently good, human nature is likewise good. *Qi*, however, varies in purity—some being clear (*qing*), others turbid (*zhuo*)—and thus native capacity (*cai*) may manifest as either good or evil. To eliminate evil tendencies, one must undertake moral cultivation (*xiuyang*). The path of cultivation rests upon the triad of *sincerity* (*cheng*), *reverence* (*jing*), and *extension of knowledge* (*zhizhi*). *Sincerity* and *reverence* denote inward concentration and moral focus, thereby preventing the intrusion of perverse thoughts; *extension of knowledge* refers to the investigation of things (*gewu*) and the exhaustive study of *li*, which constitutes the method for attaining *cheng* and *jing*. Cheng Yi (1033–1107) considered this latter pursuit especially crucial; he therefore maintained that ‘to know is difficult, whereas to act is not difficult’. Once genuine understanding (*zhi*) is attained, right action (*xing*) necessarily follows; failure to act upon knowledge indicates that one’s understanding remains incomplete. Hence, *zhizhi*—the rigorous pursuit of knowledge grounded in moral principle—is the most essential task. Cheng Yi held that *li*, *xing*, *dao* (the Way), *tian* (Heaven), and *xin* (mind–heart) are not distinct ontological entities but rather different aspects of a single, unified reality. He thus declared: ‘Each thing possesses its own *li*, yet all *li* emanate from a single origin.’ He identified the inherently good aspect of human nature (*xing*) as *dao*; the spontaneous, natural expression of *xing* as *tian*; the *li* endowed in human beings as *xin*; and affirmed that *xin* shares the same essential nature as *tian* and *di* (Earth)—that is, as the cosmos itself. Furthermore, he maintained that *xin*, *xing*, *li*, *dao*, and *tian* are ultimately identical: though designated by different terms, they constitute a single, undivided reality (*benyi*). Thus, to fully realise the mind–heart (*jin xin*) is to achieve unity of Heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi*); to embody impartiality (*gong*) and selflessness (*wuwo*) is to realise universal solidarity (*datong*)—whereby, though one may be but a single, frail individual situated within the vast cosmos, one is, in essence, indistinguishable from Heaven and Earth. Hence Cheng Yi stated: ‘The benevolent person regards Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as a single, unified body—none of it lies outside the self.’ This constitutes Cheng Yi’s doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity. Here, I deliberately juxtapose Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Shouren (1472–1529, known as Wang Yangming) as two pre-eminent Neo-Confucian thinkers, not only because their respective schools exerted profound and lasting influence upon later Confucian thought, but also because their teachings significantly shaped Chinese social ethics and moral psychology. Zhu Xi stands as the synthesiser and culminating figure of Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism and may thus be regarded as the representative exponent of the Song Neo-Confucian tradition. Subsequent Confucian scholars, broadly speaking, aligned themselves either with the Zhu Xi school (*Zhuxi xuepai*) or with the Wang Yangming school (*Yangming xuepai*). Those who praised Zhu Xi’s teachings were often contrasted with adherents of the *xinxue* (Mind–Heart School), of which Wang Yangming was the definitive synthesiser and most influential exponent—that is, the representative figure of the Ming-dynasty idealist (or Mind–Heart) tradition. Wang Yangming was… [Signatures] [None visible] [Seals] [None visible] [Margin Annotations] [None visible] [Archival References] [None visible] {{PAGE:13}} · 23 · I. Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity Zhu Xi (1130–1200) placed central emphasis on the concept of *li* (principle, or cosmic pattern). On the one hand, he adopted Zhou Dunyi’s (1017–1073) ‘Taiji monism’ (‘Supreme Ultimate monism’), identifying *li* with the Taiji itself; thus, *li* constitutes the ultimate, generative source (*benyuan*) of the entire cosmos and all phenomena therein. This source is atemporal, non-spatial, and transcendent—beyond all empirical determination. On the other hand, Zhu Xi inherited Cheng Yi’s (1033–1107) ‘dual-source theory of *li* and *qi*’ (*li-qi er yuan lun*), substituting *li* and *qi* for Zhou Dunyi’s earlier cosmological pair of *yin* and *yang*. According to Zhu Xi, the *li* in this *li-qi* dyad functions as the first, initiating impetus (*yuan dong li*) for all phenomena; the *qi* (vital force, or material energy), by contrast, serves as the instrument (*gongju*) through which the Taiji actualises and constitutes the myriad things of the universe. Thus, the *li* of ‘Taiji monism’ denotes the *essence* (*ben ti*) of the Taiji—its metaphysical ground—whereas the *li* of ‘*li-qi* dualism’ refers to the *operation* (*yong*, or functional activity) of the Taiji. As Zhu Xi himself states: ‘Within Heaven and Earth there exists *li* and *qi*: *li* is the metaphysical *Dao* (Way), the formless, transcendent principle that constitutes the ontological substance (*shengwu zhi ti*) of all things; *qi*, by contrast, is the concrete, material *qi* (‘instrument’ or ‘vessel’), the form-immanent agency (*shengwu zhi gongju*) through which all things are generated.’ Yet *li* and *qi* are never separable in the ontological constitution (*ben ti*) of the myriad phenomena; consequently, Zhu Xi further observes: ‘The Taiji…’ [The text breaks off at this point.] The intellectual rivalry between Zhu Xi’s school and the Wang Yangming (1472–1529) school was intense and mutually antagonistic: Zhu’s followers rigorously criticised Wang’s teachings, while Wang’s adherents, in turn, mounted vigorous counter-arguments against Zhu’s system. This opposition crystallised into the two dominant schools of Neo-Confucian thought (*lixue*) in late imperial China. In the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), thinkers such as Sun Qifeng (1584–1675), Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), Li Yu (1611–1680), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) variously advocated reconciliation (*zhonghe*), rejected Ming-dynasty interpretations in favour of Song-dynasty orthodoxy (*chu Ming zun Song*), or pursued other refinements. Although their positions diverged in detail, none ultimately transcended the conceptual framework established by Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. For the purpose of concluding the millennium-long scholarly debate within Confucianism concerning the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’, we therefore treat these two thinkers together in a single analytical section. Chronologically, Zhu Xi belonged to the Southern Song (1127–1279) ‘Min school’ (*Min pai*) of rationalist Neo-Confucianism. His most incisive contemporary critic was the idealist philosopher Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193); however, since Lu’s thought constitutes the direct intellectual antecedent (*yuan yuan*) of the Yangming school, and in the interests of analytical economy, we here take Wang Yangming—whose philosophy represents the systematic culmination (*ji da cheng*) of this line—as the representative figure. We now present an exposition of the respective doctrines of ‘the unity of Heaven and humanity’ propounded by these two schools. {{PAGE:14}} [Page 24] The term *li* (principle) alone suffices: the *Taiji* (Supreme Ultimate) is none other than the universal principle (*li*) underlying Heaven and Earth and all things. Speaking of Heaven and Earth, the *Taiji* resides within them; speaking of the myriad things, each possesses its own *Taiji*. Indeed, this principle preceded Heaven and Earth—its existence is logically and metaphysically prior. From this we may deduce the following conclusion: since human beings constitute one of the most distinguished members of the myriad things, they are, *a fortiori*, intrinsically aligned with the *Taiji* and cannot be separated from it. This constitutes Zhu Xi’s metaphysical doctrine of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*). We now turn to Zhu Xi’s ethical conception of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’. Regarding human nature (*xing*), Zhu Xi distinguishes between *benran zhi xing* (the ‘original, inherent nature’) and *qizhi zhi xing* (the ‘nature conditioned by *qi*’, or vital force). The original nature issues forth from *li* and is therefore wholly good; the nature conditioned by *qi*, by contrast, arises from the concrete, material substrate (*qi*) and is thus variegated—some aspects being *qing* (clear, pure) and others *zhuo* (turbid, impure). Purity corresponds to goodness; turbidity to moral deficiency or vice. With regard to the human heart-mind (*xin*), Zhu Xi distinguishes between the *daoxin* (‘Way-heart’, i.e., the morally oriented, principle-grounded aspect of the mind) and the *renxin* (‘human-heart’, i.e., the empirically conditioned, desire-responsive aspect). Though the *daoxin* is inherently good, it is readily obscured by private desires (*siyu*); the *renxin*, meanwhile, is morally indeterminate—capable of either virtue or vice, depending upon how it is directed and cultivated. As the sovereign of the entire person, the heart-mind contains all principles (*li*) and is thus equipped to respond appropriately to all affairs. Yet Zhu Xi identifies the essential substance (*benti*) of the heart-mind with *xing* (nature), which is inherently good; its dynamic manifestations—its affective and volitional responses—he terms *qing* (emotions/affections), which may be either good or bad. It is therefore incumbent upon the moral agent to regulate *qing* through the guiding authority of *xing*. From this framework we understand Zhu Xi’s conception of the sage (*shengren*): on the one hand, the sage is one who aligns *all* inner dispositions and outer actions—without exception—with the original, inherent nature, that is, with the cardinal virtues of *ren* (benevolence), *yi* (righteousness), *li* (ritual propriety), and *zhi* (wisdom), and with the *daoxin*, which issues directly from *li*; on the other hand, all human beings possess *qizhi*-conditioned, morally impure desires (*renyu*), and to attain sagehood, these must be thoroughly subdued and purified. To this end, Zhu Xi prescribes two complementary disciplines: *jujing* (‘maintaining reverence’) and *qiongli* (‘exhaustively investigating principle’). These methods clearly derive from Cheng Yi’s maxim: ‘Cultivation of moral character requires reverence; advancement in virtue depends upon the extension of knowledge’ (*hanyang xu yong jing, jin de zai zhi zhi*). Zhu Xi’s understanding of *jujing*, however, specifically denotes ‘concentrating the mind and remaining unmoved by external enticements or material desires’—precisely echoing Cheng Yi’s notion of *zhi yi wu shi* (‘undivided singularity, with no distraction’). The practice of *jujing* is further subdivided into two modes: *ti cha* (‘introspective self-examination’) and *jingzuo* (‘quiet sitting’). *Ti cha* is a rigorous, self-reflective discipline designed to bring all inner states and outer conduct into conformity with rational principle (*li*). *Jingzuo*, for its part, involves the inward gathering and calming of the mind’s energies, thereby dispelling idle thoughts (*xianlü*); yet it emphatically does *not* entail the cessation of thought as in Buddhist *zazen* (seated meditation). As Zhu Xi observes in the *Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi* (*Zhuzi yulei*): ‘Reverence ought to be cultivated chiefly through stillness (*jing*); yet one must also frequently practise self-examination (*ti cha*) even when not formally engaged in cultivation. With sustained effort, this becomes second nature… Should one find oneself speaking excessively, one must cultivate reticence; should one’s intentions seem vague or diffuse, one must render them precise and meticulous; should one’s bearing appear frivolous or superficial, one must deepen it with gravity and substantiality.’ The foregoing outlines Zhu Xi’s programme for the ethical cultivation of the will. As for *qiongli*, this constitutes the cultivation of the rational faculty (*zhi*). Zhu Xi maintains that knowledge (*zhi*) is attained through the practice of *gewu* (‘investigating things’), for every phenomenon—every ‘thing’ (*wu*)—embodies a specific principle (*li*). Only when one has apprehended the principle inherent in a given matter does one develop genuine motivation (*xingqu*) to act upon it; only then can one act effectively and successfully. Hence, the extension of knowledge (*zhizhi*) is paramount to human life—a point consonant with the Western philosophical dictum ‘ignorance excludes love’ (*ignorantia amoris excludit*), and equivalent in substance to Cheng Yi’s formulation that ‘advancement in virtue depends upon the extension of knowledge’. {{PAGE:15}} [Page 30] [Main Text] Zisi’s theory of the unity of Heaven and humanity—grounded in ethical cultivation—differs fundamentally from the mystical conception of such unity advanced by Han-dynasty Confucian scholars. II. The Mystical School By the Han period, major Confucian thinkers—including Gongsun Hong, Dong Zhongshu, and Ban Gu—emerged successively. Influenced by Huang–Lao Daoist and Yin–Yang cosmological currents, their conception of *Tian* (Heaven) became ambiguous. Consequently, their doctrine of the unity of Heaven and humanity proved obscure and conceptually incoherent. Dong Zhongshu’s formulation serves here as the representative expression of this mystical interpretation. Dong, building upon earlier Confucian thought, affirmed *Tian* as the generative source of all things in the cosmos. Regarding the unity of Heaven and humanity, he proposed that the human being constitutes a *microcosm* (*xiao tian di*, ‘small Heaven-and-Earth’), standing alongside Heaven and Earth as one of three co-ordinate cosmological principles. Each of these three—Heaven, Earth, and humanity—possesses its own *de* (virtue or normative power) and its own *qi* (vital energy or pneuma). Situated between Heaven above and Earth below, humanity may ‘correspond’ (*ou*) to Heaven above and to Earth below. This notion of correspondence may derive, in part, from Mencius’s statement that ‘above and below, one flows together with Heaven and Earth’ (*Mengzi* 7A:25); yet whereas Mencius’s formulation is principally psychological—resting upon the introspective premise of ‘turning inward and attaining sincerity’ (*fan shen er cheng*)—Dong’s version is distinctly concrete and structural, centring on the doctrine of the ‘correspondence (*ou*) between humanity and Heaven-and-Earth’. In my view, this idea of ‘correspondence’ draws primarily upon two canonical passages: the *Liji* (*Record of Rites*), specifically the *Liyun* (‘The Operation of Ritual’) chapter, which states, ‘Humanity is the virtue (*de*) of Heaven and Earth, and the heart-mind (*xin*) of Heaven and Earth’; and the *Zhongyong* (*Doctrine of the Mean*), with its reference to ‘the nature (*xing*) of Heaven and Earth’. We may therefore conclude that for Dong Zhongshu, the *Tian* in his doctrine of ‘the unity of Heaven and humanity’ is *Tian* conceived in its contrastive, material sense—as the visible, azure vault of heaven (*cangcang zhi tian*), a concrete, corporeal sphere devoid of conscious awareness or volition. How, then, could a seven-chi-tall human being—possessing a rounded skull and square feet, endowed with rational intellect and moral will—ever ‘unify’ (*he yi*) with such a vast, insentient, spherical firmament? Dong himself recognised the impossibility of literal unification; accordingly, he substituted the principle of ‘mutual resonance between Heaven and humanity’ (*tian ren gan ying*), drawing upon the esoteric cosmology of the Yin–Yang school to resolve the conceptual impasse. To sustain his argument, he systematically mapped human anatomy—eyes, ears, limbs, heart, viscera—and psychological states—dispositions, emotions, postures—onto natural phenomena: the four seasons, the Five Phases (*wu xing*), years, months, and calendrical divisions. This idiosyncratic and highly speculative system is wholly materialist in its foundations; even Dong appears to have regarded its correspondences as heuristic rather than ontologically binding—hence its character as forced analogy (*qiang ci fu hui*). His underlying motive, in my assessment, was not metaphysical coherence but political utility: he deployed the doctrine of ‘Heaven–human unity’ as a rhetorical instrument—a ‘foot-in-the-door’ (*qiao men zhuan*)—designed to commend himself to the sovereign, consolidate his official standing, and safeguard his institutional influence. Otherwise, why insist that only the ‘Wang’ (the sovereign, or ‘kingly ruler’) alone possesses the authority to ‘model himself upon Heaven’ (*fa tian*)? [Margin Notes] No marginal annotations visible. [Stamps] No visible archival stamps. [Signatures] No visible signatures. [Archival References] No archival references visible. {{PAGE:16}} [Page 33] [Main Text] IV. The ‘Mind-Oriented’ School The philosophical doctrines of the two Confucian scholars Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) stand in direct opposition to those of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Whereas Zhu Xi identified *li* (principle, or cosmic pattern) as transcendent and objective—grounded in external reality and apprehended through investigation of things (*gewu*), Lu and Wang identified the *xin* (mind–heart) itself as *li*. Consequently, the *xin* was held to be the sovereign principle of the cosmos, the source of the unity of knowledge and action (*zhi-xing heyi*), and the ultimate repository of all things. Thus, it was maintained that if one preserves and fully realises this *xin*, ‘all things are complete within me’. This position draws, on the one hand, from Mencius’s introspective psychological claim—‘When one turns inward and attains sincerity, all things are complete within me’ (*Mencius* 7A.4)—and, on the other, from the Han-dynasty cosmological theory of Dong Zhongshu (c.179–c.104 BCE), who described the human being as a ‘microcosm’ (*xiao yuzhou*). These strands coalesced into the Lu–Wang doctrine that ‘the universe is the mind–heart; the mind–heart is the universe’. Adherents of this ‘mind-oriented learning’ (*xinxue*) thereby elevated subjective consciousness to the status of metaphysical ground. From a rational–philosophical standpoint, however, this doctrine is fundamentally untenable. If the mind–heart *is* the universe, and the universe *is* the mind–heart, then a series of irreconcilable questions arise: How does the mind–heart itself come into being? Is the universe *created* by the mind–heart? If the universe existed prior to the mind–heart, then what was its status before the emergence of the mind–heart? Conversely, if the mind–heart preceded the universe, was the universe, prior to the mind–heart’s existence, a singular, undifferentiated whole? And if the universe is indeed the product of the mind–heart, how can it coexist simultaneously with the mind–heart? If the universe *is* the mind–heart, the doctrine may be reduced to the solipsistic assertion, ‘I think, therefore the universe exists’; conversely, ‘I do not think, therefore I do not exist—and therefore the universe does not exist’. How, then, is this to be explained? Precisely this line of reasoning demonstrates that *I*—the thinking subject—must precede the mind–heart itself; and further, that the mind–heart must precede the universe. Yet if the mind–heart is logically prior, it cannot *be* the universe; rather, the universe and the mind–heart must be ontologically distinct—two separate entities. The above constitutes my personal scholarly assessment of the principal schools of Confucian thought across Chinese intellectual history. I have been prompted to offer these reflections by the enduring significance of the concept of ‘the unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*) within the Chinese intellectual tradition—particularly in pre-modern discourse, where it occupied a central position in philosophical inquiry and served as the ultimate foundation of ethical and existential orientation. For this reason, classical thinkers devoted exhaustive effort to its elucidation, and rival schools engaged in sustained, rigorous debate upon it. Consequently, pre-modern scholars possessed a far deeper and more nuanced understanding of this issue than do contemporary thinkers, whose attention has increasingly turned toward material concerns and immediate pragmatic ends. It is in this spirit—not without a sense of humility, and fully aware of the limitations of my own perspective—that I venture these provisional observations, in the hope of inviting scholarly discussion and critical exchange. [Marginal Annotations] No marginal annotations visible. [Seals] No visible archival seals or stamps. [Signatures] No visible signature or personal rubric. [Archival References] No archival reference numbers or provenance markers visible. {{PAGE:17}} [Page 85] [Main Text] Love is the Lord; it manifests the Holy Spirit. (This is purely an analogy—the reality is not identical.) In the divine order, the Son is the principal agent of initiation, while the Holy Spirit is the principal agent of consummation; likewise, in the human person, the intellect serves as the discerning faculty of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, whereas the will is the faculty that brings actions to completion. From these two points, it follows that the human person is the authentic image of God. III. The Human Person as the *Consubstantial Image* of God In the supernatural order, after creating humanity, God bestowed upon human beings a supernatural life—namely, sanctifying grace—elevating them to a supernatural plane and thereby constituting them as His *consubstantial image* (*imago consubstantialis*). Moreover, He granted them supernatural faculties—the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity—enabling them to exercise these capacities in pursuit of the end He has ordained for them: the beatific vision of His divine essence, participation in His goodness, and sharing in His divine life—a state termed *deification* (*theosis*). Those who live this deified life are designated *saints*. IV. God’s Purpose in Creating Humanity: Communion and Mutual Fulfilment From the divine perspective, God created humanity, first, that He might be glorified, and second, that humanity might partake in His glory. Yet, since God’s glory is absolutely immutable—neither augmented nor diminished by any external cause—He has no need of glory conferred by creatures; even had He not created us, His perfection and beatitude would remain wholly unaffected. It follows, therefore, that God’s primary motive in creation is oriented *ad hominem*: namely, that humanity might attain eternal beatitude and be united with Him in perfect communion. To this end, He specially endowed human nature with an innate, supernatural inclination (*inclinatio*) towards Himself; it is precisely through this disposition that the desire for the vision of God—the *spes visionis Dei*—arises within the human heart. The greater the sincerity and fervour of this hope, the greater the joy and beatitude experienced in the eschatological fulfilment of that vision. Hence, the person who ardently hopes in God may already, in this present life, attain real union with Him. From the human perspective, since God is our ultimate end (*finis ultimus*), we bear a strict moral obligation to attain Him; since He has loved us unconditionally, we are bound in justice and charity to love Him unconditionally in return; and since He has abundantly bestowed upon us the graces necessary for salvation, we have a corresponding duty—grounded in gratitude and stewardship—to employ these gifts faithfully and fruitfully. Thus, we not only may— [Seals] [Top left corner] — (Illegible seal) [Signatures] [Centre right] — (Illegible signature) [Archival references] [Bottom right margin] — AHU_CU_Índia, Cx. 14, D. {{PAGE:18}} [Page 89] [Main Text] The ultimate criterion for the moral conduct of human beings is the divine will of God: that which conforms to this standard is good; that which deviates from it is evil. What Confucianism terms *liangzhi* (innate moral consciousness) and *liangneng* (innate moral capacity) may, in other words, be understood as a faculty bestowed upon humanity by God—through which the divine will is made known. Thus, any human action aligned with *liangzhi* and *liangneng* is morally good; conversely, any action contrary to them is morally evil. In this respect, Confucian ethics and Catholic moral theology are in agreement. Regarding the doctrine of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (*tianren heyi*), Confucianism and Catholicism share common ground not only in ethics but also in certain other respects—though some concepts bear identical terminology while embodying fundamentally divergent meanings. For analytical clarity, these points are here grouped under the rubric of ‘points of convergence and divergence’. (1) *Humanity as a ‘microcosm’*: Confucian thinkers refer to the human person as a ‘microcosm’ (*xiaoyu*); Catholic theology does not reject this designation *per se*. However, the Han Confucian conception of the ‘microcosm’ situates humanity between Heaven and Earth, establishing a correlative, analogical relationship—rooted in the cosmological framework of the Yin-Yang school—wherein human beings and the cosmos interact through sympathetic resonance (*ganying*). This is a metaphorical and phenomenological, not an ontological, claim. By contrast, the Catholic understanding of the human person as a ‘microcosm’ rests upon a scientific and theological anthropology: the human being, as a composite of body and soul, integrates within itself all the perfections found in creation. Moreover, in the order of grace (*supernatural order*), humanity is not merely a natural microcosm but also a *supernatural* microcosm—since, by virtue of divine grace (*gratia*), human beings are enabled to participate in the divine life (*vita divina*). Thus, although the term ‘microcosm’ is shared, its meaning in the two traditions is radically distinct. (2) *The ‘humanisation of Heaven’*: The Song-dynasty Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai (Chang Heng-ch’ü) metaphorically designates Heaven and Earth as ‘parents’ and human beings as their ‘children’. Within this framework, he refers to Jesus Christ as our ‘Elder Brother’ and to ourselves as His ‘younger brothers’. Superficially, this nomenclature appears to parallel Catholic usage—yet the underlying referents differ substantially. In Confucian discourse, terms such as ‘Heavenly Father’ (*tianfu*), ‘Elder Brother’ (*dage*), and ‘children’ or ‘brothers’ are strictly metaphorical and symbolic, expressing cosmological or ethical relationships rather than ontological realities. In Catholic doctrine, by contrast, the titles ‘God the Father’, ‘Jesus Christ our Elder Brother’, and ‘children of God’ (*filii Dei*) and ‘brothers in Christ’ denote objective, revealed truths grounded in divine revelation and sacramental grace: they signify real, filial and fraternal relationships established through adoption in Christ (*adoptionis filii*), conferred by the Holy Spirit. [Archival Reference] Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), Conselho Ultramarino, Índia, Caixa 14, Documento. {{PAGE:19}} [Page 30] [Main Text] Zisi’s ethical theory of the ‘unification of Heaven and humanity’ is fundamentally distinct—rather, it is the Han-dynasty Confucian mystical school’s conception of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ that is under discussion here. II. The Mystical School By the Han dynasty, major Confucian scholars—including Gongsun Hong, Dong Zhongshu, and Ban Gu—emerged successively. Influenced by Huang–Lao Daoist thought and the Yin–Yang school, their conception of ‘Heaven’ (Tian) became ambiguous and imprecise; consequently, their doctrine of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ proved obscure and difficult to comprehend. Dong Zhongshu’s formulation may be taken as representative. While building upon earlier Confucian tradition, Dong acknowledged ‘Heaven’ as the ultimate generative principle of the cosmos and all things therein. Regarding ‘Heaven–humanity unity’, he advanced the view that the human being constitutes a ‘microcosm’, standing alongside Heaven and Earth as one of the ‘Three Powers’ (san cai). Each of these three entities possesses its own characteristic virtue (de) and vital qi; humanity, situated between Heaven and Earth, may ‘correspond’ (ou) with Heaven above and with Earth below. This conception of ‘correspondence between humanity and Heaven–Earth’ may well derive from Mencius’s phrase ‘flowing in unison with Heaven and Earth above and below’; yet whereas Mencius’s formulation is predominantly psychological—grounded in the premise of ‘turning inward to attain sincerity’ (fan shen er cheng)—Dong’s is markedly concrete and structural, emphasising a systematic ‘correspondence’ (ou) between human beings and the cosmic order. In my view, Dong’s notion of ‘human–cosmic correspondence’ draws primarily upon the *Liji* (*Record of Rites*), specifically the *Liyun* chapter’s assertion that ‘humanity embodies the virtue and serves as the heart-mind of Heaven and Earth’, or upon the *Zhongyong* (*Doctrine of the Mean*)’s reference to ‘the nature bestowed by Heaven and Earth’ (*tian di zhi xing*). It therefore follows that the ‘Heaven’ to which Dong refers in his doctrine of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ is not the transcendent, moral, or metaphysical Heaven of classical Confucianism, but rather the ‘Heaven’ opposed to Earth—a tangible, azure, corporeal Heaven, devoid of consciousness or volition. How, then, could a seven-chi-tall human being—endowed with a rounded skull and square feet, rational intellect, and moral will—possibly ‘unify’ with such a vast, insentient, spherical Heaven? Dong himself recognised the conceptual impossibility of literal unification; he therefore adopted the principle of ‘mutual resonance between Heaven and humanity’ (*tian ren gan ying*), drawing upon the mystical cosmology of the Yin–Yang school to resolve the difficulty. In order to sustain his argument, he forcibly aligned human anatomy—the five sense organs, the four limbs, the heart, the hundred bones and sinews—as well as psychological states, postures, and emotions, with natural phenomena: the four seasons, the Five Phases (wuxing), years, months, and solar terms. His theory, consequently, is wholly materialist in its foundations; indeed, it is so patently contrived and arbitrary that even Dong himself appears to have lacked genuine conviction in its validity. Its underlying motivation, however, seems clear: to deploy the doctrine of ‘Heaven–humanity unity’ as a rhetorical instrument—‘a key to enter the political arena’—designed to flatter the reigning monarch, consolidate ministerial authority, and safeguard political influence. Otherwise, how is one to explain his insistence that only the ‘Sovereign’ (Wang) possesses the capacity to ‘model himself upon Heaven’? [Margin Notes] No marginal annotations visible. [Seals] No visible archival seals. [Signatures] No visible signatures. [Archival References] No archival references visible. {{PAGE:20}} **[Main Title]** *Volume Five of the Hengyi Series*: A Comparative Study of the Catholic Doctrine of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity and Confucian Thought on the Same Theme **[Central Box]** © Copyright Reserved. Reproduction Prohibited without Permission **[Vertical Columns, Right to Left]** Author: Zhao Bingshi Imprimatur Granted by: Msgr. Cai Wenxing, Apostolic Prefect of the Apostolic Prefecture of Taichung Publisher and Distributor: Kuangchi Press, No. 4 Zhongxiao Road, Taichung City Retail Outlets: — Kuangchi Press, No. 4 Zhongxiao Road, Taichung City — Huaming Bookstore, No. 4 Zhongshan North Road, Section I, Taipei City — St Francis Xavier College, 167 Argyle Street, Hong Kong — Catholic Truth Society, Emperor Building, Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong — Kuangchi Philosophical Institute, P.O.B. 1815, Manila, Philippines — Catholic South Seas Mission Promotion Society, No. 31 Victoria Street, Singapore Printer: Zhongtai Printing Press, No. 13 Gongyuan Road, Taichung City Price: NT$2.50 **[Leftmost Vertical Column]** First Edition: August 1957 (Year 46 of the Republic of China) Registration Certificate No. Nei-Jing-Tai-Ye-308, issued by the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China **[Footnote]** *Imprimi potest*: José Onate, S.J., Apostolic Visitor to the Missions in China
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spelling A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
This archival document is a scholarly treatise titled *A Comparative Study of Catholic Doctrine and the Confucian Concept of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity*, published as *Hengyi Series*, No. 5, and attributed to Zhao Bingshi (also recorded as Zhao Binshi and Chao Pin-shih), identified in the text as a Reverend holding the degree C.D.D. The work is physically associated with St Joseph’s Seminary and its *Yuan Ruosheng Shu Tu* (Institute of Sacred Scripture and Bibliographic Studies) Library, as confirmed by official seals. Marginal annotations and multiple signatures—including “Submitted by Jia Jingde”—indicate collaborative or institutional submission processes. The treatise engages in a rigorous comparative analysis of the Confucian concept of *tian–ren heyi* (*unity of Heaven and humanity*) and Catholic theological conceptions of the divine–human relationship, with explicit reference to Mencius’s articulation of moral agency, Neo-Confucian developments, and Catholic doctrines of creation *ex nihilo*, grace, Incarnation, and *theosis*. It foregrounds the philosophical question of human agency within divine–human unity, positioning the work as a methodologically grounded, historically informed contribution to interreligious and cross-traditional theological discourse. The document reflects late imperial or early Republican-era Chinese Catholic intellectual engagement with classical Confucian thought, and serves as primary evidence of indigenised theological scholarship in East Asia.
Books
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Catholic Doctrine
Catholic-Confucian dialogue
Chao Pin-shih
Comparative Religious Studies
Confucian Philosophy
Confucian-Catholic Comparative Theology
Convergence of Catholicism and Confucianism
Fr José Onate SJ
Heaven and Humanity unity
Hengyi Series
Imprimatur of Msgr. Cai Wenxing
Kuangchi Press
Msgr Cai Wenxing
St Joseph’s Seminary Macau
Taichung
Taichung 1957 Edition
Taichung Apostolic Prefecture
Tianren Heyi
Zhao Bingshi
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Chao, Pin-shih, Rev.
{{PAGE:1}} **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家 天人合一比較觀 **[Anotações marginais]** 賈景德題 **[Selos]** [No canto inferior direito] (Selo ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** 賈景德題 {{PAGE:2}} **[Texto Principal]** A Comparison of Catholic and Confucian Concepts on Relations between God and Man by Rev. Chao Pin-shih, C.D.D. **[Selos]** [No centro, à direita]: (Selo ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:3}} **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 恆毅叢書之五 趙賓實著 **[Selos]** [No topo, à esquerda]: SEMINARIO DE S. JOSE 院若聖修書圖 BIBLIOTECA [No centro, à esquerda]: (Selo ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:4}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:5}} **[Page 4]** **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 前言 關於「天人合一」問題，古今中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 人之非。關於「天人合一」問題，古今中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 子｜於諸家之中，是「入者主之」問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 說。到了宋儒、孟子之中，對這主之問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 日，這種問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 際談這種問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 解決。但這問題仍然，孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 是孰非，今人是有靈落伍懸因孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 誰對誰錯，我將儒家有靈落伍懸因孟子，對這問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 判若天淵，各派的動物因決佛對問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 若「天人合一」的動物因決佛對問題，出者奴役之中外，各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 人不能多有一些影響大感影響於，國竟各家的見解不同，議論紛紛，莫衷一是，彼此之間，各是其是而攻 令人一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 人一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 一看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 看分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 分明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 明，略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 略介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 介紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 紹於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 於下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 下，而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 而後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 後再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 再將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 將天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 天主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 主教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 教的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 的一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 一日不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 不有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 有行別則繼之之神雖少論及 行別則繼之之神雖少論及 別則繼之之神雖少論及 則繼之之神雖少論及 繼之之神雖少論及 之之神雖少論及 之神雖少論及 神雖少論及 雖少論及 少論及 論及 及 **[Assinaturas]** 趙賓實 {{PAGE:6}} **[Page 5]** **[Texto Principal]** 天主教與儒家天人合一比較觀 目 錄 前言 蔣序 壹 孔子對於天人合一的態度 一、孔子的天人合一說 二、子思、孟子的天人合一說 三、漢儒的天人合一說 貳 思、孟派的天人合一說 參 漢儒的天人合一說 二、王者成了天意的化身，來統制人群 一、人是個小宇宙 **[Anotações marginais]** (Ilegível) **[Carimbos]** (Ilegível) **[Assinaturas]** (Ilegível) **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:7}} **[Page 6]** **[Texto Principal]** 肆 肆 伍 唐代儒家天人合一觀念的薄弱 六 宋代的儒家的天人合一說 一、宋代儒家道學的興起與派別 二、濂洛關閩四大學派的天人合一說 三、濂派周敦頤的天人合一說 四、關派張子橫渠的天人合一說 五、洛派程顥程頤二子的天人合一說 六、朱熹同王守仁二大儒家的天人合一說 七、對於歷代儒家各學派的綜合與評價 八、天主教對於天人合一的基本理論 一、天人實際是否能和一 二、天人兩觀念的取意 三、從各個觀點上來看天主教的天人合一 一、朱熹的天人合一說 二、王守仁的天人合一說 **[Referências arquivísticas]** (Ilegível) {{PAGE:8}} **[Page 7]** **[Texto Principal]** 二、人如何與天主合一 玖天主教與儒家天人合一的異同 一、相同之點 二、同異之點 三、相異之點 拾結論 **[Referências arquivísticas]** 三六三八三八三九四〇四一 {{PAGE:9}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:10}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5-vl-72b-instruct] {{PAGE:11}} **[Page 10]** **[Texto Principal]** **說，則未提及。** **孔子在生時，特別警告人不可去諂媚神，因那太自私了，且失了敬神的意義，但對於「天人合一」之** **思、孟子在孔子以後，對這問題的徒弟，甚對於這個問題，他的感興趣，亦很少提及，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **貳 思、孟派的天人合一說** **一、曾子的天人合一說** **在孝經上說：「這個人若能照裁判，要注重實際問題，徒去身際，先不尚玄談，注意這個問題，他的倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **在父母若能彀配之天行化於自己，修實一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **止於至善人，使它的下人，以後** **曾子至善，按着天下人，** **曾子說主張人若能彀配之德止着判要對這** **若：「這若人能照裁但注** **能「這若人能照裁但注** **能彀配之德止着判要對這** **天行化於自己，修實一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **莫大的現善的作，，榜一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **才算達於世，榜一切當正心，去善正心談，而問題** **達到嚴父目標心滿作惡心** **到人生嚴父是足這標準他的倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **生最後莫使而就準他所說倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **最後莫使而就準他所說倫理哲學發揮的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **的大人不叫，而說「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **目標於都他做「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **標配能求「後的「心學，的不少，連不欲他們默見荀子，對後世亦不欲多論。惟有曾子、子** **。天孝了新再心，以** **這「」親推己，以** **是。親及人是指身** **曾子在而亦可稱由的本。** **子這孝親可稱由的本。** **所說所的稱由的本。** **說所的稱由的本。** **的說最為近「良心」主張惟對** **天說最為近「良心」主張惟對** **天配後德及良心他有能** **人天目化遠心」張惟對** **合的標，這個親他有能** **一「天」，這個親他有能** **觀。天」就是德及以能** **，是化疏為修** **亦就親的，人** **是能彀最後漸漸若的** **大學配目標的有了君** **所說天標去感一，** **說。就是化正直能** **的因此是他人直齊家** **「此使人的良** **至他** **[Anotações marginais]** **善」。** **在** **孝經** **父母說** **若：** **能** **配之** **天，** **才** **算** **達** **到** **生** **最** **後** **的** **目** **標** **。** **這** **是** **曾** **子** **所** **說** **的** **天** **人** **合** **一** **觀** **。** **，** **亦** **是** **大** **學** **所** **說** **的** **「** **至** **他** **[Carimbos]** **(Nenhum carimbo visível)** **[Assinaturas]** **(Nenhuma assinatura visível)** **[Referências arquivísticas]** **(Nenhuma referência arquivística visível)** {{PAGE:12}} [Transcription failed after trying 2 times with the following models: qwen2.5
spellingShingle A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
Chao, Pin-shih, Rev.
Catholic Doctrine
Catholic-Confucian dialogue
Chao Pin-shih
Comparative Religious Studies
Confucian Philosophy
Confucian-Catholic Comparative Theology
Convergence of Catholicism and Confucianism
Fr José Onate SJ
Heaven and Humanity unity
Hengyi Series
Imprimatur of Msgr. Cai Wenxing
Kuangchi Press
Msgr Cai Wenxing
St Joseph’s Seminary Macau
Taichung
Taichung 1957 Edition
Taichung Apostolic Prefecture
Tianren Heyi
Zhao Bingshi
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
title A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
title_autocomplete A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
title_full A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
title_fullStr A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
title_full_unstemmed A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
title_short A comparison of Catholic and Confucian concepts on relations between God and Man
title_sort a comparison of catholic and confucian concepts on relations between god and man
topic Catholic Doctrine
Catholic-Confucian dialogue
Chao Pin-shih
Comparative Religious Studies
Confucian Philosophy
Confucian-Catholic Comparative Theology
Convergence of Catholicism and Confucianism
Fr José Onate SJ
Heaven and Humanity unity
Hengyi Series
Imprimatur of Msgr. Cai Wenxing
Kuangchi Press
Msgr Cai Wenxing
St Joseph’s Seminary Macau
Taichung
Taichung 1957 Edition
Taichung Apostolic Prefecture
Tianren Heyi
Zhao Bingshi
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
topic_autocomplete Catholic Doctrine
Catholic-Confucian dialogue
Chao Pin-shih
Comparative Religious Studies
Confucian Philosophy
Confucian-Catholic Comparative Theology
Convergence of Catholicism and Confucianism
Fr José Onate SJ
Heaven and Humanity unity
Hengyi Series
Imprimatur of Msgr. Cai Wenxing
Kuangchi Press
Msgr Cai Wenxing
St Joseph’s Seminary Macau
Taichung
Taichung 1957 Edition
Taichung Apostolic Prefecture
Tianren Heyi
Zhao Bingshi
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
topic_facet Catholic Doctrine
Catholic-Confucian dialogue
Chao Pin-shih
Comparative Religious Studies
Confucian Philosophy
Confucian-Catholic Comparative Theology
Convergence of Catholicism and Confucianism
Fr José Onate SJ
Heaven and Humanity unity
Hengyi Series
Imprimatur of Msgr. Cai Wenxing
Kuangchi Press
Msgr Cai Wenxing
St Joseph’s Seminary Macau
Taichung
Taichung 1957 Edition
Taichung Apostolic Prefecture
Tianren Heyi
Zhao Bingshi
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
Macau. University of Saint Joseph
url https://macau-legacy.usj.edu.mo/docs/A8VTU3IX/viewer_A8VTU3IX.html
zotero_collection_key CSBIYA6A
PAAL2UHW

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