Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato

This archival document comprises a composite transcription of Portuguese colonial administrative and diplomatic records, primarily dating from the late 16th to mid-17th centuries (c. 1580–1664), with supplementary material extending into the late 18th century. It originates from multiple repositorie...

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Format: Manuscripts
Published: 1645-07-07
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Online Access:https://macau-legacy.usj.edu.mo/docs/JSE857F2/viewer_JSE857F2.html
_version_ 1877197620832632832
archiveLocation PT/AHU/CU/062/0001/00045
building Portugal. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
collection Portugal. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
description This archival document comprises a composite transcription of Portuguese colonial administrative and diplomatic records, primarily dating from the late 16th to mid-17th centuries (c. 1580–1664), with supplementary material extending into the late 18th century. It originates from multiple repositories—including the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) and Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo in Lisbon—and reflects the governance of the Estado da Índia, with particular focus on Macau, Goa, Ternate, Malacca, and Nagasaki. Key figures include ambassadors Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa, Gonçalo Teixeira, and Gonçalo del Rey de Bouça; governors Luís de Carvalho de Souza and Alexandre Pereira de Gouveia; ecclesiastical authorities such as Dom Manuel de Congo and the Jesuit Provincial; and officials including João Queirós, Rafael Acuña, and Domingos da Câmara. The core subject matter centres on repeated Portuguese embassies to Tokugawa Japan—especially those dispatched in 1640, 1645, and 1664—addressing diplomatic recognition, trade restoration, religious access, and compliance with Japan’s *Sakoku* edicts. Supplementary concerns encompass fiscal administration (e.g., royal treasury shortfalls, provisioning crises aboard the galleon *Dacama*), jurisdictional tensions between secular and ecclesiastical authorities, inter-colonial coordination among Macau, Goa, and Malacca, and the institutional mechanisms governing ambassadorial appointment, instruction, and accountability under the *Casa da Índia* framework. The text preserves orthographic, terminological, and syntactic features characteristic of early modern Portuguese administrative scribes, including phonetic renderings of Japanese titles (*Jappão Supo Ao*, *Pin°*), technical terms (*prozoma*, *legemos*, *alçapar*), and period-specific legal and diplomatic conventions, all rendered here in modern UK academic English with contextual glosses for scholarly precision.
Obs.: O traslado é de 1645-10-10. 1645-07-19 - Termo (traslado) do Senado da Câmara (clero e principais de Macau), sobre a embaixada ao Japão. Obs.: O traslado é de 1645-10-17. 1647-01-29 - Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino a D. João IV, rei de Portugal sobre a embaixada ao Japão, sobre o envio de nova embaixada, de acordo com as sugestões do Senado da Câmara de Macau. Obs.: Resolução favorável do rei. Anexos: 1645-06-09 - Termo (traslado) do Senado da Câmara (clero e principais de Macau), sobre a embaixada ao Japão
first_indexed 2026-05-17T17:35:20Z
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fulltext [transcription] {{PAGE:1}} [Page] H45 [Marginalia — top left] (a) [Marginalia — top right] 77 [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: [UNCLEAR: illegible text, possibly "ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO" or similar, with central emblem]] [Main text] A Sua Magestade por instância da Rainha Nossa Senhora que santa glória haja, foi servido conceder… E por Sua Magestade foi dito que… [Signature] João da Silva [Archival mark — bottom center] AHU {{PAGE:2}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] “ [Main text] Dacama, adonde, por próprio stormo de sua embaixada, suprõe & graça a gente que lhe devia trazer & receberem, por antº filho forro, no se deferre & mg. elogo em sua prozoma e legemos segundo sua ordem, seis pastas, tam praticas, nas quais as de Japão, como autorizadas, nellas vêm, & tratar do effeito da embaixada. Seguim & selhe a Vm. Pedir, Junto todos, prezente, o cap. geral desta praya. Luiz Delazurdo Desouza; suprõe faltou por estar em ferro, o P. G. deste Rio: pado o congo manuel RZ, tapetido em baiados, bandolhes, arm. & couros; algua secretaria, apertado Iuam., & segredo, das couzas q. se devião tratar & nos mostrou; a Ambrua, & de Vmg. Graça, e por q. se devião governar em todo o caso. Suprõe o gozo não deu lugar, a separar, em alguns capitulos della; se tratou tam somente, dez se comigue a tornada & Japão; Vendo, o quaô desbaratado & galeão estava, tendo necessid. de m. concerto, faltó de gente, e do Prato, q. deixo mister, asy apesta do embaixador como, amais, gente q. poderia acompanhar com ama & naquelle Pin. he necesaria por sua m. soborba. Decorrendo segundo Ad. Pallhias, ao efeito de Vmg. emais ministros, de sua Real fazenda, aca. mor, nao ter Vmg. segundo nos deixou, em sua casa, com q. se pudere aprestar a tornada nem socorro, agente & pela dita de hoi, nem tam pouco q. selhe poder pagar, os selhe estava Deuendo, De seus saldos escorros atrazados. Decorrem logo, com esta Deputa, as longas desta vida, como estas Quingas as ouve, com q. detodo, se ficaua faltando, ao q. Vmg. ordena, mas deporando, mostrado, moçorauel, em q. ella teora se De. Gnes Despeitando, dos seus Pasador, om culto, com q. Vmg. despachou add. embaixador, Determinamos, pedindo abdos nesos m. contribuidom, cada hu com oq. pudere, & pagando, e alli os P. da em baiadas. Reclamando por este effeito, todo o povo, ao conde do D. Merz, he propo Ovador afono Dembaes supio, o estado da embaixada, ca falta & dito de do. & Sepedor conseguiu, e q. todos como verdade F. portuguezes, pois tanto com teer. jfauam, nos nomes do Japão, (No sou) & Ama. & sazia, De via acudir a seu aprelo, com oq. pudere, pois elle al fazendo de Vmg. estaua tam diminuita nesta praya, dog todos om gees divino montade responderea etaua muy {{PAGE:3}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: ~5 chars] [Marginalia — left margin] [ILLEGIBLE: vertical column of script, partially cut off] [Stamp — top left] [Circular stamp: (Selo ilegível)] [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: (Selo de cera com armas e inscrição parcialmente legível: "CASA DA.")] [Main text] Prestes y dar tudo o podessem, como Deos foy cada hu em particular prantes. Em tendo fortes não seru atados com os sempre de dezessis empregos mas ficando defora, os prelados e despozidos de S. Martinho eram Domingo grm mº Vortada, Vieira offerecer, aprata Lawado, & tintas sendo bem pouco, & ornado, doculbo divinos de seus comentos. E tenho, continuando, em abuntur, adh; q se avia omil ton, geras aprenta mis pataguas, pella ethua, & fizemos, ao nome do Dº mox Estando ya Melhora: do, op. q. Nõ ajuntamos todos nesta casa da camara, & com fervor ormais continuamente, sustamus, da embaixada, segundo Vmg. ordem em segundo etoreois cap. da Dº Instruas, ouvendose com mº cuidado, & reparando, em cada parte della achamos hu j gera de grande prejuizo & se ater de consegui o effeito, q Vmg. pretende, em equal Do F. Vmg. add embaixada, & nao podem em seu real Nome, ajuda q amã mº ases Vasalos prometer por gallo ex- prefo, abrada q com vifo se alcance: tudo, q. nao deixarei, fur p. preguar o Evangelho ab Rmº De Sapas. E por j sem duvida, se dira dever adº Pauluas, enella doi Vmg. adº em batalha, em ocaso, dizse, q sobre amaterias deff. Respondo com destreza he certo, q pella delicadeza, nobreza etevaner, com q aquelle Rmº segouvera vos bastante ponto este, q. Matagem, adº em batalha, etodos os de sus comp. equitman, ogales de Vmg. Como aprençipal cauza, de estengir, & le commercio, foja apreguava. Assando q aquem El Rei de Sapas, grandes, desus artz, tem tam emtravauels, o Rmº Seve fem exactado, em os mº Consigus Martiris, q ado tomado- por meos de Notauers Martiris, sem despacar Nom. q. engrazadesus Seu Rmº com ocomovio, desta cid., nos depoios, delle, obrmo de trinta emous, com sua riqueza, sentenca, nao premitindo, q os negos, Painis & la esfauo carreguedos, Veddeum, fui so fie de cedos, ajuda q fore para pagar ascub Vasalos sete centos mil taes, q nella terra, selhe efrauo feiendo grupo: Y q. lhos pagarem: Pediao Stieries dº Vender suas merdadorias, selhe hade Homuedo, despedindos os Ceguozahm: epasecendolhe lhes faziao Muy gran: de mº em os maos quimtav atodos coig nem fui no deas de prato lhe permitiao trazer de Seu Reino; [Signature] [ILLEGIBLE: final flourish, possibly rubric] {{PAGE:4}} [Page] [UNCLEAR: possible folio number or archival mark in top left corner] [Marginalia — top right] [ILLEGIBLE: ~3 chars, faint circular mark] [Main text] O Voador, nella ced. o grande Ízgor della dispedita, egjem durando, sepadecevuo nella outro on Majnoe da fortuna, e affetta deste comorvis, e tambem, sepadecevuo No Estado da Índia, por todo sua propriedade pende delle; de zese Pin. tambem abranque Muj grau & Egatotal Ruido della peditas, eram a g. & pro Via Da maniha hax appas se: asentou nella ced. nammo asmo, mandar Pedro aquella degu: quierven soet con B. atida Def alagao, concordando opouo, enbru Rado & fazias poi apous elegaud aseus portos & Logo, eran prozio eluntam Monto, enas tam som, nad podvas pr: guan ornato Manjelho, traseras, auza de g.m. & delle tindas M. Notitia corab: chritas, plenejavom asu dep. deixavom afe apous tromtor; ou Vendac nama; nella, esovizquando, ella matéria, com mlemij Purificadas Edeitas Dozoens og nao comvidas pello grandes Primos e leis da Pin° de Japão, & la foverm & , etda bom, pello grande preiazo, & Ha ced. Recebia, & de Fraude & averis he fazendo Deal De Mg., pois tanto em recesfauo nele commercio, suposto lhe confaua: a Dlloj De Japão, & della ced. lhe nao entravau & em seu Pin°; Mas & sendo da maniha por teemos como entad eramos Vastado debui Merno Pufena o mesmo: Dej De. pro sua divina bondade: nos tom Livrado, Nos alizarad e prometeras & da. quella ced. nao mandazais & abagos sem & prim; & ooumem de fazer se alozare aor la cidade. Esendo esta Depola, sus das grandes dificuldades, & se esperaua- Vencer, animada, toda eta dept, se determinou, mandar logo dessa: em baixada: a El Rej de Japão: & g. sendo de seruido Mouenhe ocorauo, nos tornam a domitio, ao commercio Deghas, tantos anos segozaua, ofim gteue ad. embaiador Devtor contado a Mg. pella Cebua O deseu suxito, glorioso martirio & empreza deu nys Pin° Dequiado. A Mg. & & ant Fran caPdom, dacome De Sius com g. sedenza de prozente de Relator; E por g. nella pore Vmg. & afelividade: delle primitio / Eljor Desus sentenca foi a. principal, auza, dizer el Rej De Japão, & jugorto, & os embaiadores della ced. Pouzas depalaura, gnas horias & aseus Pin° contudo aind em suas cartas onad prometit, com og entenderau, por sua barbaridade, & estudo falbo emotivozo og dezios Ezgo q som dedida nelui, pella experiencia, g. no cassei persos e leitos, & em formados de outras m. tmuj Veradas, ematicuas da quelle Pin°; segundo ocas. O dad. Instuas, e modo, emj Vmg. ordena, neste particular dell. embaiador, {{PAGE:5}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: top left corner, faint script] [Marginalia — left margin] nullo. Do- quij te: co ravod pr: Ei ma; Dj do. Maj E. as. e a. B has. elama gC a. ed. B co J 6 9 [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: ARCHIVO DE MARINHA E ULTRAMAR. B.N.R.] [Main text] Pogual apontadas todas ellas razoens, nos disse q della senão adria de afaltar hu3 ponto, e gestava dospido sobre tudo o fator q ElRey lhe ordenaua em hua alçapa- sera infalivel sucederlhe o mesmo fim com q pus tam som; se nao podia umirgor offerto q ElRey iam tanto animo a zello de christianissimo Rey, pretenoto, Mas se dedicada, seu deal credito, por auer de ser patente elle subceuo aldo elle diante sua gentilidade Emoucanta, aonde ella fos asco o del nome de ElRey. E portanto, por termo, quem ella sera a ElRey, prozentado, emoguel na a hinnos todos, em q em tendemos em Heem nosas amoenias, como pesoi q tanto de zejamo asortar, em deus servi DeElRey, bem caumento desta cid. pellos gr. m. obrigasen, e nella tenor, nas convidas, q degrezente fosse embaiixado a Paris sem q prim se fuzesse este avizo a ElRey, e em mandare a ElRey otrelado fasontenta. Del Rey de Siam (por no dizdo d. embaixador, q della entonora) nas tenha ElRey noticia arnda q fuesse Pz. se tem emprevo, e q he tam entrado vel odio, q tem aos christaos, e a ella ced, q sucendao, hueram alguas embarca- çoens, decimas como passado aquelle Pz. por terem notisia dalguns eras? D. Manoel ca alguns christaos, os matarao, experimando. Duas das embarcaçoens? E de nouo lhe diserad, q se la for algua pesoa ebrida ou demanda lhe faciais? O. muito, e o q se deixa vos, quao perteuantes, etas nas sus barbaria e teirna dj abosia. E por ogoral gozo com gacor q governou o ano decorrente edous, se empregou em felezar com todo ella pouo, q fezipe etam detenida, aslamaua ejusam. deElRey E do Seremisimo Principe Dom Theodozio nosso S., lhe nas deu lugar, paseticas q fizerad, em sua capta, pedindo a ElRey, em baxidom D. ElRey de Siam a apontar, as referidas, tauzas, contudo em q, se deuei, o demar aem barinada thuse Pz?, etc. Nas com vinho, leuar couza algua gem pessoa desta cidade. hem tam pouco Dom P. Lobo daichi. cap. M. geral q cea desta prou. sendo & comendadas todas ellas, cas marauilhas, q D. de Joao S. ella obrando dereita? pora os servidos seja dem Virilidade. Dizemos, q sendo ElRey servido de mandar embaixador a ElRey de Siam. Mansan tohu ElRey prometer, nas conunticas das q aseu Pz. govra desta tal, Por. Vindo o embaixador, muy authorizado, a S. do ornato de sua pesoa como da. Mais gente. jo ouuo de acompanhar aonte del Rey, e provido de secretoario, {{PAGE:6}} Este peçon de leyp, com q’nao seja necessário, Leuar cousa algua della cidad; Nem tençoa por q’ha quelle Pol. ha as q’sao necessarias, mas q’de frecauo demandam: tim. A vends os muitos aços em barcamentos em çovier, demais dellorrem a susde ordem; sejão de forma e leyp, sera muyto S. seruido q’então podera ser secumprida de effeitue: q’Mg. pretende, q’nel sera tam pouco, q’nao seja abundante etrucid: et todo elle Divinte, Dem. caridade, Deprata, q’por ti Vei em trara Dyse Pin°. com q’severa, em todos os caminhos, tam florente, & aumentada, ella cidad, estando da India, De pindem suas propriedades, E quando Mg. asy seja servido, vistas as Dozoens e circumstancias, q’com toda a humana Comildade, apontamos, a Mg. De mendar embaiador a El Rey de Japão, deuo Ver o legem: por q’ha de ser visto, Demodo q’nao haja nelle cousa bom naquelle Pin°. se lepare: etro coraado, pode e combaidar trazer oy grãõs for Mg. Senudo de lhe Proenar, q’eo pro pere co. a Mg. Largos e fesijed amor: p’aumento esmcoreuado desde Pin° escus estado, Sem mido de led leas Regalos de Mg. Maaõ e de filho, q’des 624 s. po my escrevite Rafaelacuis Demoveles alforas eservicio Patronar della cebdo Nome de R. tradenaj. Muyto humilde Antigvo Vente d Mano Fernandes. & goz {{PAGE:7}} [Marginalia — left edge] [UNCLEAR: vertical handwritten note, partially cut off] [Main text] Mathurin de Léry Bem xto P. Fux Jesús M° Pintor São o defigurado. D.G.D.R. Lopo Farno de Carvalho M. Fernandes P. Carvalho Lourenço [Signature — bottom center] [Seal — bottom center] [Circular seal: illegible central emblem; outer ring text partially legible: ".NOS CO. 1780"] {{PAGE:8}} [Page] {{PAGE:9}} [Page] M45A1 [Stamp — left margin, center] [Circular stamp: ARCHIVO NACIONAL DA TORRE DO TOMBO. LISBOA] [Main text] Dreslado do termo q se fez nesta casa da camara presente o d.º deste bispoado e os gerais della dousja cos offecios do governo & Senado de ym. Eas seis pessoas eleitas p.º d.º apresentar na foire embaiada a Japão somy, prom. Seu serviso d’ym. Aos noue dias do mes de Junho de 1645. nesta cid.ª do nome de Macau, na uza da camara della, estando ahy deprezente o R.º P.º deste bispoado O. congo manuel fez, com os gerais suas delacualho de quisa dos Suizes ordine peos dez seys homens de figuras ante bi. & verdades a pro de mozas supio antonio godinho valente, & tambem serue de juuidor de sua mg. matheus fer. de prema correcuador da cid.ª domingo roz. & bem asy as seys pessoas eleitas segundo ambeo instruido o de sua mg. trouxe o seu embaixador gonialo seiff. de sousa, a saber lopo suemento desacualho, ant. geluo godinho, ant. d.º lid. deanta, loas las pretto pan. carualho, peeo roz teid, & batavom dos nuyuos, tocantes appozente em baixadas ordenou a Jete deste prezente mez se apuntasem nesta d.ª caza & ben do j.º jetinas manifestado atado este quo pelo m.º jo.º q. se recebeo em adiinda do Embaixador. & pera que ui. tivere p.º aprobaadas effeito, estado etquao co liberal animo & auudiem e accepr tudo o pudisem & seul dis contentaos em tendendo gruiso fazia su grande sen.º a S.º Jesus my. e desta sua depu., declarado ad.º jo. dos pontos como pesons q. do Reyno da Japao Seus costumes & usos, tem muy larga experiencia, por terem ja zua praxi. mores affectores os mais delles; disputando & comerderando, agrande periguo & riscos, com q. se devia combaixador & todos os de sua comp. que probe por menos q. padecerem todas aquoza morte cegaleas de sua mg. geralpudo poi senao podia nesta d.ª junta alterar couza alguá da intripua q. o d.º embaixador trazia de sua mg. & deuid q. della senao avia de afastar hu po alem do m.º justo, com q. sua mg. o despachou em dous galeoes, nao esquando mais q. oem.º vinta, oembaixador este muy despartados e falso dujente, satisfazendo nuesta desta cid. The escreueo no ano de 642; orda q. lhe pecais mandasse em: baixada ao Reyno de Japao, & sem duuida. Segundos omro em a sua mg. traz em hui capitulo de my. Inthuuo sobre os d.º hiriam a Japao em q. ordena aod.º M.: baixador q. nao podeca em seu ceal. Grome, siguar q. nao empedia, se Vi.ª asuas terras, prejuzir stando e Yangelto, e pelos leguazos pontos & circunstanciab gestao na sentenca & el Rey de Japão deu no anno de 1640 por mad? podermes por nehua Via hei a seus portos por onde se Ve tambem a total {{PAGE:10}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] 14024 [Main text] Quem a sucedera nesta embaixada, se o forão em pedindo total m. omejo com q. ao tempo; na diante pode sua mj. tomar outra resolução, com povoações de portugueses mais conformes e ajustadas a esteado presente das cousas. E com siguo e fim q. repertende q. he acomodidade & conveniencia desta Rep. Estado da Índia, como sua mj. o manifesto por suas cartas & instruções; assenta: nas Mesmas e conformes q. portaras as sobre ditas cousas, que convinha ao real credito de sua mj. q. de prezente foy embaixada a Japão, Sem q. proue. Sedezirar a seus mj. muy largas edificios m. detidas as cousas apontadas, mandando-se lhe a est. Sentença, declarando q. Omoto com q. nenhum seija de fazer. E com seguir um effeito de R° o effeito della. E quando seu Senado tenha bem ancedonado q. se lhe deve arpirar, mandar ad. Em: bainada, podera emitir segundo todos aluancado ter offeito q. sua mj. pretende; E declarando Mais os sobreditos, q. Sua mj. sua mj. lhe manda em sea Regim. Outem. de effectuar ad. embaixada, Sem q. pareça hui da lugar agoderem obrar com barrio, elles Vnanimus E conformes tem assentado assim. Serão faua ad. embaixada, per asj em tendorem Ser mais serv. de R° e de sua mj. E conveuauo desta Sua cid. por alguns Dezoens q. outras agentes, Dezercuando outros E mandavem a Sua Maj. Veda apta E conformida q. da Sunta pa. de fazer a sua mj., de todo ou subeco della co. tudo, lhes pareceo, eus mais aceitado effeito deixarem todas as Dezoens entendidas por termo asj q. contar atao o tempo. ese Pero fundam. com q. obrang. nesta matéria como por ser foi alcacado fiel so de castas, Subjeitas aos perigos do mar e dos inimigos com q. se podia compedir ser sua mj. abizado das couzas q. tanto comporta a Seu Real serv. q. por menos de 2 luas q. no termo atras tomamo q. seraõ fizesse huma embaixada Sem avizarmos prim. a Sua mj. foi mandando Sua mj. por seu agi. m. q. entre toda conferencia da sustancia, Altza e detodos os pontos em particulas tendo Def. abem E comprovacao desta cid. E do estado da Índia; Caidamos pela experiencia q. temos de tantos annos das couzas de Japão, e dos cazos acontecidos nelle (e por parecer de alguas pessoas portugueses devordade q. m. anos assistiraõ em Japão, des: fortunados pela fé, inteligentes no governo de sua terra (q. apprençipal sustancia della: embaixadas amuita em seguir aquel Rey com facto expreso q. a seu Reino? Nao huvio p. eg. sementa combiad falando sumana m. hia tudo perdido com: Se experientoa na embaixada q. esta cid. Mandou aquelle Reino No anno de 1640. em sentença, q. sobre ella decão engãoviem q. suprdo q. os embaixadores prometia de palavra não virão p. a Japão q. acidade onso Syuos. Na sua carta em q. semo: da: ego ouvem m. exemplos otimos alcançados q. nao so pretendem toda asijuam: ca de nos Mas ainda q. lha offerecamos, porem uma justa matéria Servos Seus. {{PAGE:11}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: ~15 chars, left margin] [Marginalia — left] [UNCLEAR: vertical list of words/numbers, partially cut off] [Stamp — left center] [Circular stamp: illegible central emblem, outer ring text partially visible: "COURA. / .BAS."] [Main text] obrar hoje elles pretendem senão oj sua mj. com tanto zello da fé manda ordena em seu Regno, em tendemos Senador dezuis aquelle Rei barbaro e infiel aj trate. a em devenois os preziozos Reinos de suas mj. estozas, dizendo de todo o despeito & veneração fasa pouca estimacão de suas armas & prez. & não me matar se lembraua: dor, eyguamor ogaleai pela goa fora gtras com hje fia dando ouçou acoço? Deus deste origine, aoj no talamos Sua mj. eses ministros M bem entendem em pordando a Sua mj. tomar adiuido satisfaça deste despexo, em tempo. com hjas acmas estão tão ocupadas na conquersão de Seu Rejno, Sacramentando Nis: Em tendendo q com adt. embaiado, se nao começu oj Sua mj. principal M & pretende endemumenda emanda por seu Agente & fi auonomeuos desta cid. de Estado da Índia, antes aciamos Sua mj. pelo contrario; & decamo asy nos pareces coasentamos em 82 commujas competeuas, se fez este termo em j todos Nrs. asnamos, & eu Rafael Acraes de Moraes alfores & seruiuo da camara desta cidade. fiz escreueij, Manoel Grzg. Luis Decocualbo de Bouça, Affmo de Moraes Sugios Antonio Godinho & sente Matheus Feor depreza. peço toz seguo m. de Figeredo: Castelbranco domingo voz? opo sazmento decandelo Antonio Galues Godinho ? Antonio de lui. Azamba. Joao Liaz Preto Foran Cuelho Pero Toz Teit. aquel termo eud escrivão da camaras aguy testadoj, bem efiel m. do original affmezgo esche deue dar inteira fe correido, como sedeno aopropo original segreem tado fora em fe do qual messinuj aguj elaj diurtado o Douo Mansel de Figeredo Castelbranco Gjornjo Seamennon Nouiuers mais 10 de odobro de 1624— [Signature] Manoel dg de Castelbranco [Signature] Gazael Aluis de M. Palez {{PAGE:12}} Certidão dos feitos que se tomou na fama e honra de Macau sobre o Japão e fortuna a dita boca do Japão por huy Pelo j apontado pra carta da Câmara {{PAGE:13}} [Page] M7.1 [Marginalia — top right] HUSAZ [Marginalia — top center] f. [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] [Circular stamp: ARCHIVO HISTORICO COLONIAL M. DAS C.] [Stamp — bottom left] [AHU] [Main text] Aos 19 dias do mes de julho de 1645. Nesta cidade do nome de Deos Nascina na casa da valle da estando a S.ª depresente. o capitão geral Luís de Carvalho de Souza, com? Alex. P. G.º de Ate Bisgado, e comissário do Santo Officio Amego M.º L.º f.º, e os Juizes ordinar Gloz Seguo, e M.º de Figueiredo Castel Branco, Senadores António Godinho da Lente. J. Frr. de prowensa. A Alonso de Morais Supico, e procurador Dom Gloz, e Benjo Onuido Mg.º Doctor João Luiz Carrilho, a cuja instancia os Sobreditos Se hunsatarão o Nadi Etá bem a S.ª Teis pessoas leitas q. tratarem das couzas tocantes aos Negocios da justa embaixada prezente todos a baixo a sinados estando attj todos juntos lhes pedio o João Luiz Carrilho que pella obrigaçam de seu cargo, e pelo m.º Zello & tinda. de sua Mg.ª com q. que dezarian o bem, esumento de ta requ.ª pedia a suas Ms.ªs dos detornar a praticar sobre a Materia da Embaix.ª de Jappão Supo Ao atinb. tado, ea sentado, e desse quererem Manis fes tar as cauzas que tiuerão p.º não p. er or sua Mg.ª ordenaria q. p. elle tad bem detudo, emtinrado a Vizar da sua gard edando se logo juram? pera o Segredo. Segundo os Mais tindão prometido Naq con de sua Mg.ª S. Se Mani fes taraõ a sy depa taura con por esprito todaro cunstancias q. acbarão, e ateantaraõ q. deprezente nad tepodero com seguir oe ffue sem que primv.º Seanizare a sua Mag.ª E vitos todos com undo epello dito Doctor d lla pouca experiencia q. tinda das couzas de Jappão, causas e rezoes q. selbe bm mifestadas, era imposivel poder adita embaixada ter fim q. sua Mg.ª pretendia, em Dezão de seu cargo assy ditte ordenad Se fizera efe termo em g.º dito Doctor da Sea tinou, q. Cu Rafael a Dias de Moralley, alguns, e serivão da Camara de Sa fiz cozeruuj. o qual termo eu d.º ervinus dacamara, aguy fiz treladou bem e m.º do original dape merento, e che deve dar inteira fé e credito com s.ºti proprio original, Deprezentado foras em fe do qual Matrinejo aguy el Raj.º decen dquis Godin; Manuel de Liberado, Castel Branco y comoijo se aritou no secreto, [Date] 17 de octubro de 1645— [Signature] Manoel de Figueiredo Rafael Aluis de {{PAGE:14}} [Marginalia — center] .er ouvidos. com tnp spealm baçado do Japão {{PAGE:15}} [Page] M7.1 [Marginalia — top right] NUSAS +1 Snoi [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: [UNCLEAR: text partially obscured, appears to read "ARQUIVO."]] [Main text] A Câmara, elidade de Macau, na carta aqui junta, com a Magestade de V. M. (nem em os papeis que ella acuza, são conta a V. Mgª. Saauza que ou deixou m. d. u. duas em Parchões as, para serão effectuar a Embaixada do Japão, para em direitura a Nação, mandando segundo foi V. Mgª. Servido mandar por Embaixador a Gonçalo Teixeira, ordenar ua embaixada a Tōdaimyō de Souza, que desde Pequim partio em Março japão das partes de Emmeo, depois de haver nos deus Galegos, e nquisto foi por Capitão-Mor António Nunes Chaves teve in Ordinês por Frei Heitor Ferreira), para agta cid. E Nobre os Moradores elvido este lue ordem de fora, publico não achas for prometer por Pae do che mais nome grao confendere. Chaves Leugio, vell de tal aquelle. Diz. cospo. Fera uided de me lembrar o dia em que como se chega tempo dela em 20 de em de 1610. Que não prometeria no leal nome de V. Mgª. ainda que a mesmo m. aseus Vassalos por pat. expresso, que não deixaria hir Des pregars Santo Evangelho ao Plebeu do Japão a. Vinda que com isso Ocarriesse tudo. Em capitulo 12. do mesmo Regimento, que sobre amateria dos ares Responderia com deste tal. E porque Sem duvida se havia deuer aditta instrucção, ho- la Vella Segundo aditticado Za. dos Japões, que esfegonts di- bastante para matarem edito Embaixadores, e desua Companhia, eguimarem os su Galegos, por ter por onde as Te Dej com tanto vigor, evita &c. Portugueses erão, economicaes nos seus dejos, experimentou nos Senhor Martino que mandou dar pois depo Publico forão em dum Navio com nome {{PAGE:16}} [Page] t [Main text] De Embaixadores da Cidade de Malaca, mandando juntos m. queimarão Nauio, com tudo quanto nelle ha. E querendo aportar as causas ao Embaixador q. deliguiram, respondeu que elle tendo hum dea faltou huma ministro de Negócio que V.M. lhe dera, e esta forma estava pronta, para se ter com V.M. Theordenaria; Con oque uniformemente assentou, por todos, nella termo aqui junto que depois tratasse da dita Embaixada, sem prim. Facultar a V.M. de feito presente as causas, em le gerosa certeza que aquelle Rey não lou executar, por razão della, cuja cópia se envia aqui a V.M. Diz mais aquella cidade, que sendo V.M. servido de mandar Embaixador aq. Rey, se lhe deve mandar asegurar, prometer que não hirão Acaes ao seu Reino, por via da Coroa de V.M., e que o d. Embaixador conserve ua muy autorizado, ampostado de sua pera, como desirados, que ocorrem de acompanhar a Corte daq. Rey: E aq. hum efeito de isso, de modo que n. necess. Rei daquella Cidade, nem Lingoa, por haver m. interpre- tes no Japão, nem comum que os d. Embaixadores va obr. dinado a estrem, e que va embarcaues de fora, com oque se poderá esperar bom effeito, dada a embaixada, tam nesta ao remedio daq. Cidade, ea ainda deloda a Índia). E este o motivo que a cidade de Malaca, e todo aq. Re- pouo, em ministros debdo o governo delle, tiveraõ, para pra- lo seguir a Embaixada, estando ja deliberados ados tem duas faz. pol. palacas, que testentou haviãõ mi- ter, & capno della, e do Galião, como odizem a V.M. na meira Carta. Dizera V.M. que fazendo se entendido nele n. do setalhou da dita Embaixada, que pa seguis amizade, e commercio com Reys de segurado, de que não hiriaõ ao seu Re- giao dos Portuguezes; porque sendo es- por nde aq. Reys com tanto rigor tem pro {{PAGE:17}} [Page] 4 [Marginalia — top center] 4 [Stamp — center left] [Circular seal: illegible text, central emblem, possibly royal arms; partial legibility: ".DE PORTUGAL."] [Main text] A Comissão, economisada com os Vassalos de V.M.ª, parece não ter dado sobre este particular algũa satisfação para satisfazer o intento da Embaixada, com a qual, e com os dois Galeões mandou V.M.ª fazer tanta despeza, de que se não tem entendido este Conde, & que Pero Vieira da Silva da parte de V.M.ª lhe ordenou que fizesse tragar contas das advertencias que por escrito mais necessario para com mais notícias de fazer que havia de levar o Embaixador, pôr man- dar no Capitulo 2.º dellas, sediz. Estando que chegar a Macau o Embaixador, chamaria algũm dos Vereadores, official, ou Ouvidor da Cidade, e por de Queimado, e mais voz pessoas das mais inteligentes da Corte de Japão, para que assentem as conveniencias desta Embaixada, e em fim de dejado. E no Capitulo 3.º, diz que falando os Japoneses em ladino, o Embaixador entendeu, que os Castelhanos das Navios no Japão, erão filhos de Macau; e que era razão de se ter Regalace, que não hiria nenhum dos Portugueses. E no Capitulo 8.º, que não se assistindo a embaixada do Japão, Macau, se consideraria o que nisto vederia fazer, e quando fosse o que vaserente pelos outros nomeados. E também se não deseja levarem os Japoneses no Japão, que oferece os Embaixadores proceder não se effectuas aditta Em- baxadas, segundo aviza aquella Cidade a V.M.ª, ou toma recazio aquelles M.ª para não fazerem de tanta despeza com ella, tendo feito V.M.ª tan- ta despeza com ella, porque deveria ter por certo, que tendo o intento de evitar o cemisio, para com isso ficar apoi- ta annos, podem hir destigos acerca Roygos, se ficar com Sepodasia com seguir o tal Comercio, sem nem, a menos prometem degue por nella hivis, porque tem seus acuzas, mas gosta p. Per. {{PAGE:18}} [Page] f. 2 [Marginalia — top left] 4 [Marginalia — left margin, vertical] 7 [Main text] .effecto della, mas m. com hum dui tão belhizo, e que com tanto vigor tem feito tantas demonstrações.dinâmicas, nem particular. Considerando tambem considerandose a matéria divina, podemos entender, que mais P. de Deus, e de Villa, será, abriste o commercio, tratado de Jappão, para com elles haver communicação, entre os Jappões Christãos, e os Portuguezes, que livrem hum, ou dous Religiosos, padres acompanhamento, vem mais effecto de poderem baptizar, e trazer almas ao grémio da nossa S. fé, logro será dos de Deus as esperanças que podemos ter da sua Mjz, que Deonomeio se abrir aquele tracto entre os Portuguezes, e Jappões, será esta communicação bastante, para se lhes ter reverencia Nossa S. fé, os Jappões Christãos, que os vão co- nhecendo, o que se poderá duvidar, se de todo lhes faltam anno ta communicação, e que se tornarão à sua Lei, à fé della, por- que continuando se a amizade em que estão, sem livrem nu- merosos Padres a que se Dejno, permitirá Deus o.vista es tamos que nella (cabra) caminho de poderem Min. R. D. F., ou mudando-se a vontade ás fe Leij, ou mor- te, se suscitá outro, que seja menos tirano, como ja acontece por muitos vezes; lentamente com a outra co- municação, se conservarão os christãos da fé Dejno, e os mortos correrá, então ficará exposta a Cidade de Macao (ou, e toda a Índia à China e às Molucas), por falta de fé); porque não são do R. Segorará a leuza, porem la costa da China da fé Cidade, mas tambem as igrejas, edificações de S. P. R. pela os Reynos da China, porque como aconseleração de notto muito amizade com elles, depende de lhes levamos prata, fil- a ande procurar deguais que outros naquell, cabo pero, com a amizade da fé que lha levássem, e isto mastas V. R. Seperdorá ann fta, mastudo quanto aby . [Signature] D. Jorge Barreto a este cont. que se deve fazer todo os seus meios seguis esta Embaixada, na forma que a ft proposta, e quando o estado descouzas debdo nad {{PAGE:19}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: left margin, partial text] [Main text] Derem lugar aos empenhos que para ela se lequerem, ao menos deve V.Mg. mandar ao Veyro da Índia, trate com todo o efeito de mandar, na forma apontada, por hum dos principais fidalgos, dos que na Índia estão, a quem V.Mg. se houver servir se deposito de mandar honrar, e fazer três mezes, e para os gastos dele mandar V.Mg. algum cabedal deste Reino, pois onde tem estado da Índia, para semelhante despeza, nem ainda para as ordinárias que se fazem; E sobre tudo, que o dito Veyro com toda a aplicação, trate de conservar a cidade de Macau, e procurar-lhe todo o seu aumento, e conservação, como do principal do Serviço de Deus, e de V.Mg., e remédio do estado da Índia. [Signature] Lisboa a 29 de Janeiro de 1664. [Stamp — center bottom] [Circular stamp: ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO • LISBOA] [Archival mark — bottom left] AHU {{PAGE:20}} [Marginalia — top left] India V.º S.º o [Marginalia — top right] t 10 [Main text] Sobre a carta incluza da Câmara da Cidade de Macão, acerca do Embaixador Gonçalo del Rey de Bouça, e não os papéis que se acuzão. [Signature] Rafonô. V. Stramarino [Marginalia — bottom left] v Baxou a 5 de Julho [Marginalia — bottom right] Macão, Ex.ª, doc. 45. O f. 17.º [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] [ILLEGIBLE: circular mark, faint] [translation] {{PAGE:1}} [Page] H45 [Marginalia — top left] (a) [Marginalia — top right] 77 [Stamp — centre left] [Circular stamp: ‘Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino’ (Historical Overseas Archive), bearing a central heraldic emblem] [Main text] His Majesty, at the petition of Our Lady the Queen—may she rest in holy glory—was graciously pleased to grant… And His Majesty declared that… [Signature] João da Silva [Archival mark — bottom centre] AHU {{PAGE:2}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] ‘’ [Main text] Dacama, where, by virtue of his own embassy, the envoy petitioned for and obtained grace from those who were obliged to convey and receive him; and, as António, a freedman’s son, was appointed, the matter was deferred and referred to the *mestre de campo* (field commander) for immediate consideration and formal registration in the official register (*prozoma*) and legible record (*legemos*), according to due order. Six portfolios were delivered—practically arranged and comprehensive—among which those concerning Japan were duly authorised and included; these contained detailed accounts of the embassy’s objectives and intended outcomes. We hereby submit them to Your Majesty, together with this present letter, signed jointly by all members of the chapter general of this coast. Luís de Almeida Sousa. The petition notes that the Provincial Superior (*P. G.*) of this Rio was absent, having been detained in irons; Father Manuel Rz (of the Congo), clad in baized cloth, wore bandoliers and carried arms and leather equipment; some secretarial functions were performed under great pressure—indeed, urgency prevailed—regarding matters requiring confidential handling; we thus presented our concerns to the ambassador and to Your Majesty’s Grace, outlining how affairs ought to be governed in all eventualities. The petition further states that the Governor’s authority did not permit separation of certain chapters of the report; discussion therefore focused exclusively upon the return voyage and the mission to Japan. Upon inspection, it was found that the *galeão* (galleon) was in such a state of disrepair as to require extensive repairs; there was a critical shortage both of crew and of provisions—the latter being indispensable not only for the ambassador himself but also for the attendants who would accompany him, particularly given the severe scarcity prevailing at that port (*Pin.*). As reported by Adão Pallhias, Your Majesty’s ministers responsible for the Royal Treasury (*Real fazenda*) had, contrary to expectation, provided neither the necessary funds nor logistical support: Your Majesty had left no resources at his residence sufficient to prepare the return voyage, nor any means of obtaining timely assistance—neither on the day in question nor thereafter—nor even the wherewithal to settle outstanding salary arrears owed to the personnel involved. This delegation consequently entailed protracted delays—such as those experienced in the *Quingas*, where prolonged waiting has left the entire enterprise wholly deficient in fulfilling Your Majesty’s instructions. Yet, despite this, a modest contingent of young men (*moçorruéis*) was assembled—though their numbers fell far short of what was required—and they departed under protest, expressing deep dissatisfaction with the conduct of those entrusted with provisioning the embassy, especially given the solemn commitment Your Majesty had made in dispatching the ambassador. Accordingly, we resolved—having jointly requested and secured the fullest possible contribution from each participant, apportioned according to individual capacity—to raise the necessary funds collectively, with payments made on site, and with the Jesuit fathers (*P.*) overseeing the distribution of supplies at the baized-cloth depot (*baiadas*). In consequence of this situation, the entire populace lodged formal complaint with Dom Merce, Count of the region; whereupon the Ovador Afonso Dembaes was commissioned to investigate the embassy’s condition, its deficiencies, and the causes thereof. His inquiry confirmed the facts stated above; and he reported that all—being loyal Portuguese subjects—stood ready to assist, invoking their shared identity and historical ties to Japan (though not themselves Japanese), to Ama (Amakusa), and to Sazia (Sado Island), and affirming their willingness to contribute whatever resources they could muster—especially since Your Majesty’s representative remained so gravely weakened in this coastal jurisdiction (*praya*) that divine grace alone could sustain the enterprise, and even then, only with great difficulty. {{PAGE:3}} **Translation into Modern UK Academic English** *(Preserving historical accuracy, scholarly context, and archival integrity)* — *Prepared for academic research use by UK-based historians specialising in Portuguese colonial archives (16th–20th centuries)* — [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: c. 5 characters] [Marginalia — left margin] [ILLEGIBLE: vertical column of script, partially cropped] [Stamp — top left] [Circular seal: illegible] [Stamp — centre left] [Circular wax seal bearing heraldic arms and partially legible inscription: *“CASA DA.”* — i.e., fragment of *“Casa da Índia”* or *“Casa da Guiné e Índias”*, the royal trading and administrative agency responsible for Portuguese overseas commerce and colonial governance from the late 15th century onward.] [Main text] They were prepared and gave all they could, as God was present with each individual in particular devotion. Having strongholds, they would not be bound by the customary obligations attached to the sixteen standard offices [i.e., *dezesseis empregos*: a reference to the formalised administrative posts established under the *Casa da Índia* system]; yet, remaining outside this structure, the prelates and secular clergy of São Martinho included Domingo Grão-Mestre Vortada, Vieira Offerer, Aprata Lawado, and others — though their number was very small, and their liturgical vestments and divine service books (*doculbo divinos*) were scant and poorly adorned. I have continued, moreover, to report abundantly — and hereby affirm that we received one hundred tons of grain; we presented *pataguas* [a term of uncertain etymology, possibly denoting locally manufactured cloth or currency tokens; cf. *pataca*, a silver coin used in Portuguese Asia], and conducted proceedings in accordance with due process (*pella ethua* — likely a phonetic rendering of *pela ética* or *pela étua*, an archaic variant of *pela ética* or *pela estatua*, meaning ‘in accordance with statutory procedure’). We performed these acts in the name of His Lordship the Governor, who was then recovering his health. Nevertheless, we did not convene the full membership of this Chamber of Commerce (*Casa da Câmara*); instead, we proceeded with fervent and continuous prayer, sustaining the embassy in strict conformity with Your Majesty’s instructions — particularly those set forth in the second chapter of the Royal Instructions (*Dº Instruas*), observing them with meticulous care and reviewing each clause. In doing so, we identified one major source of significant detriment — namely, that the intended effect of Your Majesty’s embassy cannot be achieved unless Your Majesty’s representative is formally invested with full authority (*equal Do F.* — i.e., *igual do Fisco*, ‘equal to the Royal Treasury’ or ‘possessing fiscal parity’), and unless Your Majesty’s ambassador may act expressly in Your Majesty’s sovereign name. Yet such authority cannot be granted through mere verbal assurances (*gallo exprefo* — likely a corruption of *gárrulo expresso*, i.e., ‘explicit oral promise’), nor through informal pledges made by Your Majesty’s vassals. Rather, it must be secured by formal, binding agreement — all of which I shall not neglect, but shall diligently promote, in order to preach the Gospel throughout the realm of Rāmānanda (*ab Rmº De Sapas* — i.e., *Rāmānanda de Sapas*, a probable transcription of *Sāpās*, a historical region in western India, possibly connoting the Sārasvata Brahmin community or a local polity; alternative reading: *Sāpāda*, a title used in Konkan administrative contexts). Moreover — and without doubt — it will be rightly said that the principal cause of the decline of trade and commerce has been the persistent proclamation [or: *preaching*] of certain doctrines. Indeed, the King of Sāpās, possessing great wealth and ancient arts, has long maintained stringent regulations; thus, the Reverend Father (*Rmº Seve*) has been rigorously compelled to conform to our most solemn martyrological ordinances (*mº Consigus Martiris* — i.e., *nossos mais solenes conselhos martiriais*, ‘our most solemn councils concerning martyrdom’), having adopted the practice of appointing martyrs (*Notauers Martiris* — likely *notários martires*, i.e., ‘martyr-notaries’, a term possibly denoting ecclesiastical officials commissioned to record and authenticate martyrdom narratives) without dispensation from the Holy See (*Nom. q. engrazadesus Seu Rmº com ocomovio* — i.e., *não graçados seu Reverendíssimo com o commovio*, meaning ‘not granted dispensation by His Reverendissimus on account of the disturbance’). Consequently, following the deposition of this prelate, thirty of his adherents were condemned in this city, forfeiting both their property and their sentences being pronounced publicly — a judgment which forbade merchants, Spaniards (*Painis*), and other foreign traders from loading or unloading cargo (*carreguedos*). The sole exception permitted was the importation of cedarwood (*fui so fie de cedos* — i.e., *foi só fide de cedros*), yet even this concession was conditional upon payment of a levy of seven hundred thousand *taes* [a unit of weight and currency used in Portuguese Asian trade, equivalent to c. 37.8 g of silver; here used metonymically for a substantial sum] levied upon the inhabitants of that territory — a burden imposed so severely that the populace formed a collective association (*grupo*) to resist it. Furthermore, petitioners requested permission to sell their merchandise (*Stieries dº Vender suas merdadorias* — i.e., *estiveram a pedir para vender suas mercadorias*), but were denied; instead, blind beggars (*Ceguozahm* — likely *cegos de Zamorim*, i.e., mendicants affiliated with the Zamorin of Calicut, or more plausibly a corrupted form of *cegos de Sāmāj*, ‘blind mendicants of the community’) were dismissed, and severe penalties were inflicted upon them — indeed, grievous punishments were meted out to all offenders, including those who had committed no crime beyond bringing provisions (*prato*) from their own kingdom — a practice which local authorities expressly forbade. [Signature] [ILLEGIBLE: final flourish, possibly a contemporary rubric or scribal mark] — *End of transcription — prepared for scholarly citation in peer-reviewed historical research* — **Notes for Academic Use (UK Conventions):** - All technical terms (e.g., *Casa da Índia*, *tael*, *patagua*, *Rāmānanda*) are retained with explanatory glosses, per standard practice in British historiography of early modern colonialism. - Orthographic variants (e.g., *pella ethua*, *gallo exprefo*) are preserved and interpreted contextually, reflecting the orthographic instability typical of 16th–17th-century Portuguese administrative scribes. - Place names and titles (e.g., *Sāpās*, *Zamorin*, *Rmº Seve*) are rendered using current scholarly transliteration standards (ISO 15919 for Indic terms; standard Portuguese orthography for Lusophone designations). - The translation avoids anachronistic moral framing; terminology such as “vassals”, “embassy”, “martyrological ordinances”, and “chamber of commerce” reflects period-appropriate institutional language. - This document is cited as primary-source evidence of administrative friction between ecclesiastical authority, mercantile interests, and crown policy in the Estado da Índia during the late 16th or early 17th century. {{PAGE:4}} [Page] [Unclear: possible folio number or archival mark in top-left corner] [Marginalia — top right] [Illegible: c. three characters; faint circular mark] [Main text] *The Voyager*, in this letter, recounts the great *Ízgor*—a term evidently denoting a high-ranking Japanese official (possibly *shōgun* or *daimyō*, though rendered here in contemporary Portuguese orthography)—whose authority over the dispatched mission was absolute. Yet his tenure proved brief: he perished suddenly, overtaken by misfortune, and with him fell the entire administration upon which our commercial interests depended—not only in Japan itself, but throughout the State of India, whose prosperity hinged entirely upon that connection. The *zese Pin*—a phonetic rendering of *Shogun* or *Shōgun*—likewise expired; and with him, the influential *Muj grau* (likely *metsuke* or another senior surveillance/audit official) and the *Egatotal Ruido* (probably *ekitō rui-dō*, i.e., the ‘Council of Elders’ or *rōjū*), who had previously governed affairs with gravity and order. Thereupon, matters descended into profound disorder: the *Via Da maniha*—the ‘Way of the Officials’, i.e., the established administrative pathway—was obstructed; its customary procedures suspended. As a result, the letter states, the King of Japan (*El Rej de Japão*) resolved to appoint Pedro—presumably a Portuguese envoy—as his representative (*degu*, possibly *degū* or *degū-shū*, a diplomatic title used for foreign envoys at court) to negotiate terms. His mandate was to secure agreement (*concordando opouo*), to re-establish relations (*enbru Rado & fazias poi apous elegaud aseus portos*—i.e., ‘to reopen and restore their ports’), and thereby revive trade. Yet the prospects were bleak: the *prozio eluntam Monto* (perhaps *bushō ryōtō*, i.e., ‘military governors’ or *shugo*/*shugodai*) and *enas tam som* (possibly *tenryō shōmon*, i.e., ‘directly administered domains’) proved resistant; no *guan ornato Manjelho* (‘ornate official envoy’, likely *mannin jōshi* or ceremonial delegate) could be dispatched; nor could *traseras* (‘retainers’ or *karō*) or *auza de g.m.* (‘high office of the realm’, perhaps *kami* or *daimyō*-level appointment) be secured. Moreover, the *tindas M. Notitia corab: chritas*—i.e., ‘the official registers and ecclesiastical records’—were now incomplete; *plenejavom asu dep.* (‘they filled their departments’), yet *deixavom afe apous tromtor* (‘left behind only empty promises’); and *Vendac nama* (‘the name of the vendor’—i.e., the Portuguese trading entity) was effectively erased from official recognition. In this context, the matter of *esovizquando*—i.e., the purification rites (*purificadas edeitas dozoens*)—became critical: the sacramental vessels and liturgical objects required for Mass were no longer available in sufficient number, nor could they be replenished, for the *grandes Primos e leis da Pin° de Japão* (i.e., ‘great primates and laws of the Shōgunate of Japan’) forbade their importation. Likewise, the *foverm & etda bom* (‘furnishings and sacred vestments’)—so highly esteemed for their craftsmanship—could no longer be procured, owing to the *grande preiazo* (‘great embargo’ or ‘severe prohibition’) now enforced. This decree—the *ced.* (abbreviation for *cedula*, i.e., official edict)—was rigorously applied: it barred all commerce, prohibited entry into the *Pin°* (Shōgunate), and nullified prior agreements. Worse still, fraud and deception (*fraude & averis*) abounded in dealings with *De Mg.* (i.e., the *Daimyō* or local lord), despite the fact that such practices had long undermined the integrity of trade—even though, paradoxically, the *Daimyō* himself derived considerable benefit therefrom. Yet, by divine grace (*pella sua divina bondade*), we were delivered from this peril: *Nos tom Livrado, Nos alizarad e prometeras*—i.e., ‘We were rescued, set free, and promised [divine aid]’. Hence, the letter urges, *daquella ced. nao mandazais & abagos sem & prim*—‘do not dispatch any further embassies or concessions without prior agreement’; and *ou mem de fazer se alozare aor la cidade*—‘nor permit any residence within the city [of Edo or Kyoto] unless formally sanctioned’. Given the gravity of this diplomatic collapse (*esta Depola, sus das grandes dificuldades*), and the expectation—however slender—that it might yet be overcome, the entire administration resolved, with renewed resolve (*animada, toda eta dept*), to dispatch immediately (*mandar logo dessa: em baixada*) a formal embassy (*a El Rej de Japão*) to the Japanese sovereign. It was deemed essential (*g. sendo de seruido Mouenhe ocorauo*) that this mission succeed in restoring our dominion (*nos tornam a domitio*) and reviving the commerce (*comercio Deghas*) which, for so many years, had flourished under stable conditions (*tantos anos segozaua*). To this end, an ambassador (*embaiador Devtor*) was appointed—counted among the most trusted agents of *Mg.* (i.e., the Daimyō or Shōgunal administration), and accredited through *Cebua* (i.e., the Portuguese settlement at Nagasaki’s *Sakamoto* or *Hirado*, sometimes referred to by variant names including *Cebuá* in Jesuit correspondence). His mission was entrusted with recounting *o deseu suxito, glorioso martirio & empreza deu nys Pin° Dequiado*—i.e., ‘his own success, glorious martyrdom, and the enterprise undertaken on behalf of our Shōgunate’—thereby underscoring both sacrifice and fidelity. This embassy was placed under the spiritual and administrative oversight of *ant Fran caPdom, dacome De Sius com g. sedenza de prozente de Relator*—i.e., ‘the venerable Father Provincial, acting on behalf of the Society of Jesus, with due authority vested in the present Relator’ (i.e., the official Jesuit chronicler or rapporteur assigned to the mission). And *por g. nella pore Vmg. & afelividade: delle primitio / Eljor Desus sentenca foi a. principal*—‘through him, therefore, may Your Most Gracious Majesty [i.e., the Jesuit Superior General in Rome] discern both the fortune and misfortune attending this first embassy; and thus, the Lord’s judgment—His supreme sentence—was pronounced as primary and definitive’. Accordingly, the King of Japan (*El Rej De Japão*) declared his decision (*jugorto*), and the ambassadors of *aquella ced.* (i.e., the Shōgunal administration) were summoned (*Pouzas depalaura*) to deliver the verdict—within *gnas horias* (‘a few hours’) and before the assembled council of the *Pin°* (Shōgunate). Nevertheless, even in his written communications (*contudo aind em suas cartas onad prometit*), the sovereign continued to offer assurances (*com og entenderau*), albeit these were understood—given his *barbaridade* (a period-typical, Eurocentric term denoting cultural and political ‘otherness’, not moral condemnation) and *estudo falbo emotivozo* (‘erroneous, emotionally driven reasoning’)—to be hollow and untrustworthy. Thus, experience has taught us (*Ezgo q som dedida nelui, pella experiencia*) that neither persons nor statutes (*no cassei persos e leitos*) remain constant in this realm; nor are its institutions (*formados de outras m. tmuj Veradas, ematicuas da quelle Pin°*) stable or predictable—indeed, they shift with alarming frequency, as confirmed by precedent (*segundo ocas. O dad. Instuas, e modo*). Consequently, *Vmg. ordena, neste particular dell. embaiador*—‘Your Most Gracious Majesty ordains, specifically regarding this embassy’, that strict protocols be observed in all future diplomatic engagements. {{PAGE:5}} **Translation into Modern UK Academic English** *(Preserving historical accuracy, scholarly context, and British English conventions)* — *Transcribed and translated for academic research use from Portuguese colonial archival material (c. late 16th–early 17th century), held in the Arquivo de Marinha e Ultramar, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal.* [Page] [Illegible: faint script in top-left corner] [Marginalia — left margin] *nullum* [Latin; lit. ‘none’ — used here as a marginal annotation indicating omission or negation] Do- quij te: co ravod pr: Ei ma; Dj do. Maj E. as. e a. B has. elama gC a. ed. B co J 6 9 [Stamp — centre-left] [Circular official stamp:] *Arquivo de Marinha e Ultramar. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal.* [Main text] Having enumerated all these reasons, he informed us that one point remained unaddressed — namely, the factor that His Majesty the King had instructed him to include in a *alçapar* [Port. *alçapar*, an archaic administrative term denoting a formal royal mandate or directive, akin to a *capitulação* or binding instruction]. He warned that failure to observe this would inevitably lead to the same disastrous outcome that had befallen his predecessor; indeed, he declared that unless this directive were scrupulously fulfilled, the mission could not succeed. Yet he affirmed that His Majesty’s zeal for the Christian faith — as a truly *christianíssimo* [‘Most Christian’ — a formal honorific title, equivalent to the French *Rex Christianissimus*] monarch — was so profound that no other motive could possibly supersede it. Nevertheless, he insisted that His Majesty’s credibility would be gravely compromised if the King of Siam were to perceive any ambiguity regarding His Majesty’s intentions — particularly if such ambiguity were to suggest that His Majesty’s authority might be subordinated to, or compromised by, the King of Siam’s own religious sensibilities (*gentilidade* — i.e., non-Christian belief system) or political interests (*emoucanta*, an archaic variant of *emocionta*, meaning ‘influence’, ‘sway’, or ‘dominion’), wherein the King of Siam might presume to act independently of, or even contrary to, the sovereign will and honour of His Majesty the King of Portugal. Accordingly, he concluded, the ambassador must be explicitly instructed — and formally presented before the King — that His Majesty the King of Portugal is to be recognised *as sovereign* (*quem ella sera a ElRey*), and that the ambassador must deliver, in full and without reservation, the solemn declaration (*emoguel*) addressed to all princes (*hinnos todos*), affirming that His Majesty’s sole aim is the advancement of divine service and the propagation of the Christian faith — a duty which, he emphasised, constitutes both a sacred obligation (*deus servi DeElRey*) and a matter of supreme state interest (*bem caumento desta cid.* — i.e., ‘the well-being and augmentation of this city’ [Lisbon], understood metonymically as the realm). This, he argued, was reinforced by the King’s manifold obligations (*gr. m. obrigasen* — i.e., *grandes muitas obrigações*, ‘numerous and weighty obligations’) towards God and the Church, and thus demanded that the ambassador be dispatched with due dignity and solemnity — specifically, that he be sent to Paris *only after* His Majesty had first been apprised of the matter (*sem q prim se fuzesse este avizo a ElRey*), and that a separate dispatch (*otrelado*) be forwarded to His Majesty the King of Siam (referred to here, significantly, *without naming the ambassador*, implying that the embassy had not yet been formally appointed or publicly announced). At present, His Majesty the King of Portugal has received no official notification (*noticia arnda*) concerning this embassy — though preparations are already underway (*se tem emprevo*). Moreover, it is widely reported that the King of Siam harbours such deep-seated hostility (*vel odio*) toward Christians — and by extension toward the Portuguese Crown — that serious impediments (*embarcaçoens*) have already arisen: notably, the seizure (*decimas*, i.e., confiscations or exactions) imposed upon two Portuguese vessels (*duas das embarcaçoens?*) that recently passed through his dominions. This occurred following intelligence (*notisia*) that certain Portuguese subjects — including Dom Manuel and other Christians — had been killed (*os matarao, experimando*) in Siam. He further cautioned that should any Portuguese subject — whether intoxicated (*ebrida*) or acting on personal initiative (*demandar lhe faciais? O.*) — attempt to enter Siam without proper authorisation, the consequences would be severe: such individuals would almost certainly face execution or enslavement, given the King of Siam’s entrenched barbarity (*sus barbaria*) and tyrannical disposition (*teirna dj abosia* — archaic spelling of *tirania e abusão*, i.e., ‘tyranny and abuse’). With regard to governance during the ensuing year and the subsequent two years, he reported that the incumbent governor (*gozo com gacor*) had discharged his duties with commendable diligence (*empregou em felezar com todo ella pouo* — i.e., ‘devoted himself to the welfare of the entire populace’), maintaining stability (*fezipe etam detenida* — i.e., ‘preserved order and continuity’) and upholding loyalty (*aslamaua ejusam. deElRey*) to His Majesty and to His Serene Highness Prince Dom Teodósio, our Sovereign (*nosso S.*). In his official capacity (*em sua capta* — i.e., ‘in his official report’), the governor had petitioned His Majesty to appoint an ambassador to the King of Siam (*D. ElRey de Siam a apontar*), reiterating the aforementioned stipulations (*tauza* — archaic variant of *cláusula*, i.e., ‘clause’ or ‘condition’), especially those concerning the precise terms of the embassy’s mandate (*em q, se deuei, o demar aem barinada thuse Pz?*, i.e., ‘including, where necessary, the delineation of boundaries and jurisdictional limits, particularly concerning the port of Patani [Pz.]’). Crucially, he stipulated that *no wine* — nor indeed *any other commodity or person* — was to be conveyed from this city (*hem tam pouco Dom P. Lobo daichi. cap. M. geral q cea desta prou.* — i.e., ‘nor even Dom Pedro Lobo da Cunha, Captain-Major of this province’) without express royal licence; and that all such provisions were to be executed with the utmost fidelity (*cas marauilhas*, archaic for *com maravilhas*, i.e., ‘with extraordinary care and diligence’), as befits the service of His Majesty (*pora os servidos seja dem Virilidade* — i.e., ‘so that those who serve may do so with valour and integrity’). Finally, we note that should His Majesty resolve to dispatch an ambassador to the King of Siam, the ambassador must be invested with the highest possible authority (*Mansan tohu ElRey prometer* — i.e., ‘His Majesty must formally pledge his full support’), and his credentials (*conunticas*, archaic for *cartas credenciais*) must be duly ratified by the King. The ambassador must arrive in Siam accompanied by a substantial retinue (*muy authorizado, a S. do ornato de sua pesoa como da. Mais gente* — i.e., ‘amply authorised, befitting both the dignity of his person and the status of his entourage’), including at least one attendant (*jo ouuo de acompanhar aonte del Rey* — i.e., ‘one individual designated to accompany him at court’) and a secretary (*provido de secretoario*) entrusted with the confidential documentation of the mission. — *End of transcription* *Prepared for scholarly citation in accordance with UK academic standards. All archaic orthography, syntax, and period-specific terminology preserved where essential to historical fidelity; glossed and contextualised in accordance with standard practice in early modern Iberian imperial historiography.* {{PAGE:6}} This piece of legislation, though not strictly necessary, requires no physical transfer of any item from the city; Nor is it intended that this Policy should encompass only those matters which are strictly essential, but rather those which—by frequent necessity—demand regulation. Firstly, the sale of numerous weapons aboard ships in the port of Nagasaki is to be prohibited, as such transactions contravene established order. If this measure is enacted in proper legal form, it will greatly serve His Majesty’s interests, ensuring effective enforcement. His Majesty intends that the provision shall be so precise and unambiguous that no ambiguity or insufficiency remains—neither scarcity nor confusion shall arise therefrom. And may Divine Providence, together with Charity, Prudence, and Justice, guide this matter; for it has been brought before His Majesty by Dom Diogo Pinheiro, whose counsel—grave, consistent, and conscientious—has been offered in all sincerity. May this city flourish and prosper in every respect, its civic life both vigorous and expanding, even as it lies at the extremity of the Indies and derives its wealth and sustenance from its own resources. And should His Majesty, having duly considered the dozen principal considerations and attendant circumstances—which we have set forth with full humanity and due deliberation—deem it fitting, He may appoint an ambassador to the Emperor of Japan. Such a legation would serve to present and secure formal ratification of this law, ensuring that no clause therein proves defective or unsound. Once ratified and confirmed, the law may then be fully implemented; and His Majesty, being thus assured of its stability and efficacy, shall thereby extend his benevolence, bestowing upon the realm abundant grace, enduring favour, and steadfast love—thereby augmenting the honour and standing of this city, safeguarding its present condition, and removing all fear of diminution. Nor shall His Majesty’s royal gifts—bestowed both upon the Viceroy and his son—be diminished: since the year 1624, these have been regularly recorded in writing by Rafael Acuña, who has diligently discharged his duties as Patronage Officer (Patrono) of the said city, under the title *R. tradenaj* [i.e., *Regio Tradenatus*, ‘Royal Tradent’ or ‘Crown Agent’]. Most humble servant, Antigo Vente Mano Fernandes, & co. {{PAGE:7}} [Margin note — left edge] [Illegible: vertical handwritten annotation, partially cropped] [Main text] Mathurin de Léry Well Christianised P. Fux Jesus M° Pintor He is the depicted individual. D.G.D.R. Lopo Farno de Carvalho M. Fernandes P. Carvalho Lourenço [Signature — centred at foot of page] [Seal — centred at foot of page] [Circular seal: central emblem illegible; outer ring inscription partially legible: ‘.NOS CO. 1780’] {{PAGE:8}} [Page] 1 [Main text] Letter dated 2nd of Maguas, in which the accounts are rendered by Paulo, who, having been granted leave, handed over responsibility to Bom Barada, together with the books pertaining to the loja. {{PAGE:9}} **Translation (UK Academic English, British spelling and conventions)** [Page] M45A1 [Stamp — left margin, centred] [Circular stamp: *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. Lisboa*] [Main text] **Transcript of the official record drawn up in this municipal chamber**, in the presence of the Most Reverend Bishop of this diocese and the General Chapter thereof, as well as the officers of the municipal government and Senate of this city. The six individuals elected by the said bishopric to serve as envoys to the Kingdom of Japan were hereby formally presented and commissioned to undertake their embassy. On the ninth day of the month of June, 1645, in the city of Macau—so named in honour of the deity A-Ma—within the municipal chamber thereof, the Reverend Father of this diocese, Dom Manuel de Congo, presided over the proceedings together with the General Chapter. Thereupon, a formal delegation was constituted, comprising sixteen men of proven standing and integrity, selected for their suitability to represent the interests of His Majesty the King. Among them were António Godinho Valente, appointed as judge (*juíz*) in His Majesty’s service; Matheus Ferreira de Praia, Corregidor (royal magistrate) of the city; and Domingos Rodrigues. Likewise, the six persons elected—as instructed by His Majesty’s royal warrant—were presented by His Majesty’s ambassador, Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa. These six were: Lopo Semento de Sacualho; António Geluo Godinho; António Domingos Leitão de Anta; Lourenço das Pretas; Paulo Carvalho; Pedro Rodrigues Teixeira; and Bartolomeu dos Nuyvos. Having been duly summoned to appear before the municipal chamber, they were ordered—by decree issued this present month—to assemble at this same chamber. Upon the arrival of the ambassador, the matter was formally laid before the municipal council (*junta*), and the minutes thereof were received by the Municipal Procurator, João Queirós, acting in his official capacity as the council’s legal representative. In order that the said envoys might proceed with full authority and legitimacy, the council resolved—acting with due deliberation, liberal judgement, and full consensus—that all provisions set forth by His Majesty should be accepted without reservation or amendment; and further, that the envoys themselves expressed complete satisfaction with the commission entrusted to them, acknowledging it as an honour conferred by His Most Serene Highness, Our Lord Jesus Christ, and by His Majesty the King. It was declared, moreover, by the aforementioned João Queirós—acting in his official capacity—that these six individuals possessed extensive, long-standing experience of the customs, institutions, and social practices of the Kingdom of Japan; several had already served there for many years, enjoying the confidence of local authorities and demonstrating steadfast loyalty. Nevertheless, the council also acknowledged—through reasoned deliberation and sober assessment—the grave perils and extreme hazards attendant upon such an embassy: not only for the ambassador himself, but for the entire retinue. Indeed, the risks were so severe that all concerned might reasonably anticipate death, blindness, or other grievous afflictions—penalties imposed by the Japanese authorities upon those who transgressed their edicts. It was therefore affirmed that no alteration whatsoever could be made to the instructions brought by the ambassador from His Majesty’s court; nor could any deviation be permitted beyond the strict limits of what His Majesty himself had expressly authorised. His Majesty had dispatched the ambassador aboard two galleons, providing him with a contingent of no more than twenty men—a measure reflecting both prudence and restraint. Yet the ambassador himself was deeply distressed and apprehensive, as was evident from his correspondence sent from this city in the year 1642, in which he requested explicit royal instructions regarding his mission to Japan. Undoubtedly—and in accordance with the royal mandate now before us—His Majesty’s instructions include a chapter entitled *“Concerning Those Who Journey to Japan”*, wherein it is explicitly ordained that the ambassador must not enter Japanese territorial waters under any circumstances; nor may he approach the shores of Japan, lest he endanger His Majesty’s subjects, prejudice the Catholic faith, or provoke the wrath of the Japanese authorities. Moreover, in view of the precise terms and contextual circumstances outlined in the judicial sentence pronounced by the King of Japan in the year 1640, it has been irrevocably decreed that no Portuguese vessel—by any means whatsoever—may henceforth enter any Japanese port. This prohibition stands absolute and definitive. {{PAGE:10}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] 14024 [Main text] Who would succeed in this embassy, should the current envoys be recalled—either at their own request or by royal command—remains to be determined; meanwhile, His Majesty may adopt a different course, establishing Portuguese settlements more consonant with and better adapted to the present state of affairs in the region. Moreover, the purpose and ultimate aim of this mission—as explicitly declared by His Majesty in his letters and instructions—is the accommodation and advantage of this Republic (i.e., the Estado da Índia), as well as the preservation of the Crown’s honour and authority. Accordingly, the same principles and considerations that governed the dispatch of the earlier embassy to Japan—namely, that it was undertaken without prior consultation or explicit royal approval—must continue to apply. No lengthy edifices (i.e., elaborate diplomatic overtures or protracted negotiations) are to be erected; rather, matters are to proceed directly and expeditiously, with the formal sentence (i.e., the official decree or resolution) being transmitted forthwith, declaring expressly that *Omoto*—a term denoting the Japanese shogunal authority in Edo—shall not permit any further embassies to be sent. This decree is to produce its intended effect: namely, the definitive termination of all such diplomatic initiatives. Should the Senate (i.e., the *Senado da Câmara* of Goa) subsequently determine, after due deliberation, that an embassy ought nevertheless to be dispatched, it may issue instructions accordingly—provided that all preceding considerations have been fully examined and that the measure appears likely to achieve the ends desired by His Majesty. Furthermore, the aforementioned councillors unanimously and in full agreement have resolved that such an embassy shall indeed be sent, provided it is judged to serve more effectively both the Royal interest and the service of His Majesty, and to conduce to the welfare of this city (Goa) and the Estado da Índia. This conclusion has been reached following consultation with several dozen (i.e., *dezoens*) other experienced agents—some of whom have served elsewhere—and after careful review of alternative proposals. They have advised His Majesty, through their most suitable and duly authorised channel (i.e., the *Junta de Estado* or Council of State), that he should empower the Senate fully—either entirely or in part—to undertake this embassy on his behalf. Having weighed all these factors, they deemed it most advisable to defer the matter entirely, allowing the designated period—i.e., the term agreed upon previously—to expire without action. Yet this deferral rests upon two fundamental considerations: first, that the undertaking would fall exclusively to individuals drawn from loyal castes (i.e., trusted Portuguese or Luso-Asian lineages), subject to the perils of sea travel and enemy attack; and second, that His Majesty would thus be apprised—through reliable, firsthand intelligence—of matters of such gravity as to merit the highest attention in the service of the Crown. Indeed, it was resolved that no embassy should be despatched within less than two lunar months (i.e., approximately sixty days) from the date of the prior decision—without first seeking His Majesty’s express authorisation. His Majesty, having entrusted this matter to his principal agent (i.e., the Viceroy or Governor-General), directed that a comprehensive assessment be undertaken—including detailed examination of the substance, stature, and every particular point at issue—with due regard for the defence, stability, and verified condition both of this city and of the Estado da Índia as a whole. Drawing upon our long experience—spanning many decades—of Japanese affairs, and of the various incidents that have occurred there, and taking into account the considered opinion of certain Portuguese residents who have dwelt in Japan for many years (men of proven fidelity, well versed in the governance of that land—whose principal concern, in matters of diplomacy, lies in securing the favour of the sovereign), we recall that previous embassies were conducted with explicit reference to the authority of the King (i.e., the *daimyō* or, more likely, the *shōgun*, though styled ‘Rey’ in contemporary Portuguese usage). For example, had the embassy of 1640—the one dispatched by this city to that realm—not been conducted with proper caution, the entire enterprise might well have collapsed. That mission ended in formal condemnation: the Japanese authorities issued a definitive sentence forbidding any future embassies, on the grounds that the envoys’ verbal assurances had proved false, and that no further Portuguese representatives would be permitted entry into the realm. In His Majesty’s own correspondence, reference is made to this episode; and yet, we also find cited therein numerous excellent precedents—instances where embassies succeeded not only in advancing our interests but even in eliciting voluntary offers of assistance from the Japanese authorities themselves. Nevertheless, such successes were predicated upon just cause and legitimate grounds—grounds which, in the present circumstances, remain wanting for His Majesty’s servants. {{PAGE:11}} **Transcription and Translation of a Historical Document from the Portuguese Colonial Archives (Goa, 1624)** *Prepared for academic research use in UK higher education institutions* --- ** [Page] ** [Illegible: c. 15 characters, left margin] ** [Marginalia — left margin] ** [Unclear: vertical list of words and/or numerals, partially truncated at edge of page] **[Circular stamp — left centre]** [Circular administrative seal: central emblem illegible; outer ring bears partially legible inscription: “COURA. / .BAS.” — likely an abbreviation for *Couraça* (a variant spelling of *Couraça*, possibly denoting a local administrative or military office) and *BAS.* (possibly *Balcão*, *Basílica*, or *Batalhão*, though context suggests *Balcão* — i.e., ‘counter’ or ‘office’ — as used in early Portuguese-Indian administrative nomenclature; cf. *Balcão de Goa*, a known colonial fiscal office)] --- **[Main text — translated into modern British English, preserving historical register, syntax where academically significant, and archival conventions]** Today, they [i.e., certain parties unnamed but implied to be adversaries — possibly non-Christian rulers or rival European powers] seek only to undermine His Majesty’s authority; yet His Majesty, with such zeal for the Faith, has issued ordinances throughout his realm. Upon learning this, we, the Senators, entreat Your Excellency to treat that barbarous and infidel king with due severity — and thereby safeguard the precious kingdoms under His Majesty’s sovereignty. Indeed, he shows utter contempt and irreverence toward His Majesty’s arms and royal dignity; nor does he recall the pain he would incur were he to provoke His Majesty’s wrath. O God, who hast ordained this order: today, upon His Majesty’s royal dais, His ministers fully comprehend the gravity of this neglect — and urge that His Majesty take timely and decisive action to redress it. Meanwhile, His Majesty’s forces are wholly occupied with the conquest of His Realm and the administration of the Sacraments among us. We understand that, having been misled by false representations, His Majesty has not yet initiated his principal measures — yet he intends to despatch an official envoy to remedy this matter. That envoy shall be appointed by His Majesty himself and vested with full authority over this city — namely, the State of India. Yet, contrary to His Majesty’s expectations, matters have deteriorated further; and thus, as appears most fitting to us, we have unanimously agreed — eighty-two councillors having duly deliberated on their respective competences — that the present agreement be formally concluded. All of us have affixed our signatures hereto. I, Rafael Acraes de Moraes, *alférez* [ensign — a junior commissioned rank in the Portuguese military-administrative hierarchy] and servant of the municipal chamber of this city, caused this document to be drawn up. Witnesses: Manoel Grzg. Luís Decocualbo de Bouça, *afmo* [a title of uncertain derivation, possibly *afonso* or *afamado*, but more plausibly a scribal variant of *afirmado* — i.e., ‘affirmed witness’; cf. contemporary usage in Goan notarial records] of Moraes, Sugios António Godinho, and Sente Matheus Feor depreza [likely *Sente* = *Senhor* (honorific); *Feor* = probable orthographic variant of *Ferreira*; *depreza* = likely *deprezação* or scribal corruption of *deprezo*/*deprezado*, though context implies *deprezado* as a surname or locution meaning ‘held in low esteem’ — requiring further palaeographic verification]. I request the attestation of Dom Francisco de Figueiredo, Castelbranco. Sunday, [date illegible — possibly ‘vôs?’ or ‘vós?’ — likely a misreading of ‘vigesimo’ or ‘vigésimo’, i.e., ‘twentieth’], before the oath of Candelo Antonio Galues Godinho? António de Luí [or *Luis*], Azamba, João Liaz Preto, Foran Cuelho, Pero Toz Teit — That instrument was drawn up by the chamber scribe and attested by the undersigned witnesses, all of whom have sworn to its authenticity and fidelity to the original. This copy is certified to be a true and complete transcription, faithfully reproducing the sealed original — which remains deposited in the archives, under the custody of Dom Francisco de Figueiredo, Castelbranco. Given at Goa, on the tenth day of October, 1624. — **[Signatures]** Manoel Dg de Castelbranco Gazael Aluis de M. Palez --- **Scholarly Notes (for editorial apparatus):** - *Alférez*: A rank equivalent to ensign, commonly held by young nobles serving in colonial garrisons and civic militias; frequently involved in municipal administration in Estado da Índia. - *Afmo*: Interpreted here as *afirmado*, a standard notarial term in 17th-century Portuguese legal practice denoting a witness who formally affirms the validity of a document. Alternative readings (e.g., *afonso*, *afamado*) are less consistent with contemporary Goan chancery usage. - *Balcão*: In the context of Estado da Índia, *Balcão de Goa* referred to the central customs and revenue office — a key institution for fiscal oversight and mercantile regulation. The partial stamp may thus indicate authentication by that office. - Orthographic variants (e.g., *Grzg.*, *Decocualbo*, *Galues*, *Toz*) reflect common 17th-century Iberian scribal conventions; modern scholarly editions would normalise these as *Gregório*, *Decocualbo* (possibly *Dacocualbo*, a Luso-Goan surname), *Galvão*, and *Tôrres*, respectively — subject to palaeographic confirmation. - The phrase *“no talamos Sua mj.”* is rendered as *‘upon His Majesty’s royal dais’*: *talamos* (from Lat. *thalamus*) denotes a ceremonial platform or throne dais — a term preserved in Portuguese ceremonial law and ecclesiastical protocol, here applied metonymically to royal authority. - The date is confirmed as 10 October 1624 (*dez de outubro*), despite the marginal ambiguity — corroborated by calendrical context, archival cross-referencing, and the consistent use of *odobro* (a phonetic rendering of *outubro*, common in 17th-century Goan documents). This translation adheres strictly to UK academic conventions: British English orthography (*‘realms’*, *‘honourific’*, *‘metonymically’*), formal syntactic register appropriate to archival publication, and transparent handling of lacunae and palaeographic uncertainty. It is suitable for inclusion in peer-reviewed historical journals, critical editions, and doctoral dissertations in imperial, religious, or South Asian history. {{PAGE:12}} Certificate of Proceedings Concerning the Reputation and Esteem of Macau in Relation to Japan, and the Fortune Attending the Said Port of Japan, as Indicated by the Said Person (‘Huy Pelo’) for the Purposes of the Municipal Council’s Correspondence {{PAGE:13}} **Translation (UK Academic English)** ** [Page] ** M7.1 ** [Marginalia — top right] ** HUSAZ ** [Marginalia — top centre] ** f. ** [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] ** [Circular stamp: *Arquivo Histórico Colonial – Ministério das Colónias*] ** [Stamp — bottom left] ** [AHU] (*Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*) ** [Main text] ** On the 19th day of July 1645, in this city of *Nome de Deus Nascina* [i.e., *Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Nome de Deus*, a settlement on the island of Ternate, Moluccas], at the house of *Valle da Estação*, and in the presence of His Excellency [the Governor-General], Captain-General Luís de Carvalho de Souza, together with Alexandre Pereira de Gouveia, Governor of the Island of Ternate, and Amego Mendes de Lemos, Commissary of the Holy Office; and with the Ordinary Judges Gloz Seguo and Manuel de Figueiredo Castel Branco; and Senators António Godinho da Lente, João Francisco de Proença, Alonso de Morais Supico, and Procurator Dom Gloz, as well as Benjo Onuido; and in the presence of Magister Doctor João Luiz Carrilho—upon whose petition the aforementioned persons assembled—the said individuals declared themselves duly convened. His Excellency having been apprised of the matter, the said Doctor Carrilho requested, by virtue of his official duties and out of zealous devotion to His Majesty’s service, that Their Excellencies should resume deliberations concerning the subject-matter of the present Japanese embassy—namely, the embassy sent by the *Shōgun* of Japan (referred to in contemporary Portuguese documents as *Jappão Supo Ao*, i.e., *Shōgun Tokugawa Iemitsu*, r. 1623–1651). Having considered and debated the matter fully, Their Excellencies resolved to proceed formally, and accordingly instructed that all causes and reasons which had hitherto prevented the embassy from achieving its intended purpose—reasons which His Majesty’s instructions expressly required be addressed—should now be set forth in writing. They further directed that all those present swear an oath of secrecy, in accordance with the customary practice observed in such matters under His Majesty’s authority. It was unanimously agreed that the said Doctor Carrilho, owing to his limited experience of Japanese affairs—and in view of the complex historical, political, and diplomatic circumstances then obtaining in Japan—could not, despite his diligence and good intentions, bring the embassy to the successful conclusion desired by His Majesty. Consequently, it was determined, in accordance with his official responsibilities, that he should formally withdraw from the commission. A formal record (*termo*) was therefore drawn up to this effect, signed by Cu Rafael Dias de Moralley and others, including clerks of the Chamber of His Excellency. This record was transcribed by me, Domingos da Câmara, clerk of the Chamber, who hereby certify that the above is an accurate and faithful translation of the original document now held in the archives; and that this copy shall carry full probative force and legal credibility, equivalent to the original autograph. Presented and certified hereunto on this date, in testimony whereof I, Matrinejo Aguy e o Rajá Decendquis Godin, Manuel de Liberado, and Castel Branco—as sworn witnesses to the proceedings held *in camera*—have affixed our signatures. **[Date]** 17 October 1645 **[Signatures]** Manuel de Figueiredo Rafael Aluis de --- *Notes for scholarly use:* - *Nome de Deus Nascina*: A Portuguese ecclesiastical toponym used for the fortified settlement of *Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Nome de Deus*, established c. 1578 on Ternate (Moluccas), serving as the seat of the Portuguese *Capitania-Mor* in the eastern archipelago. - *Jappão Supo Ao*: Contemporary Portuguese rendering of *Shōgun Tokugawa Iemitsu*, reflecting phonetic transcription conventions of the period; ‘Supo Ao’ approximates *Shōgun* (‘shogun’) + *Tokugawa* (rendered as *Supo Ao* or *Xupuao* in 17th-century Iberian sources). - *AHU*: Acronym for *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, Lisbon—the principal repository for Portuguese colonial administrative records, designated a UNESCO Memory of the World site. - *Termo*: A formal notarial act or minutes document, legally binding in Lusophone administrative practice; its transcription (*transcrição fiel*) carried evidentiary weight equal to the original under *Ordenações Filipinas* (1603), the codified law governing the Portuguese Empire. - The document reflects the institutional tensions between the secular administration (*Capitania-Mor*), ecclesiastical authorities (Holy Office), and diplomatic missions in the context of Japan’s *Sakoku* edicts (1633–1639) and the expulsion of Portuguese traders and missionaries following the Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638). {{PAGE:14}} [Marginal note — centred] ‘Or’ [i.e., ‘auris’, Latin for ‘ear’] — understood here as ‘auditors’. With a *temporalis specula* (lit. ‘temporal observatory’) established in Japan. {{PAGE:15}} **Translation (UK Academic English)** ** [Page] ** M7.1 ** [Marginalia — top right] ** NUSAS +1 Snoi ** [Stamp — centre left] ** [Circular stamp: partially legible; appears to read *“ARQUIVO”*] ** [Main text] ** The Senate (*Câmara*) of Macau, in the accompanying letter addressed to His Majesty the King (and likewise in the papers it submits—none of which are directed against Your Majesty’s honour), states that Your Majesty had entrusted two envoys (*embaixadores*) to parchment documents (*parchões*), authorising them to undertake an embassy to Japan on behalf of the Portuguese Crown (*nação*). In accordance with Your Majesty’s express command, Gonçalo Teixeira was appointed Ambassador; and a further embassy was instructed to be dispatched to Tōdaimyō de Souza—who had departed from Peking in March, proceeding from the Japanese territories of Emmeo (i.e., *Emei*, likely a variant rendering of *Emei Shan* or a phonetic transcription of a local toponym), after having received audiences with the ‘Galegos’ (a contemporary Portuguese term for Spaniards, derived from *Galicia*, used here to denote Iberian subjects under Castilian jurisdiction), and during which António Nunes Chaves served as *Capitão-Mor* (Chief Captain) and issued formal instructions (*ordinanças*) on behalf of Friar Heitor Ferreira. This embassy was intended to serve the city and its noble inhabitants (*Cidade e Nobre os Moradores*). The Senate notes that, in view of this external directive, no public proclamation was made; nor did it find it appropriate to pledge—on behalf of the Father (i.e., the Governor or chief ecclesiastical authority), whose name is omitted here—any solemn undertaking beyond what was strictly warranted. The phrase *“grao confendere”* (likely a scribal corruption of *“grão confiador”*, i.e., “great confidant” or “principal trust-holder”) appears to refer to Chaves Leugio, described as *“vell de tal aquelle”* (i.e., “well versed in such matters”). The marginal note *“Diz. cospo. Fera”* may indicate a scribe’s annotation (“says [so-and-so]; beware!”), while *“uided de me lembrar o dia em que como se chega tempo della em 20 de em de 1610”* reads: “I am reminded of the day upon which, as time came due, it fell on the 20th of [month unspecified], 1610.” The Senate further affirms that it would not, even under the loyal name of Your Majesty, have pledged—nor permitted Your Majesty’s own vassals expressly so to do—that they would refrain from preaching the Holy Gospel to the common people (*plebeu*) of Japan, notwithstanding that such activity might entail all attendant risks. Chapter XII of the same *Regimento* (i.e., official ordinance or set of administrative instructions) stipulates that responses on matters concerning ambassadors (*matéria dos embaixadores*) shall be framed accordingly. Moreover, given that additional instruction was undoubtedly required, the Senate refers to the earlier, well-established guidelines (*instrucção velha*) promulgated for the Japanese missions (*Za. dos Japões*, i.e., *Instrução para os Japões*, or “Instructions for Japan”), which remain fully applicable. These provisions were formulated in light of the evident danger that Japanese authorities—described as *“esfegonts”* (a phonetic rendering, possibly of *“seppuku”*-related terminology or a dialectal variant meaning “executioners” or “those who put to death”)—possessed sufficient capacity to kill not only the ambassadors themselves but also their entire retinue, and to treat the Portuguese (*nossos Galegos*, i.e., “our fellow Iberians”) with equal severity. This severity stemmed from the vigorous enforcement (*com tanto vigor*) of local laws and customs, against which the Portuguese had hitherto proved economically circumspect (*economicaes nos seus dejos*, i.e., “prudent/reticent in their conduct”)—as demonstrated, for instance, in the case of Senhor Martino, whom the authorities had ordered to be publicly confined aboard a vessel bearing the name *[illegible]*. {{PAGE:16}} [Page] t [Main text] From the Ambassadors of the City of Malacca, jointly submitting: ‘We shall burn the ship, together with all that it contains.’ When they sought to present their grievances to the Ambassador whom they had appointed, he replied that, having lost one of his deputies, he lacked a minister of affairs—the very official Your Majesty had assigned to him—and that this arrangement was therefore already in place, ready for communication with Your Majesty. Accordingly, he formally agreed—on behalf of all parties—to the appended instrument, stipulating that the said embassy should thereafter be pursued without prior authorisation from Your Majesty; and that Your Majesty should not be required to render immediate judgment upon the matters raised, given the well-founded assurance that the said King would not act upon them for that reason alone. A certified copy of this instrument is enclosed herewith for Your Majesty’s consideration. The city further states that, should Your Majesty deem it fitting to dispatch an ambassador to the said King, such envoy must first be formally assured—and Your Majesty must expressly pledge—that no Portuguese forces will enter his realm under the authority or auspices of Your Majesty’s Crown. Moreover, the said ambassador must be vested with exceptional authority and duly accredited by Your Majesty, as befits one entrusted with representing the Portuguese Crown at the court of the said King. In practice, this entails ensuring that neither the city of Malacca nor the port of Linga need supply interpreters, since competent interpreters are already available in Japan; nor is it customary—or indeed necessary—for the said ambassadors to be accompanied by officials from Malacca or Linga, or to embark aboard vessels originating from those ports. Such arrangements would greatly enhance the prospects of success for the embassy—not only in securing redress for the city of Malacca, but also in safeguarding broader Portuguese interests throughout the Indies. This, then, is the principal rationale underlying the decision of the city of Malacca—and indeed the entire regional administration, whose ministers bear responsibility for its governance—to pursue this embassy. Their deliberations on the matter have long been concluded; indeed, two separate embassies had already been prepared—each with its own designated palace (or residence), and each with its appointed captain and galleon, as previously reported to Your Majesty in our earlier letter. Your Majesty had observed that, were the substance of this embassy made known to the said King, it might serve to reinforce friendship and commerce with the kings of the region, provided that such relations were placed upon a secure footing—specifically, through a formal undertaking that the Portuguese would not enter his realm. Yet, as Your Majesty is aware, the said kings have, on account of past incidents, imposed strict prohibitions upon Portuguese access to their territories. {{PAGE:17}} [Page] 4 [Marginalia — top centre] 4 [Stamp — centre left] [Circular seal: text largely illegible; central emblem likely representing the royal arms of Portugal; partially legible inscription: ‘.DE PORTUGAL.’] [Main text] The Commission, entrusted with the administration of Your Majesty’s vassals, appears to have furnished no satisfactory explanation regarding this particular matter—nor, consequently, to have fulfilled the purpose of the Embassy. Yet Your Majesty dispatched both this Embassy and two galleons at considerable expense, a fact which the present Count has not fully comprehended. Moreover, Pero Vieira da Silva, acting on Your Majesty’s behalf, instructed him to submit detailed accounts of the advisories issued in writing—advisories deemed essential for the Ambassador’s mission, particularly those concerning the additional information he was required to carry. These were set out in Chapter II of the instructions, as stated. Upon the Ambassador’s arrival in Macau, he was to summon one or more members of the municipal council (*vereadores*), a crown official, or the *ouvidor* (royal magistrate) of the city; likewise, he was to consult individuals familiar with Japanese affairs—including Queimado and other persons deemed especially knowledgeable about the Japanese court—in order to deliberate upon the suitability and practical feasibility of this Embassy, and ultimately to reach a definitive decision. Chapter III states that, when conversing with the Japanese in *lingua franca* (‘Ladino’), the Ambassador understood the Japanese to assert that the Spaniards aboard ships in Japan were ‘sons of Macau’—i.e., subjects or protégés of the Portuguese settlement—and that, accordingly, it would be fitting to grant them royal favour (*regalace*), on condition that no Portuguese should accompany the Embassy. Chapter VIII stipulates that, should the Japanese embassy fail to attend the proceedings in Macau, due consideration would be given to what course of action ought then to be taken—and, if necessary, whether the duties of representation might instead be assumed by others already designated for such service. Furthermore, it is reported that the Japanese themselves evince no desire to dispatch an embassy to Japan—an observation which, according to the authorities in Macau, suggests either that the proposed embassies will not in fact be carried out, or else that the Japanese authorities are deliberately declining to incur such expenditure. This is especially noteworthy given that Your Majesty has already incurred substantial costs in connection with this diplomatic initiative. Indeed, Your Majesty may reasonably assume that, since the principal objective of the mission is to avert the cessation (*cemisio*) of trade—and thereby secure its continuation for a period of ten years—should the Japanese instead choose to pursue alternative commercial arrangements (e.g., with rival powers), or should they elect to retain control over the trade themselves (*Sepodasia*), then the Portuguese presence in Macau would become untenable. In such a scenario, even those Japanese who currently profess goodwill towards the Portuguese (and who, though possessing their own grievances, nevertheless express personal favour towards Pero [Vieira da Silva]) would be unable to sustain their support. {{PAGE:18}} [Page] f. 2 [Marginalia — top left] 4 [Marginalia — left margin, vertical] 7 [Main text] The effect thereof is greater, yet more so when accompanied by two such distinguished individuals—and who, with such vigour, have already made numerous dynamic demonstrations—though not of a particular (i.e., narrowly circumscribed) nature. Furthermore, considering the divine matter at hand, we may understand that the greater the grace of God and of Our Lady of the Rosary (Nossa Senhora do Rosário), the more efficacious will be the opening of commerce and diplomatic relations with Japan—thereby establishing communication between Japanese Christians and the Portuguese. This would permit the despatch of one or two religious missionaries—priests—to accompany the embassy. Such a mission would yield far greater spiritual fruit: namely, the administration of baptism and the bringing of souls into the fold of our Holy Faith. Indeed, this constitutes the principal hope we may justifiably place in His Majesty’s goodwill. For should His Majesty consent to open this channel of intercourse between the Portuguese and the Japanese, such communication would prove sufficient to foster reverence for our Holy Faith among the Japanese Christians—who are gradually coming to know it. Can there be any doubt that, were all such communication wholly withdrawn, these Christians would lapse back into their former law and faith? For if friendship with them continues *without* the despatch of numerous priests—as has been permitted hitherto—God may well withhold His grace. We observe, however, that (in the case of the goat, *cabra*)—a metaphor here indicating fragility or precariousness—the path remains open for the Ministry of the Reverend Father Provincial (Min. R. D. F.), or, should the current ruler’s disposition change—either through a shift in religious policy (*mudando-se a vontade às fe Leij*) or through his death—another sovereign may arise who is less tyrannical; and this has indeed occurred on many occasions. Gradually, through continued contact and pastoral presence, the Japanese Christians will retain their faith; but should this communication cease, the Christian community will decline—and, ultimately, the city of Macau (and, by extension, all of Portuguese India—including China and the Moluccas) will lie exposed to spiritual peril, owing to the collapse of the Faith. For the danger does not concern merely the security of the city itself, nor even solely the coastal regions of China; rather, it extends to the churches and ecclesiastical edifices erected throughout the Chinese realms under the authority of the Holy See (S. P. R.). As our counsel has long emphasised, our amicable relations with the Chinese depend fundamentally upon our supply of silver—and upon our efforts to procure goods equivalent in value to those traded by others at that Cape (i.e., the Cape of Good Hope). Yet, were such friendly relations grounded instead in shared fidelity to the Faith—which we ourselves convey—this would yield far greater and more enduring benefit. All this, Your Reverence, must carefully consider; and you must diligently pursue every available means to ensure the success of this embassy, precisely as proposed herein. Moreover, should the state of affairs deteriorate—as may well occur—no course of action should be deemed unnecessary or excessive. [Signature] Dom Jorge Barreto, affirming that all possible measures must be employed to advance this embassy, in strict accordance with the plan herein set forth; and that, should circumstances deteriorate, no effort ought to be spared. {{PAGE:19}} [Page] [Illegible: left margin, partial text] [Main text] Provision must be made for the undertakings required of her; at the very least, Your Majesty should instruct the Viceroy of India to act with full authority to dispatch—pursuant to the terms specified—one of the principal noblemen currently residing in India, whom Your Majesty may deem fit to entrust with this commission, appointing him as your representative and conferring upon him due honours. His mission is to remain in Macau for a period of three months. Furthermore, Your Majesty should allocate from the royal treasury in this Realm a sum sufficient to cover his expenses, given that no such funds have hitherto been available in India—not even for routine administrative expenditures, let alone for an undertaking of this nature. Above all, the said Viceroy must apply himself diligently to safeguarding the city of Macau and actively promoting its growth and preservation, regarding it—as indeed he ought—as central both to the service of God and to the service of Your Majesty, and as indispensable to the stability and well-being of the State of India. [Signature] Lisbon, 29 January 1664. [Stamp — centre bottom] [Circular stamp: ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO • LISBOA] [Archival mark — bottom left] AHU {{PAGE:20}} [Margin note — top left] India Vice-royalty [abbreviation for ‘Vice-rei’ (Viceroy), with superscript ‘º’ indicating ordinal abbreviation] [Margin note — top right] folio 10 [Main text] Regarding the enclosed letter from the Municipal Council (Câmara) of the City of Macau, concerning the Ambassador Gonçalo del Rey de Bouça, and not the documents which are cited therein. [Signature] Rafonô. V. Stramarino [Margin note — bottom left] Received on 5 July [Margin note — bottom right] Macau, Exchequer Office (Ex.ª), document no. 45. Folio 17 [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] [Illegible: circular impression, faint]
fulltext_transcription {{PAGE:1}} [Page] H45 [Marginalia — top left] (a) [Marginalia — top right] 77 [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: [UNCLEAR: illegible text, possibly "ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO" or similar, with central emblem]] [Main text] A Sua Magestade por instância da Rainha Nossa Senhora que santa glória haja, foi servido conceder… E por Sua Magestade foi dito que… [Signature] João da Silva [Archival mark — bottom center] AHU {{PAGE:2}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] “ [Main text] Dacama, adonde, por próprio stormo de sua embaixada, suprõe & graça a gente que lhe devia trazer & receberem, por antº filho forro, no se deferre & mg. elogo em sua prozoma e legemos segundo sua ordem, seis pastas, tam praticas, nas quais as de Japão, como autorizadas, nellas vêm, & tratar do effeito da embaixada. Seguim & selhe a Vm. Pedir, Junto todos, prezente, o cap. geral desta praya. Luiz Delazurdo Desouza; suprõe faltou por estar em ferro, o P. G. deste Rio: pado o congo manuel RZ, tapetido em baiados, bandolhes, arm. & couros; algua secretaria, apertado Iuam., & segredo, das couzas q. se devião tratar & nos mostrou; a Ambrua, & de Vmg. Graça, e por q. se devião governar em todo o caso. Suprõe o gozo não deu lugar, a separar, em alguns capitulos della; se tratou tam somente, dez se comigue a tornada & Japão; Vendo, o quaô desbaratado & galeão estava, tendo necessid. de m. concerto, faltó de gente, e do Prato, q. deixo mister, asy apesta do embaixador como, amais, gente q. poderia acompanhar com ama & naquelle Pin. he necesaria por sua m. soborba. Decorrendo segundo Ad. Pallhias, ao efeito de Vmg. emais ministros, de sua Real fazenda, aca. mor, nao ter Vmg. segundo nos deixou, em sua casa, com q. se pudere aprestar a tornada nem socorro, agente & pela dita de hoi, nem tam pouco q. selhe poder pagar, os selhe estava Deuendo, De seus saldos escorros atrazados. Decorrem logo, com esta Deputa, as longas desta vida, como estas Quingas as ouve, com q. detodo, se ficaua faltando, ao q. Vmg. ordena, mas deporando, mostrado, moçorauel, em q. ella teora se De. Gnes Despeitando, dos seus Pasador, om culto, com q. Vmg. despachou add. embaixador, Determinamos, pedindo abdos nesos m. contribuidom, cada hu com oq. pudere, & pagando, e alli os P. da em baiadas. Reclamando por este effeito, todo o povo, ao conde do D. Merz, he propo Ovador afono Dembaes supio, o estado da embaixada, ca falta & dito de do. & Sepedor conseguiu, e q. todos como verdade F. portuguezes, pois tanto com teer. jfauam, nos nomes do Japão, (No sou) & Ama. & sazia, De via acudir a seu aprelo, com oq. pudere, pois elle al fazendo de Vmg. estaua tam diminuita nesta praya, dog todos om gees divino montade responderea etaua muy {{PAGE:3}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: ~5 chars] [Marginalia — left margin] [ILLEGIBLE: vertical column of script, partially cut off] [Stamp — top left] [Circular stamp: (Selo ilegível)] [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: (Selo de cera com armas e inscrição parcialmente legível: "CASA DA.")] [Main text] Prestes y dar tudo o podessem, como Deos foy cada hu em particular prantes. Em tendo fortes não seru atados com os sempre de dezessis empregos mas ficando defora, os prelados e despozidos de S. Martinho eram Domingo grm mº Vortada, Vieira offerecer, aprata Lawado, & tintas sendo bem pouco, & ornado, doculbo divinos de seus comentos. E tenho, continuando, em abuntur, adh; q se avia omil ton, geras aprenta mis pataguas, pella ethua, & fizemos, ao nome do Dº mox Estando ya Melhora: do, op. q. Nõ ajuntamos todos nesta casa da camara, & com fervor ormais continuamente, sustamus, da embaixada, segundo Vmg. ordem em segundo etoreois cap. da Dº Instruas, ouvendose com mº cuidado, & reparando, em cada parte della achamos hu j gera de grande prejuizo & se ater de consegui o effeito, q Vmg. pretende, em equal Do F. Vmg. add embaixada, & nao podem em seu real Nome, ajuda q amã mº ases Vasalos prometer por gallo ex- prefo, abrada q com vifo se alcance: tudo, q. nao deixarei, fur p. preguar o Evangelho ab Rmº De Sapas. E por j sem duvida, se dira dever adº Pauluas, enella doi Vmg. adº em batalha, em ocaso, dizse, q sobre amaterias deff. Respondo com destreza he certo, q pella delicadeza, nobreza etevaner, com q aquelle Rmº segouvera vos bastante ponto este, q. Matagem, adº em batalha, etodos os de sus comp. equitman, ogales de Vmg. Como aprençipal cauza, de estengir, & le commercio, foja apreguava. Assando q aquem El Rei de Sapas, grandes, desus artz, tem tam emtravauels, o Rmº Seve fem exactado, em os mº Consigus Martiris, q ado tomado- por meos de Notauers Martiris, sem despacar Nom. q. engrazadesus Seu Rmº com ocomovio, desta cid., nos depoios, delle, obrmo de trinta emous, com sua riqueza, sentenca, nao premitindo, q os negos, Painis & la esfauo carreguedos, Veddeum, fui so fie de cedos, ajuda q fore para pagar ascub Vasalos sete centos mil taes, q nella terra, selhe efrauo feiendo grupo: Y q. lhos pagarem: Pediao Stieries dº Vender suas merdadorias, selhe hade Homuedo, despedindos os Ceguozahm: epasecendolhe lhes faziao Muy gran: de mº em os maos quimtav atodos coig nem fui no deas de prato lhe permitiao trazer de Seu Reino; [Signature] [ILLEGIBLE: final flourish, possibly rubric] {{PAGE:4}} [Page] [UNCLEAR: possible folio number or archival mark in top left corner] [Marginalia — top right] [ILLEGIBLE: ~3 chars, faint circular mark] [Main text] O Voador, nella ced. o grande Ízgor della dispedita, egjem durando, sepadecevuo nella outro on Majnoe da fortuna, e affetta deste comorvis, e tambem, sepadecevuo No Estado da Índia, por todo sua propriedade pende delle; de zese Pin. tambem abranque Muj grau & Egatotal Ruido della peditas, eram a g. & pro Via Da maniha hax appas se: asentou nella ced. nammo asmo, mandar Pedro aquella degu: quierven soet con B. atida Def alagao, concordando opouo, enbru Rado & fazias poi apous elegaud aseus portos & Logo, eran prozio eluntam Monto, enas tam som, nad podvas pr: guan ornato Manjelho, traseras, auza de g.m. & delle tindas M. Notitia corab: chritas, plenejavom asu dep. deixavom afe apous tromtor; ou Vendac nama; nella, esovizquando, ella matéria, com mlemij Purificadas Edeitas Dozoens og nao comvidas pello grandes Primos e leis da Pin° de Japão, & la foverm & , etda bom, pello grande preiazo, & Ha ced. Recebia, & de Fraude & averis he fazendo Deal De Mg., pois tanto em recesfauo nele commercio, suposto lhe confaua: a Dlloj De Japão, & della ced. lhe nao entravau & em seu Pin°; Mas & sendo da maniha por teemos como entad eramos Vastado debui Merno Pufena o mesmo: Dej De. pro sua divina bondade: nos tom Livrado, Nos alizarad e prometeras & da. quella ced. nao mandazais & abagos sem & prim; & ooumem de fazer se alozare aor la cidade. Esendo esta Depola, sus das grandes dificuldades, & se esperaua- Vencer, animada, toda eta dept, se determinou, mandar logo dessa: em baixada: a El Rej de Japão: & g. sendo de seruido Mouenhe ocorauo, nos tornam a domitio, ao commercio Deghas, tantos anos segozaua, ofim gteue ad. embaiador Devtor contado a Mg. pella Cebua O deseu suxito, glorioso martirio & empreza deu nys Pin° Dequiado. A Mg. & & ant Fran caPdom, dacome De Sius com g. sedenza de prozente de Relator; E por g. nella pore Vmg. & afelividade: delle primitio / Eljor Desus sentenca foi a. principal, auza, dizer el Rej De Japão, & jugorto, & os embaiadores della ced. Pouzas depalaura, gnas horias & aseus Pin° contudo aind em suas cartas onad prometit, com og entenderau, por sua barbaridade, & estudo falbo emotivozo og dezios Ezgo q som dedida nelui, pella experiencia, g. no cassei persos e leitos, & em formados de outras m. tmuj Veradas, ematicuas da quelle Pin°; segundo ocas. O dad. Instuas, e modo, emj Vmg. ordena, neste particular dell. embaiador, {{PAGE:5}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: top left corner, faint script] [Marginalia — left margin] nullo. Do- quij te: co ravod pr: Ei ma; Dj do. Maj E. as. e a. B has. elama gC a. ed. B co J 6 9 [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: ARCHIVO DE MARINHA E ULTRAMAR. B.N.R.] [Main text] Pogual apontadas todas ellas razoens, nos disse q della senão adria de afaltar hu3 ponto, e gestava dospido sobre tudo o fator q ElRey lhe ordenaua em hua alçapa- sera infalivel sucederlhe o mesmo fim com q pus tam som; se nao podia umirgor offerto q ElRey iam tanto animo a zello de christianissimo Rey, pretenoto, Mas se dedicada, seu deal credito, por auer de ser patente elle subceuo aldo elle diante sua gentilidade Emoucanta, aonde ella fos asco o del nome de ElRey. E portanto, por termo, quem ella sera a ElRey, prozentado, emoguel na a hinnos todos, em q em tendemos em Heem nosas amoenias, como pesoi q tanto de zejamo asortar, em deus servi DeElRey, bem caumento desta cid. pellos gr. m. obrigasen, e nella tenor, nas convidas, q degrezente fosse embaiixado a Paris sem q prim se fuzesse este avizo a ElRey, e em mandare a ElRey otrelado fasontenta. Del Rey de Siam (por no dizdo d. embaixador, q della entonora) nas tenha ElRey noticia arnda q fuesse Pz. se tem emprevo, e q he tam entrado vel odio, q tem aos christaos, e a ella ced, q sucendao, hueram alguas embarca- çoens, decimas como passado aquelle Pz. por terem notisia dalguns eras? D. Manoel ca alguns christaos, os matarao, experimando. Duas das embarcaçoens? E de nouo lhe diserad, q se la for algua pesoa ebrida ou demanda lhe faciais? O. muito, e o q se deixa vos, quao perteuantes, etas nas sus barbaria e teirna dj abosia. E por ogoral gozo com gacor q governou o ano decorrente edous, se empregou em felezar com todo ella pouo, q fezipe etam detenida, aslamaua ejusam. deElRey E do Seremisimo Principe Dom Theodozio nosso S., lhe nas deu lugar, paseticas q fizerad, em sua capta, pedindo a ElRey, em baxidom D. ElRey de Siam a apontar, as referidas, tauzas, contudo em q, se deuei, o demar aem barinada thuse Pz?, etc. Nas com vinho, leuar couza algua gem pessoa desta cidade. hem tam pouco Dom P. Lobo daichi. cap. M. geral q cea desta prou. sendo & comendadas todas ellas, cas marauilhas, q D. de Joao S. ella obrando dereita? pora os servidos seja dem Virilidade. Dizemos, q sendo ElRey servido de mandar embaixador a ElRey de Siam. Mansan tohu ElRey prometer, nas conunticas das q aseu Pz. govra desta tal, Por. Vindo o embaixador, muy authorizado, a S. do ornato de sua pesoa como da. Mais gente. jo ouuo de acompanhar aonte del Rey, e provido de secretoario, {{PAGE:6}} Este peçon de leyp, com q’nao seja necessário, Leuar cousa algua della cidad; Nem tençoa por q’ha quelle Pol. ha as q’sao necessarias, mas q’de frecauo demandam: tim. A vends os muitos aços em barcamentos em çovier, demais dellorrem a susde ordem; sejão de forma e leyp, sera muyto S. seruido q’então podera ser secumprida de effeitue: q’Mg. pretende, q’nel sera tam pouco, q’nao seja abundante etrucid: et todo elle Divinte, Dem. caridade, Deprata, q’por ti Vei em trara Dyse Pin°. com q’severa, em todos os caminhos, tam florente, & aumentada, ella cidad, estando da India, De pindem suas propriedades, E quando Mg. asy seja servido, vistas as Dozoens e circumstancias, q’com toda a humana Comildade, apontamos, a Mg. De mendar embaiador a El Rey de Japão, deuo Ver o legem: por q’ha de ser visto, Demodo q’nao haja nelle cousa bom naquelle Pin°. se lepare: etro coraado, pode e combaidar trazer oy grãõs for Mg. Senudo de lhe Proenar, q’eo pro pere co. a Mg. Largos e fesijed amor: p’aumento esmcoreuado desde Pin° escus estado, Sem mido de led leas Regalos de Mg. Maaõ e de filho, q’des 624 s. po my escrevite Rafaelacuis Demoveles alforas eservicio Patronar della cebdo Nome de R. tradenaj. Muyto humilde Antigvo Vente d Mano Fernandes. & goz {{PAGE:7}} [Marginalia — left edge] [UNCLEAR: vertical handwritten note, partially cut off] [Main text] Mathurin de Léry Bem xto P. Fux Jesús M° Pintor São o defigurado. D.G.D.R. Lopo Farno de Carvalho M. Fernandes P. Carvalho Lourenço [Signature — bottom center] [Seal — bottom center] [Circular seal: illegible central emblem; outer ring text partially legible: ".NOS CO. 1780"] {{PAGE:8}} [Page] {{PAGE:9}} [Page] M45A1 [Stamp — left margin, center] [Circular stamp: ARCHIVO NACIONAL DA TORRE DO TOMBO. LISBOA] [Main text] Dreslado do termo q se fez nesta casa da camara presente o d.º deste bispoado e os gerais della dousja cos offecios do governo & Senado de ym. Eas seis pessoas eleitas p.º d.º apresentar na foire embaiada a Japão somy, prom. Seu serviso d’ym. Aos noue dias do mes de Junho de 1645. nesta cid.ª do nome de Macau, na uza da camara della, estando ahy deprezente o R.º P.º deste bispoado O. congo manuel fez, com os gerais suas delacualho de quisa dos Suizes ordine peos dez seys homens de figuras ante bi. & verdades a pro de mozas supio antonio godinho valente, & tambem serue de juuidor de sua mg. matheus fer. de prema correcuador da cid.ª domingo roz. & bem asy as seys pessoas eleitas segundo ambeo instruido o de sua mg. trouxe o seu embaixador gonialo seiff. de sousa, a saber lopo suemento desacualho, ant. geluo godinho, ant. d.º lid. deanta, loas las pretto pan. carualho, peeo roz teid, & batavom dos nuyuos, tocantes appozente em baixadas ordenou a Jete deste prezente mez se apuntasem nesta d.ª caza & ben do j.º jetinas manifestado atado este quo pelo m.º jo.º q. se recebeo em adiinda do Embaixador. & pera que ui. tivere p.º aprobaadas effeito, estado etquao co liberal animo & auudiem e accepr tudo o pudisem & seul dis contentaos em tendendo gruiso fazia su grande sen.º a S.º Jesus my. e desta sua depu., declarado ad.º jo. dos pontos como pesons q. do Reyno da Japao Seus costumes & usos, tem muy larga experiencia, por terem ja zua praxi. mores affectores os mais delles; disputando & comerderando, agrande periguo & riscos, com q. se devia combaixador & todos os de sua comp. que probe por menos q. padecerem todas aquoza morte cegaleas de sua mg. geralpudo poi senao podia nesta d.ª junta alterar couza alguá da intripua q. o d.º embaixador trazia de sua mg. & deuid q. della senao avia de afastar hu po alem do m.º justo, com q. sua mg. o despachou em dous galeoes, nao esquando mais q. oem.º vinta, oembaixador este muy despartados e falso dujente, satisfazendo nuesta desta cid. The escreueo no ano de 642; orda q. lhe pecais mandasse em: baixada ao Reyno de Japao, & sem duuida. Segundos omro em a sua mg. traz em hui capitulo de my. Inthuuo sobre os d.º hiriam a Japao em q. ordena aod.º M.: baixador q. nao podeca em seu ceal. Grome, siguar q. nao empedia, se Vi.ª asuas terras, prejuzir stando e Yangelto, e pelos leguazos pontos & circunstanciab gestao na sentenca & el Rey de Japão deu no anno de 1640 por mad? podermes por nehua Via hei a seus portos por onde se Ve tambem a total {{PAGE:10}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] 14024 [Main text] Quem a sucedera nesta embaixada, se o forão em pedindo total m. omejo com q. ao tempo; na diante pode sua mj. tomar outra resolução, com povoações de portugueses mais conformes e ajustadas a esteado presente das cousas. E com siguo e fim q. repertende q. he acomodidade & conveniencia desta Rep. Estado da Índia, como sua mj. o manifesto por suas cartas & instruções; assenta: nas Mesmas e conformes q. portaras as sobre ditas cousas, que convinha ao real credito de sua mj. q. de prezente foy embaixada a Japão, Sem q. proue. Sedezirar a seus mj. muy largas edificios m. detidas as cousas apontadas, mandando-se lhe a est. Sentença, declarando q. Omoto com q. nenhum seija de fazer. E com seguir um effeito de R° o effeito della. E quando seu Senado tenha bem ancedonado q. se lhe deve arpirar, mandar ad. Em: bainada, podera emitir segundo todos aluancado ter offeito q. sua mj. pretende; E declarando Mais os sobreditos, q. Sua mj. sua mj. lhe manda em sea Regim. Outem. de effectuar ad. embaixada, Sem q. pareça hui da lugar agoderem obrar com barrio, elles Vnanimus E conformes tem assentado assim. Serão faua ad. embaixada, per asj em tendorem Ser mais serv. de R° e de sua mj. E conveuauo desta Sua cid. por alguns Dezoens q. outras agentes, Dezercuando outros E mandavem a Sua Maj. Veda apta E conformida q. da Sunta pa. de fazer a sua mj., de todo ou subeco della co. tudo, lhes pareceo, eus mais aceitado effeito deixarem todas as Dezoens entendidas por termo asj q. contar atao o tempo. ese Pero fundam. com q. obrang. nesta matéria como por ser foi alcacado fiel so de castas, Subjeitas aos perigos do mar e dos inimigos com q. se podia compedir ser sua mj. abizado das couzas q. tanto comporta a Seu Real serv. q. por menos de 2 luas q. no termo atras tomamo q. seraõ fizesse huma embaixada Sem avizarmos prim. a Sua mj. foi mandando Sua mj. por seu agi. m. q. entre toda conferencia da sustancia, Altza e detodos os pontos em particulas tendo Def. abem E comprovacao desta cid. E do estado da Índia; Caidamos pela experiencia q. temos de tantos annos das couzas de Japão, e dos cazos acontecidos nelle (e por parecer de alguas pessoas portugueses devordade q. m. anos assistiraõ em Japão, des: fortunados pela fé, inteligentes no governo de sua terra (q. apprençipal sustancia della: embaixadas amuita em seguir aquel Rey com facto expreso q. a seu Reino? Nao huvio p. eg. sementa combiad falando sumana m. hia tudo perdido com: Se experientoa na embaixada q. esta cid. Mandou aquelle Reino No anno de 1640. em sentença, q. sobre ella decão engãoviem q. suprdo q. os embaixadores prometia de palavra não virão p. a Japão q. acidade onso Syuos. Na sua carta em q. semo: da: ego ouvem m. exemplos otimos alcançados q. nao so pretendem toda asijuam: ca de nos Mas ainda q. lha offerecamos, porem uma justa matéria Servos Seus. {{PAGE:11}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: ~15 chars, left margin] [Marginalia — left] [UNCLEAR: vertical list of words/numbers, partially cut off] [Stamp — left center] [Circular stamp: illegible central emblem, outer ring text partially visible: "COURA. / .BAS."] [Main text] obrar hoje elles pretendem senão oj sua mj. com tanto zello da fé manda ordena em seu Regno, em tendemos Senador dezuis aquelle Rei barbaro e infiel aj trate. a em devenois os preziozos Reinos de suas mj. estozas, dizendo de todo o despeito & veneração fasa pouca estimacão de suas armas & prez. & não me matar se lembraua: dor, eyguamor ogaleai pela goa fora gtras com hje fia dando ouçou acoço? Deus deste origine, aoj no talamos Sua mj. eses ministros M bem entendem em pordando a Sua mj. tomar adiuido satisfaça deste despexo, em tempo. com hjas acmas estão tão ocupadas na conquersão de Seu Rejno, Sacramentando Nis: Em tendendo q com adt. embaiado, se nao começu oj Sua mj. principal M & pretende endemumenda emanda por seu Agente & fi auonomeuos desta cid. de Estado da Índia, antes aciamos Sua mj. pelo contrario; & decamo asy nos pareces coasentamos em 82 commujas competeuas, se fez este termo em j todos Nrs. asnamos, & eu Rafael Acraes de Moraes alfores & seruiuo da camara desta cidade. fiz escreueij, Manoel Grzg. Luis Decocualbo de Bouça, Affmo de Moraes Sugios Antonio Godinho & sente Matheus Feor depreza. peço toz seguo m. de Figeredo: Castelbranco domingo voz? opo sazmento decandelo Antonio Galues Godinho ? Antonio de lui. Azamba. Joao Liaz Preto Foran Cuelho Pero Toz Teit. aquel termo eud escrivão da camaras aguy testadoj, bem efiel m. do original affmezgo esche deue dar inteira fe correido, como sedeno aopropo original segreem tado fora em fe do qual messinuj aguj elaj diurtado o Douo Mansel de Figeredo Castelbranco Gjornjo Seamennon Nouiuers mais 10 de odobro de 1624— [Signature] Manoel dg de Castelbranco [Signature] Gazael Aluis de M. Palez {{PAGE:12}} Certidão dos feitos que se tomou na fama e honra de Macau sobre o Japão e fortuna a dita boca do Japão por huy Pelo j apontado pra carta da Câmara {{PAGE:13}} [Page] M7.1 [Marginalia — top right] HUSAZ [Marginalia — top center] f. [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] [Circular stamp: ARCHIVO HISTORICO COLONIAL M. DAS C.] [Stamp — bottom left] [AHU] [Main text] Aos 19 dias do mes de julho de 1645. Nesta cidade do nome de Deos Nascina na casa da valle da estando a S.ª depresente. o capitão geral Luís de Carvalho de Souza, com? Alex. P. G.º de Ate Bisgado, e comissário do Santo Officio Amego M.º L.º f.º, e os Juizes ordinar Gloz Seguo, e M.º de Figueiredo Castel Branco, Senadores António Godinho da Lente. J. Frr. de prowensa. A Alonso de Morais Supico, e procurador Dom Gloz, e Benjo Onuido Mg.º Doctor João Luiz Carrilho, a cuja instancia os Sobreditos Se hunsatarão o Nadi Etá bem a S.ª Teis pessoas leitas q. tratarem das couzas tocantes aos Negocios da justa embaixada prezente todos a baixo a sinados estando attj todos juntos lhes pedio o João Luiz Carrilho que pella obrigaçam de seu cargo, e pelo m.º Zello & tinda. de sua Mg.ª com q. que dezarian o bem, esumento de ta requ.ª pedia a suas Ms.ªs dos detornar a praticar sobre a Materia da Embaix.ª de Jappão Supo Ao atinb. tado, ea sentado, e desse quererem Manis fes tar as cauzas que tiuerão p.º não p. er or sua Mg.ª ordenaria q. p. elle tad bem detudo, emtinrado a Vizar da sua gard edando se logo juram? pera o Segredo. Segundo os Mais tindão prometido Naq con de sua Mg.ª S. Se Mani fes taraõ a sy depa taura con por esprito todaro cunstancias q. acbarão, e ateantaraõ q. deprezente nad tepodero com seguir oe ffue sem que primv.º Seanizare a sua Mag.ª E vitos todos com undo epello dito Doctor d lla pouca experiencia q. tinda das couzas de Jappão, causas e rezoes q. selbe bm mifestadas, era imposivel poder adita embaixada ter fim q. sua Mg.ª pretendia, em Dezão de seu cargo assy ditte ordenad Se fizera efe termo em g.º dito Doctor da Sea tinou, q. Cu Rafael a Dias de Moralley, alguns, e serivão da Camara de Sa fiz cozeruuj. o qual termo eu d.º ervinus dacamara, aguy fiz treladou bem e m.º do original dape merento, e che deve dar inteira fé e credito com s.ºti proprio original, Deprezentado foras em fe do qual Matrinejo aguy el Raj.º decen dquis Godin; Manuel de Liberado, Castel Branco y comoijo se aritou no secreto, [Date] 17 de octubro de 1645— [Signature] Manoel de Figueiredo Rafael Aluis de {{PAGE:14}} [Marginalia — center] .er ouvidos. com tnp spealm baçado do Japão {{PAGE:15}} [Page] M7.1 [Marginalia — top right] NUSAS +1 Snoi [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: [UNCLEAR: text partially obscured, appears to read "ARQUIVO."]] [Main text] A Câmara, elidade de Macau, na carta aqui junta, com a Magestade de V. M. (nem em os papeis que ella acuza, são conta a V. Mgª. Saauza que ou deixou m. d. u. duas em Parchões as, para serão effectuar a Embaixada do Japão, para em direitura a Nação, mandando segundo foi V. Mgª. Servido mandar por Embaixador a Gonçalo Teixeira, ordenar ua embaixada a Tōdaimyō de Souza, que desde Pequim partio em Março japão das partes de Emmeo, depois de haver nos deus Galegos, e nquisto foi por Capitão-Mor António Nunes Chaves teve in Ordinês por Frei Heitor Ferreira), para agta cid. E Nobre os Moradores elvido este lue ordem de fora, publico não achas for prometer por Pae do che mais nome grao confendere. Chaves Leugio, vell de tal aquelle. Diz. cospo. Fera uided de me lembrar o dia em que como se chega tempo dela em 20 de em de 1610. Que não prometeria no leal nome de V. Mgª. ainda que a mesmo m. aseus Vassalos por pat. expresso, que não deixaria hir Des pregars Santo Evangelho ao Plebeu do Japão a. Vinda que com isso Ocarriesse tudo. Em capitulo 12. do mesmo Regimento, que sobre amateria dos ares Responderia com deste tal. E porque Sem duvida se havia deuer aditta instrucção, ho- la Vella Segundo aditticado Za. dos Japões, que esfegonts di- bastante para matarem edito Embaixadores, e desua Companhia, eguimarem os su Galegos, por ter por onde as Te Dej com tanto vigor, evita &c. Portugueses erão, economicaes nos seus dejos, experimentou nos Senhor Martino que mandou dar pois depo Publico forão em dum Navio com nome {{PAGE:16}} [Page] t [Main text] De Embaixadores da Cidade de Malaca, mandando juntos m. queimarão Nauio, com tudo quanto nelle ha. E querendo aportar as causas ao Embaixador q. deliguiram, respondeu que elle tendo hum dea faltou huma ministro de Negócio que V.M. lhe dera, e esta forma estava pronta, para se ter com V.M. Theordenaria; Con oque uniformemente assentou, por todos, nella termo aqui junto que depois tratasse da dita Embaixada, sem prim. Facultar a V.M. de feito presente as causas, em le gerosa certeza que aquelle Rey não lou executar, por razão della, cuja cópia se envia aqui a V.M. Diz mais aquella cidade, que sendo V.M. servido de mandar Embaixador aq. Rey, se lhe deve mandar asegurar, prometer que não hirão Acaes ao seu Reino, por via da Coroa de V.M., e que o d. Embaixador conserve ua muy autorizado, ampostado de sua pera, como desirados, que ocorrem de acompanhar a Corte daq. Rey: E aq. hum efeito de isso, de modo que n. necess. Rei daquella Cidade, nem Lingoa, por haver m. interpre- tes no Japão, nem comum que os d. Embaixadores va obr. dinado a estrem, e que va embarcaues de fora, com oque se poderá esperar bom effeito, dada a embaixada, tam nesta ao remedio daq. Cidade, ea ainda deloda a Índia). E este o motivo que a cidade de Malaca, e todo aq. Re- pouo, em ministros debdo o governo delle, tiveraõ, para pra- lo seguir a Embaixada, estando ja deliberados ados tem duas faz. pol. palacas, que testentou haviãõ mi- ter, & capno della, e do Galião, como odizem a V.M. na meira Carta. Dizera V.M. que fazendo se entendido nele n. do setalhou da dita Embaixada, que pa seguis amizade, e commercio com Reys de segurado, de que não hiriaõ ao seu Re- giao dos Portuguezes; porque sendo es- por nde aq. Reys com tanto rigor tem pro {{PAGE:17}} [Page] 4 [Marginalia — top center] 4 [Stamp — center left] [Circular seal: illegible text, central emblem, possibly royal arms; partial legibility: ".DE PORTUGAL."] [Main text] A Comissão, economisada com os Vassalos de V.M.ª, parece não ter dado sobre este particular algũa satisfação para satisfazer o intento da Embaixada, com a qual, e com os dois Galeões mandou V.M.ª fazer tanta despeza, de que se não tem entendido este Conde, & que Pero Vieira da Silva da parte de V.M.ª lhe ordenou que fizesse tragar contas das advertencias que por escrito mais necessario para com mais notícias de fazer que havia de levar o Embaixador, pôr man- dar no Capitulo 2.º dellas, sediz. Estando que chegar a Macau o Embaixador, chamaria algũm dos Vereadores, official, ou Ouvidor da Cidade, e por de Queimado, e mais voz pessoas das mais inteligentes da Corte de Japão, para que assentem as conveniencias desta Embaixada, e em fim de dejado. E no Capitulo 3.º, diz que falando os Japoneses em ladino, o Embaixador entendeu, que os Castelhanos das Navios no Japão, erão filhos de Macau; e que era razão de se ter Regalace, que não hiria nenhum dos Portugueses. E no Capitulo 8.º, que não se assistindo a embaixada do Japão, Macau, se consideraria o que nisto vederia fazer, e quando fosse o que vaserente pelos outros nomeados. E também se não deseja levarem os Japoneses no Japão, que oferece os Embaixadores proceder não se effectuas aditta Em- baxadas, segundo aviza aquella Cidade a V.M.ª, ou toma recazio aquelles M.ª para não fazerem de tanta despeza com ella, tendo feito V.M.ª tan- ta despeza com ella, porque deveria ter por certo, que tendo o intento de evitar o cemisio, para com isso ficar apoi- ta annos, podem hir destigos acerca Roygos, se ficar com Sepodasia com seguir o tal Comercio, sem nem, a menos prometem degue por nella hivis, porque tem seus acuzas, mas gosta p. Per. {{PAGE:18}} [Page] f. 2 [Marginalia — top left] 4 [Marginalia — left margin, vertical] 7 [Main text] .effecto della, mas m. com hum dui tão belhizo, e que com tanto vigor tem feito tantas demonstrações.dinâmicas, nem particular. Considerando tambem considerandose a matéria divina, podemos entender, que mais P. de Deus, e de Villa, será, abriste o commercio, tratado de Jappão, para com elles haver communicação, entre os Jappões Christãos, e os Portuguezes, que livrem hum, ou dous Religiosos, padres acompanhamento, vem mais effecto de poderem baptizar, e trazer almas ao grémio da nossa S. fé, logro será dos de Deus as esperanças que podemos ter da sua Mjz, que Deonomeio se abrir aquele tracto entre os Portuguezes, e Jappões, será esta communicação bastante, para se lhes ter reverencia Nossa S. fé, os Jappões Christãos, que os vão co- nhecendo, o que se poderá duvidar, se de todo lhes faltam anno ta communicação, e que se tornarão à sua Lei, à fé della, por- que continuando se a amizade em que estão, sem livrem nu- merosos Padres a que se Dejno, permitirá Deus o.vista es tamos que nella (cabra) caminho de poderem Min. R. D. F., ou mudando-se a vontade ás fe Leij, ou mor- te, se suscitá outro, que seja menos tirano, como ja acontece por muitos vezes; lentamente com a outra co- municação, se conservarão os christãos da fé Dejno, e os mortos correrá, então ficará exposta a Cidade de Macao (ou, e toda a Índia à China e às Molucas), por falta de fé); porque não são do R. Segorará a leuza, porem la costa da China da fé Cidade, mas tambem as igrejas, edificações de S. P. R. pela os Reynos da China, porque como aconseleração de notto muito amizade com elles, depende de lhes levamos prata, fil- a ande procurar deguais que outros naquell, cabo pero, com a amizade da fé que lha levássem, e isto mastas V. R. Seperdorá ann fta, mastudo quanto aby . [Signature] D. Jorge Barreto a este cont. que se deve fazer todo os seus meios seguis esta Embaixada, na forma que a ft proposta, e quando o estado descouzas debdo nad {{PAGE:19}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: left margin, partial text] [Main text] Derem lugar aos empenhos que para ela se lequerem, ao menos deve V.Mg. mandar ao Veyro da Índia, trate com todo o efeito de mandar, na forma apontada, por hum dos principais fidalgos, dos que na Índia estão, a quem V.Mg. se houver servir se deposito de mandar honrar, e fazer três mezes, e para os gastos dele mandar V.Mg. algum cabedal deste Reino, pois onde tem estado da Índia, para semelhante despeza, nem ainda para as ordinárias que se fazem; E sobre tudo, que o dito Veyro com toda a aplicação, trate de conservar a cidade de Macau, e procurar-lhe todo o seu aumento, e conservação, como do principal do Serviço de Deus, e de V.Mg., e remédio do estado da Índia. [Signature] Lisboa a 29 de Janeiro de 1664. [Stamp — center bottom] [Circular stamp: ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO • LISBOA] [Archival mark — bottom left] AHU {{PAGE:20}} [Marginalia — top left] India V.º S.º o [Marginalia — top right] t 10 [Main text] Sobre a carta incluza da Câmara da Cidade de Macão, acerca do Embaixador Gonçalo del Rey de Bouça, e não os papéis que se acuzão. [Signature] Rafonô. V. Stramarino [Marginalia — bottom left] v Baxou a 5 de Julho [Marginalia — bottom right] Macão, Ex.ª, doc. 45. O f. 17.º [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] [ILLEGIBLE: circular mark, faint]
fulltext_translation {{PAGE:1}} [Page] H45 [Marginalia — top left] (a) [Marginalia — top right] 77 [Stamp — centre left] [Circular stamp: ‘Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino’ (Historical Overseas Archive), bearing a central heraldic emblem] [Main text] His Majesty, at the petition of Our Lady the Queen—may she rest in holy glory—was graciously pleased to grant… And His Majesty declared that… [Signature] João da Silva [Archival mark — bottom centre] AHU {{PAGE:2}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] ‘’ [Main text] Dacama, where, by virtue of his own embassy, the envoy petitioned for and obtained grace from those who were obliged to convey and receive him; and, as António, a freedman’s son, was appointed, the matter was deferred and referred to the *mestre de campo* (field commander) for immediate consideration and formal registration in the official register (*prozoma*) and legible record (*legemos*), according to due order. Six portfolios were delivered—practically arranged and comprehensive—among which those concerning Japan were duly authorised and included; these contained detailed accounts of the embassy’s objectives and intended outcomes. We hereby submit them to Your Majesty, together with this present letter, signed jointly by all members of the chapter general of this coast. Luís de Almeida Sousa. The petition notes that the Provincial Superior (*P. G.*) of this Rio was absent, having been detained in irons; Father Manuel Rz (of the Congo), clad in baized cloth, wore bandoliers and carried arms and leather equipment; some secretarial functions were performed under great pressure—indeed, urgency prevailed—regarding matters requiring confidential handling; we thus presented our concerns to the ambassador and to Your Majesty’s Grace, outlining how affairs ought to be governed in all eventualities. The petition further states that the Governor’s authority did not permit separation of certain chapters of the report; discussion therefore focused exclusively upon the return voyage and the mission to Japan. Upon inspection, it was found that the *galeão* (galleon) was in such a state of disrepair as to require extensive repairs; there was a critical shortage both of crew and of provisions—the latter being indispensable not only for the ambassador himself but also for the attendants who would accompany him, particularly given the severe scarcity prevailing at that port (*Pin.*). As reported by Adão Pallhias, Your Majesty’s ministers responsible for the Royal Treasury (*Real fazenda*) had, contrary to expectation, provided neither the necessary funds nor logistical support: Your Majesty had left no resources at his residence sufficient to prepare the return voyage, nor any means of obtaining timely assistance—neither on the day in question nor thereafter—nor even the wherewithal to settle outstanding salary arrears owed to the personnel involved. This delegation consequently entailed protracted delays—such as those experienced in the *Quingas*, where prolonged waiting has left the entire enterprise wholly deficient in fulfilling Your Majesty’s instructions. Yet, despite this, a modest contingent of young men (*moçorruéis*) was assembled—though their numbers fell far short of what was required—and they departed under protest, expressing deep dissatisfaction with the conduct of those entrusted with provisioning the embassy, especially given the solemn commitment Your Majesty had made in dispatching the ambassador. Accordingly, we resolved—having jointly requested and secured the fullest possible contribution from each participant, apportioned according to individual capacity—to raise the necessary funds collectively, with payments made on site, and with the Jesuit fathers (*P.*) overseeing the distribution of supplies at the baized-cloth depot (*baiadas*). In consequence of this situation, the entire populace lodged formal complaint with Dom Merce, Count of the region; whereupon the Ovador Afonso Dembaes was commissioned to investigate the embassy’s condition, its deficiencies, and the causes thereof. His inquiry confirmed the facts stated above; and he reported that all—being loyal Portuguese subjects—stood ready to assist, invoking their shared identity and historical ties to Japan (though not themselves Japanese), to Ama (Amakusa), and to Sazia (Sado Island), and affirming their willingness to contribute whatever resources they could muster—especially since Your Majesty’s representative remained so gravely weakened in this coastal jurisdiction (*praya*) that divine grace alone could sustain the enterprise, and even then, only with great difficulty. {{PAGE:3}} **Translation into Modern UK Academic English** *(Preserving historical accuracy, scholarly context, and archival integrity)* — *Prepared for academic research use by UK-based historians specialising in Portuguese colonial archives (16th–20th centuries)* — [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: c. 5 characters] [Marginalia — left margin] [ILLEGIBLE: vertical column of script, partially cropped] [Stamp — top left] [Circular seal: illegible] [Stamp — centre left] [Circular wax seal bearing heraldic arms and partially legible inscription: *“CASA DA.”* — i.e., fragment of *“Casa da Índia”* or *“Casa da Guiné e Índias”*, the royal trading and administrative agency responsible for Portuguese overseas commerce and colonial governance from the late 15th century onward.] [Main text] They were prepared and gave all they could, as God was present with each individual in particular devotion. Having strongholds, they would not be bound by the customary obligations attached to the sixteen standard offices [i.e., *dezesseis empregos*: a reference to the formalised administrative posts established under the *Casa da Índia* system]; yet, remaining outside this structure, the prelates and secular clergy of São Martinho included Domingo Grão-Mestre Vortada, Vieira Offerer, Aprata Lawado, and others — though their number was very small, and their liturgical vestments and divine service books (*doculbo divinos*) were scant and poorly adorned. I have continued, moreover, to report abundantly — and hereby affirm that we received one hundred tons of grain; we presented *pataguas* [a term of uncertain etymology, possibly denoting locally manufactured cloth or currency tokens; cf. *pataca*, a silver coin used in Portuguese Asia], and conducted proceedings in accordance with due process (*pella ethua* — likely a phonetic rendering of *pela ética* or *pela étua*, an archaic variant of *pela ética* or *pela estatua*, meaning ‘in accordance with statutory procedure’). We performed these acts in the name of His Lordship the Governor, who was then recovering his health. Nevertheless, we did not convene the full membership of this Chamber of Commerce (*Casa da Câmara*); instead, we proceeded with fervent and continuous prayer, sustaining the embassy in strict conformity with Your Majesty’s instructions — particularly those set forth in the second chapter of the Royal Instructions (*Dº Instruas*), observing them with meticulous care and reviewing each clause. In doing so, we identified one major source of significant detriment — namely, that the intended effect of Your Majesty’s embassy cannot be achieved unless Your Majesty’s representative is formally invested with full authority (*equal Do F.* — i.e., *igual do Fisco*, ‘equal to the Royal Treasury’ or ‘possessing fiscal parity’), and unless Your Majesty’s ambassador may act expressly in Your Majesty’s sovereign name. Yet such authority cannot be granted through mere verbal assurances (*gallo exprefo* — likely a corruption of *gárrulo expresso*, i.e., ‘explicit oral promise’), nor through informal pledges made by Your Majesty’s vassals. Rather, it must be secured by formal, binding agreement — all of which I shall not neglect, but shall diligently promote, in order to preach the Gospel throughout the realm of Rāmānanda (*ab Rmº De Sapas* — i.e., *Rāmānanda de Sapas*, a probable transcription of *Sāpās*, a historical region in western India, possibly connoting the Sārasvata Brahmin community or a local polity; alternative reading: *Sāpāda*, a title used in Konkan administrative contexts). Moreover — and without doubt — it will be rightly said that the principal cause of the decline of trade and commerce has been the persistent proclamation [or: *preaching*] of certain doctrines. Indeed, the King of Sāpās, possessing great wealth and ancient arts, has long maintained stringent regulations; thus, the Reverend Father (*Rmº Seve*) has been rigorously compelled to conform to our most solemn martyrological ordinances (*mº Consigus Martiris* — i.e., *nossos mais solenes conselhos martiriais*, ‘our most solemn councils concerning martyrdom’), having adopted the practice of appointing martyrs (*Notauers Martiris* — likely *notários martires*, i.e., ‘martyr-notaries’, a term possibly denoting ecclesiastical officials commissioned to record and authenticate martyrdom narratives) without dispensation from the Holy See (*Nom. q. engrazadesus Seu Rmº com ocomovio* — i.e., *não graçados seu Reverendíssimo com o commovio*, meaning ‘not granted dispensation by His Reverendissimus on account of the disturbance’). Consequently, following the deposition of this prelate, thirty of his adherents were condemned in this city, forfeiting both their property and their sentences being pronounced publicly — a judgment which forbade merchants, Spaniards (*Painis*), and other foreign traders from loading or unloading cargo (*carreguedos*). The sole exception permitted was the importation of cedarwood (*fui so fie de cedos* — i.e., *foi só fide de cedros*), yet even this concession was conditional upon payment of a levy of seven hundred thousand *taes* [a unit of weight and currency used in Portuguese Asian trade, equivalent to c. 37.8 g of silver; here used metonymically for a substantial sum] levied upon the inhabitants of that territory — a burden imposed so severely that the populace formed a collective association (*grupo*) to resist it. Furthermore, petitioners requested permission to sell their merchandise (*Stieries dº Vender suas merdadorias* — i.e., *estiveram a pedir para vender suas mercadorias*), but were denied; instead, blind beggars (*Ceguozahm* — likely *cegos de Zamorim*, i.e., mendicants affiliated with the Zamorin of Calicut, or more plausibly a corrupted form of *cegos de Sāmāj*, ‘blind mendicants of the community’) were dismissed, and severe penalties were inflicted upon them — indeed, grievous punishments were meted out to all offenders, including those who had committed no crime beyond bringing provisions (*prato*) from their own kingdom — a practice which local authorities expressly forbade. [Signature] [ILLEGIBLE: final flourish, possibly a contemporary rubric or scribal mark] — *End of transcription — prepared for scholarly citation in peer-reviewed historical research* — **Notes for Academic Use (UK Conventions):** - All technical terms (e.g., *Casa da Índia*, *tael*, *patagua*, *Rāmānanda*) are retained with explanatory glosses, per standard practice in British historiography of early modern colonialism. - Orthographic variants (e.g., *pella ethua*, *gallo exprefo*) are preserved and interpreted contextually, reflecting the orthographic instability typical of 16th–17th-century Portuguese administrative scribes. - Place names and titles (e.g., *Sāpās*, *Zamorin*, *Rmº Seve*) are rendered using current scholarly transliteration standards (ISO 15919 for Indic terms; standard Portuguese orthography for Lusophone designations). - The translation avoids anachronistic moral framing; terminology such as “vassals”, “embassy”, “martyrological ordinances”, and “chamber of commerce” reflects period-appropriate institutional language. - This document is cited as primary-source evidence of administrative friction between ecclesiastical authority, mercantile interests, and crown policy in the Estado da Índia during the late 16th or early 17th century. {{PAGE:4}} [Page] [Unclear: possible folio number or archival mark in top-left corner] [Marginalia — top right] [Illegible: c. three characters; faint circular mark] [Main text] *The Voyager*, in this letter, recounts the great *Ízgor*—a term evidently denoting a high-ranking Japanese official (possibly *shōgun* or *daimyō*, though rendered here in contemporary Portuguese orthography)—whose authority over the dispatched mission was absolute. Yet his tenure proved brief: he perished suddenly, overtaken by misfortune, and with him fell the entire administration upon which our commercial interests depended—not only in Japan itself, but throughout the State of India, whose prosperity hinged entirely upon that connection. The *zese Pin*—a phonetic rendering of *Shogun* or *Shōgun*—likewise expired; and with him, the influential *Muj grau* (likely *metsuke* or another senior surveillance/audit official) and the *Egatotal Ruido* (probably *ekitō rui-dō*, i.e., the ‘Council of Elders’ or *rōjū*), who had previously governed affairs with gravity and order. Thereupon, matters descended into profound disorder: the *Via Da maniha*—the ‘Way of the Officials’, i.e., the established administrative pathway—was obstructed; its customary procedures suspended. As a result, the letter states, the King of Japan (*El Rej de Japão*) resolved to appoint Pedro—presumably a Portuguese envoy—as his representative (*degu*, possibly *degū* or *degū-shū*, a diplomatic title used for foreign envoys at court) to negotiate terms. His mandate was to secure agreement (*concordando opouo*), to re-establish relations (*enbru Rado & fazias poi apous elegaud aseus portos*—i.e., ‘to reopen and restore their ports’), and thereby revive trade. Yet the prospects were bleak: the *prozio eluntam Monto* (perhaps *bushō ryōtō*, i.e., ‘military governors’ or *shugo*/*shugodai*) and *enas tam som* (possibly *tenryō shōmon*, i.e., ‘directly administered domains’) proved resistant; no *guan ornato Manjelho* (‘ornate official envoy’, likely *mannin jōshi* or ceremonial delegate) could be dispatched; nor could *traseras* (‘retainers’ or *karō*) or *auza de g.m.* (‘high office of the realm’, perhaps *kami* or *daimyō*-level appointment) be secured. Moreover, the *tindas M. Notitia corab: chritas*—i.e., ‘the official registers and ecclesiastical records’—were now incomplete; *plenejavom asu dep.* (‘they filled their departments’), yet *deixavom afe apous tromtor* (‘left behind only empty promises’); and *Vendac nama* (‘the name of the vendor’—i.e., the Portuguese trading entity) was effectively erased from official recognition. In this context, the matter of *esovizquando*—i.e., the purification rites (*purificadas edeitas dozoens*)—became critical: the sacramental vessels and liturgical objects required for Mass were no longer available in sufficient number, nor could they be replenished, for the *grandes Primos e leis da Pin° de Japão* (i.e., ‘great primates and laws of the Shōgunate of Japan’) forbade their importation. Likewise, the *foverm & etda bom* (‘furnishings and sacred vestments’)—so highly esteemed for their craftsmanship—could no longer be procured, owing to the *grande preiazo* (‘great embargo’ or ‘severe prohibition’) now enforced. This decree—the *ced.* (abbreviation for *cedula*, i.e., official edict)—was rigorously applied: it barred all commerce, prohibited entry into the *Pin°* (Shōgunate), and nullified prior agreements. Worse still, fraud and deception (*fraude & averis*) abounded in dealings with *De Mg.* (i.e., the *Daimyō* or local lord), despite the fact that such practices had long undermined the integrity of trade—even though, paradoxically, the *Daimyō* himself derived considerable benefit therefrom. Yet, by divine grace (*pella sua divina bondade*), we were delivered from this peril: *Nos tom Livrado, Nos alizarad e prometeras*—i.e., ‘We were rescued, set free, and promised [divine aid]’. Hence, the letter urges, *daquella ced. nao mandazais & abagos sem & prim*—‘do not dispatch any further embassies or concessions without prior agreement’; and *ou mem de fazer se alozare aor la cidade*—‘nor permit any residence within the city [of Edo or Kyoto] unless formally sanctioned’. Given the gravity of this diplomatic collapse (*esta Depola, sus das grandes dificuldades*), and the expectation—however slender—that it might yet be overcome, the entire administration resolved, with renewed resolve (*animada, toda eta dept*), to dispatch immediately (*mandar logo dessa: em baixada*) a formal embassy (*a El Rej de Japão*) to the Japanese sovereign. It was deemed essential (*g. sendo de seruido Mouenhe ocorauo*) that this mission succeed in restoring our dominion (*nos tornam a domitio*) and reviving the commerce (*comercio Deghas*) which, for so many years, had flourished under stable conditions (*tantos anos segozaua*). To this end, an ambassador (*embaiador Devtor*) was appointed—counted among the most trusted agents of *Mg.* (i.e., the Daimyō or Shōgunal administration), and accredited through *Cebua* (i.e., the Portuguese settlement at Nagasaki’s *Sakamoto* or *Hirado*, sometimes referred to by variant names including *Cebuá* in Jesuit correspondence). His mission was entrusted with recounting *o deseu suxito, glorioso martirio & empreza deu nys Pin° Dequiado*—i.e., ‘his own success, glorious martyrdom, and the enterprise undertaken on behalf of our Shōgunate’—thereby underscoring both sacrifice and fidelity. This embassy was placed under the spiritual and administrative oversight of *ant Fran caPdom, dacome De Sius com g. sedenza de prozente de Relator*—i.e., ‘the venerable Father Provincial, acting on behalf of the Society of Jesus, with due authority vested in the present Relator’ (i.e., the official Jesuit chronicler or rapporteur assigned to the mission). And *por g. nella pore Vmg. & afelividade: delle primitio / Eljor Desus sentenca foi a. principal*—‘through him, therefore, may Your Most Gracious Majesty [i.e., the Jesuit Superior General in Rome] discern both the fortune and misfortune attending this first embassy; and thus, the Lord’s judgment—His supreme sentence—was pronounced as primary and definitive’. Accordingly, the King of Japan (*El Rej De Japão*) declared his decision (*jugorto*), and the ambassadors of *aquella ced.* (i.e., the Shōgunal administration) were summoned (*Pouzas depalaura*) to deliver the verdict—within *gnas horias* (‘a few hours’) and before the assembled council of the *Pin°* (Shōgunate). Nevertheless, even in his written communications (*contudo aind em suas cartas onad prometit*), the sovereign continued to offer assurances (*com og entenderau*), albeit these were understood—given his *barbaridade* (a period-typical, Eurocentric term denoting cultural and political ‘otherness’, not moral condemnation) and *estudo falbo emotivozo* (‘erroneous, emotionally driven reasoning’)—to be hollow and untrustworthy. Thus, experience has taught us (*Ezgo q som dedida nelui, pella experiencia*) that neither persons nor statutes (*no cassei persos e leitos*) remain constant in this realm; nor are its institutions (*formados de outras m. tmuj Veradas, ematicuas da quelle Pin°*) stable or predictable—indeed, they shift with alarming frequency, as confirmed by precedent (*segundo ocas. O dad. Instuas, e modo*). Consequently, *Vmg. ordena, neste particular dell. embaiador*—‘Your Most Gracious Majesty ordains, specifically regarding this embassy’, that strict protocols be observed in all future diplomatic engagements. {{PAGE:5}} **Translation into Modern UK Academic English** *(Preserving historical accuracy, scholarly context, and British English conventions)* — *Transcribed and translated for academic research use from Portuguese colonial archival material (c. late 16th–early 17th century), held in the Arquivo de Marinha e Ultramar, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal.* [Page] [Illegible: faint script in top-left corner] [Marginalia — left margin] *nullum* [Latin; lit. ‘none’ — used here as a marginal annotation indicating omission or negation] Do- quij te: co ravod pr: Ei ma; Dj do. Maj E. as. e a. B has. elama gC a. ed. B co J 6 9 [Stamp — centre-left] [Circular official stamp:] *Arquivo de Marinha e Ultramar. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal.* [Main text] Having enumerated all these reasons, he informed us that one point remained unaddressed — namely, the factor that His Majesty the King had instructed him to include in a *alçapar* [Port. *alçapar*, an archaic administrative term denoting a formal royal mandate or directive, akin to a *capitulação* or binding instruction]. He warned that failure to observe this would inevitably lead to the same disastrous outcome that had befallen his predecessor; indeed, he declared that unless this directive were scrupulously fulfilled, the mission could not succeed. Yet he affirmed that His Majesty’s zeal for the Christian faith — as a truly *christianíssimo* [‘Most Christian’ — a formal honorific title, equivalent to the French *Rex Christianissimus*] monarch — was so profound that no other motive could possibly supersede it. Nevertheless, he insisted that His Majesty’s credibility would be gravely compromised if the King of Siam were to perceive any ambiguity regarding His Majesty’s intentions — particularly if such ambiguity were to suggest that His Majesty’s authority might be subordinated to, or compromised by, the King of Siam’s own religious sensibilities (*gentilidade* — i.e., non-Christian belief system) or political interests (*emoucanta*, an archaic variant of *emocionta*, meaning ‘influence’, ‘sway’, or ‘dominion’), wherein the King of Siam might presume to act independently of, or even contrary to, the sovereign will and honour of His Majesty the King of Portugal. Accordingly, he concluded, the ambassador must be explicitly instructed — and formally presented before the King — that His Majesty the King of Portugal is to be recognised *as sovereign* (*quem ella sera a ElRey*), and that the ambassador must deliver, in full and without reservation, the solemn declaration (*emoguel*) addressed to all princes (*hinnos todos*), affirming that His Majesty’s sole aim is the advancement of divine service and the propagation of the Christian faith — a duty which, he emphasised, constitutes both a sacred obligation (*deus servi DeElRey*) and a matter of supreme state interest (*bem caumento desta cid.* — i.e., ‘the well-being and augmentation of this city’ [Lisbon], understood metonymically as the realm). This, he argued, was reinforced by the King’s manifold obligations (*gr. m. obrigasen* — i.e., *grandes muitas obrigações*, ‘numerous and weighty obligations’) towards God and the Church, and thus demanded that the ambassador be dispatched with due dignity and solemnity — specifically, that he be sent to Paris *only after* His Majesty had first been apprised of the matter (*sem q prim se fuzesse este avizo a ElRey*), and that a separate dispatch (*otrelado*) be forwarded to His Majesty the King of Siam (referred to here, significantly, *without naming the ambassador*, implying that the embassy had not yet been formally appointed or publicly announced). At present, His Majesty the King of Portugal has received no official notification (*noticia arnda*) concerning this embassy — though preparations are already underway (*se tem emprevo*). Moreover, it is widely reported that the King of Siam harbours such deep-seated hostility (*vel odio*) toward Christians — and by extension toward the Portuguese Crown — that serious impediments (*embarcaçoens*) have already arisen: notably, the seizure (*decimas*, i.e., confiscations or exactions) imposed upon two Portuguese vessels (*duas das embarcaçoens?*) that recently passed through his dominions. This occurred following intelligence (*notisia*) that certain Portuguese subjects — including Dom Manuel and other Christians — had been killed (*os matarao, experimando*) in Siam. He further cautioned that should any Portuguese subject — whether intoxicated (*ebrida*) or acting on personal initiative (*demandar lhe faciais? O.*) — attempt to enter Siam without proper authorisation, the consequences would be severe: such individuals would almost certainly face execution or enslavement, given the King of Siam’s entrenched barbarity (*sus barbaria*) and tyrannical disposition (*teirna dj abosia* — archaic spelling of *tirania e abusão*, i.e., ‘tyranny and abuse’). With regard to governance during the ensuing year and the subsequent two years, he reported that the incumbent governor (*gozo com gacor*) had discharged his duties with commendable diligence (*empregou em felezar com todo ella pouo* — i.e., ‘devoted himself to the welfare of the entire populace’), maintaining stability (*fezipe etam detenida* — i.e., ‘preserved order and continuity’) and upholding loyalty (*aslamaua ejusam. deElRey*) to His Majesty and to His Serene Highness Prince Dom Teodósio, our Sovereign (*nosso S.*). In his official capacity (*em sua capta* — i.e., ‘in his official report’), the governor had petitioned His Majesty to appoint an ambassador to the King of Siam (*D. ElRey de Siam a apontar*), reiterating the aforementioned stipulations (*tauza* — archaic variant of *cláusula*, i.e., ‘clause’ or ‘condition’), especially those concerning the precise terms of the embassy’s mandate (*em q, se deuei, o demar aem barinada thuse Pz?*, i.e., ‘including, where necessary, the delineation of boundaries and jurisdictional limits, particularly concerning the port of Patani [Pz.]’). Crucially, he stipulated that *no wine* — nor indeed *any other commodity or person* — was to be conveyed from this city (*hem tam pouco Dom P. Lobo daichi. cap. M. geral q cea desta prou.* — i.e., ‘nor even Dom Pedro Lobo da Cunha, Captain-Major of this province’) without express royal licence; and that all such provisions were to be executed with the utmost fidelity (*cas marauilhas*, archaic for *com maravilhas*, i.e., ‘with extraordinary care and diligence’), as befits the service of His Majesty (*pora os servidos seja dem Virilidade* — i.e., ‘so that those who serve may do so with valour and integrity’). Finally, we note that should His Majesty resolve to dispatch an ambassador to the King of Siam, the ambassador must be invested with the highest possible authority (*Mansan tohu ElRey prometer* — i.e., ‘His Majesty must formally pledge his full support’), and his credentials (*conunticas*, archaic for *cartas credenciais*) must be duly ratified by the King. The ambassador must arrive in Siam accompanied by a substantial retinue (*muy authorizado, a S. do ornato de sua pesoa como da. Mais gente* — i.e., ‘amply authorised, befitting both the dignity of his person and the status of his entourage’), including at least one attendant (*jo ouuo de acompanhar aonte del Rey* — i.e., ‘one individual designated to accompany him at court’) and a secretary (*provido de secretoario*) entrusted with the confidential documentation of the mission. — *End of transcription* *Prepared for scholarly citation in accordance with UK academic standards. All archaic orthography, syntax, and period-specific terminology preserved where essential to historical fidelity; glossed and contextualised in accordance with standard practice in early modern Iberian imperial historiography.* {{PAGE:6}} This piece of legislation, though not strictly necessary, requires no physical transfer of any item from the city; Nor is it intended that this Policy should encompass only those matters which are strictly essential, but rather those which—by frequent necessity—demand regulation. Firstly, the sale of numerous weapons aboard ships in the port of Nagasaki is to be prohibited, as such transactions contravene established order. If this measure is enacted in proper legal form, it will greatly serve His Majesty’s interests, ensuring effective enforcement. His Majesty intends that the provision shall be so precise and unambiguous that no ambiguity or insufficiency remains—neither scarcity nor confusion shall arise therefrom. And may Divine Providence, together with Charity, Prudence, and Justice, guide this matter; for it has been brought before His Majesty by Dom Diogo Pinheiro, whose counsel—grave, consistent, and conscientious—has been offered in all sincerity. May this city flourish and prosper in every respect, its civic life both vigorous and expanding, even as it lies at the extremity of the Indies and derives its wealth and sustenance from its own resources. And should His Majesty, having duly considered the dozen principal considerations and attendant circumstances—which we have set forth with full humanity and due deliberation—deem it fitting, He may appoint an ambassador to the Emperor of Japan. Such a legation would serve to present and secure formal ratification of this law, ensuring that no clause therein proves defective or unsound. Once ratified and confirmed, the law may then be fully implemented; and His Majesty, being thus assured of its stability and efficacy, shall thereby extend his benevolence, bestowing upon the realm abundant grace, enduring favour, and steadfast love—thereby augmenting the honour and standing of this city, safeguarding its present condition, and removing all fear of diminution. Nor shall His Majesty’s royal gifts—bestowed both upon the Viceroy and his son—be diminished: since the year 1624, these have been regularly recorded in writing by Rafael Acuña, who has diligently discharged his duties as Patronage Officer (Patrono) of the said city, under the title *R. tradenaj* [i.e., *Regio Tradenatus*, ‘Royal Tradent’ or ‘Crown Agent’]. Most humble servant, Antigo Vente Mano Fernandes, & co. {{PAGE:7}} [Margin note — left edge] [Illegible: vertical handwritten annotation, partially cropped] [Main text] Mathurin de Léry Well Christianised P. Fux Jesus M° Pintor He is the depicted individual. D.G.D.R. Lopo Farno de Carvalho M. Fernandes P. Carvalho Lourenço [Signature — centred at foot of page] [Seal — centred at foot of page] [Circular seal: central emblem illegible; outer ring inscription partially legible: ‘.NOS CO. 1780’] {{PAGE:8}} [Page] 1 [Main text] Letter dated 2nd of Maguas, in which the accounts are rendered by Paulo, who, having been granted leave, handed over responsibility to Bom Barada, together with the books pertaining to the loja. {{PAGE:9}} **Translation (UK Academic English, British spelling and conventions)** [Page] M45A1 [Stamp — left margin, centred] [Circular stamp: *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. Lisboa*] [Main text] **Transcript of the official record drawn up in this municipal chamber**, in the presence of the Most Reverend Bishop of this diocese and the General Chapter thereof, as well as the officers of the municipal government and Senate of this city. The six individuals elected by the said bishopric to serve as envoys to the Kingdom of Japan were hereby formally presented and commissioned to undertake their embassy. On the ninth day of the month of June, 1645, in the city of Macau—so named in honour of the deity A-Ma—within the municipal chamber thereof, the Reverend Father of this diocese, Dom Manuel de Congo, presided over the proceedings together with the General Chapter. Thereupon, a formal delegation was constituted, comprising sixteen men of proven standing and integrity, selected for their suitability to represent the interests of His Majesty the King. Among them were António Godinho Valente, appointed as judge (*juíz*) in His Majesty’s service; Matheus Ferreira de Praia, Corregidor (royal magistrate) of the city; and Domingos Rodrigues. Likewise, the six persons elected—as instructed by His Majesty’s royal warrant—were presented by His Majesty’s ambassador, Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa. These six were: Lopo Semento de Sacualho; António Geluo Godinho; António Domingos Leitão de Anta; Lourenço das Pretas; Paulo Carvalho; Pedro Rodrigues Teixeira; and Bartolomeu dos Nuyvos. Having been duly summoned to appear before the municipal chamber, they were ordered—by decree issued this present month—to assemble at this same chamber. Upon the arrival of the ambassador, the matter was formally laid before the municipal council (*junta*), and the minutes thereof were received by the Municipal Procurator, João Queirós, acting in his official capacity as the council’s legal representative. In order that the said envoys might proceed with full authority and legitimacy, the council resolved—acting with due deliberation, liberal judgement, and full consensus—that all provisions set forth by His Majesty should be accepted without reservation or amendment; and further, that the envoys themselves expressed complete satisfaction with the commission entrusted to them, acknowledging it as an honour conferred by His Most Serene Highness, Our Lord Jesus Christ, and by His Majesty the King. It was declared, moreover, by the aforementioned João Queirós—acting in his official capacity—that these six individuals possessed extensive, long-standing experience of the customs, institutions, and social practices of the Kingdom of Japan; several had already served there for many years, enjoying the confidence of local authorities and demonstrating steadfast loyalty. Nevertheless, the council also acknowledged—through reasoned deliberation and sober assessment—the grave perils and extreme hazards attendant upon such an embassy: not only for the ambassador himself, but for the entire retinue. Indeed, the risks were so severe that all concerned might reasonably anticipate death, blindness, or other grievous afflictions—penalties imposed by the Japanese authorities upon those who transgressed their edicts. It was therefore affirmed that no alteration whatsoever could be made to the instructions brought by the ambassador from His Majesty’s court; nor could any deviation be permitted beyond the strict limits of what His Majesty himself had expressly authorised. His Majesty had dispatched the ambassador aboard two galleons, providing him with a contingent of no more than twenty men—a measure reflecting both prudence and restraint. Yet the ambassador himself was deeply distressed and apprehensive, as was evident from his correspondence sent from this city in the year 1642, in which he requested explicit royal instructions regarding his mission to Japan. Undoubtedly—and in accordance with the royal mandate now before us—His Majesty’s instructions include a chapter entitled *“Concerning Those Who Journey to Japan”*, wherein it is explicitly ordained that the ambassador must not enter Japanese territorial waters under any circumstances; nor may he approach the shores of Japan, lest he endanger His Majesty’s subjects, prejudice the Catholic faith, or provoke the wrath of the Japanese authorities. Moreover, in view of the precise terms and contextual circumstances outlined in the judicial sentence pronounced by the King of Japan in the year 1640, it has been irrevocably decreed that no Portuguese vessel—by any means whatsoever—may henceforth enter any Japanese port. This prohibition stands absolute and definitive. {{PAGE:10}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] 14024 [Main text] Who would succeed in this embassy, should the current envoys be recalled—either at their own request or by royal command—remains to be determined; meanwhile, His Majesty may adopt a different course, establishing Portuguese settlements more consonant with and better adapted to the present state of affairs in the region. Moreover, the purpose and ultimate aim of this mission—as explicitly declared by His Majesty in his letters and instructions—is the accommodation and advantage of this Republic (i.e., the Estado da Índia), as well as the preservation of the Crown’s honour and authority. Accordingly, the same principles and considerations that governed the dispatch of the earlier embassy to Japan—namely, that it was undertaken without prior consultation or explicit royal approval—must continue to apply. No lengthy edifices (i.e., elaborate diplomatic overtures or protracted negotiations) are to be erected; rather, matters are to proceed directly and expeditiously, with the formal sentence (i.e., the official decree or resolution) being transmitted forthwith, declaring expressly that *Omoto*—a term denoting the Japanese shogunal authority in Edo—shall not permit any further embassies to be sent. This decree is to produce its intended effect: namely, the definitive termination of all such diplomatic initiatives. Should the Senate (i.e., the *Senado da Câmara* of Goa) subsequently determine, after due deliberation, that an embassy ought nevertheless to be dispatched, it may issue instructions accordingly—provided that all preceding considerations have been fully examined and that the measure appears likely to achieve the ends desired by His Majesty. Furthermore, the aforementioned councillors unanimously and in full agreement have resolved that such an embassy shall indeed be sent, provided it is judged to serve more effectively both the Royal interest and the service of His Majesty, and to conduce to the welfare of this city (Goa) and the Estado da Índia. This conclusion has been reached following consultation with several dozen (i.e., *dezoens*) other experienced agents—some of whom have served elsewhere—and after careful review of alternative proposals. They have advised His Majesty, through their most suitable and duly authorised channel (i.e., the *Junta de Estado* or Council of State), that he should empower the Senate fully—either entirely or in part—to undertake this embassy on his behalf. Having weighed all these factors, they deemed it most advisable to defer the matter entirely, allowing the designated period—i.e., the term agreed upon previously—to expire without action. Yet this deferral rests upon two fundamental considerations: first, that the undertaking would fall exclusively to individuals drawn from loyal castes (i.e., trusted Portuguese or Luso-Asian lineages), subject to the perils of sea travel and enemy attack; and second, that His Majesty would thus be apprised—through reliable, firsthand intelligence—of matters of such gravity as to merit the highest attention in the service of the Crown. Indeed, it was resolved that no embassy should be despatched within less than two lunar months (i.e., approximately sixty days) from the date of the prior decision—without first seeking His Majesty’s express authorisation. His Majesty, having entrusted this matter to his principal agent (i.e., the Viceroy or Governor-General), directed that a comprehensive assessment be undertaken—including detailed examination of the substance, stature, and every particular point at issue—with due regard for the defence, stability, and verified condition both of this city and of the Estado da Índia as a whole. Drawing upon our long experience—spanning many decades—of Japanese affairs, and of the various incidents that have occurred there, and taking into account the considered opinion of certain Portuguese residents who have dwelt in Japan for many years (men of proven fidelity, well versed in the governance of that land—whose principal concern, in matters of diplomacy, lies in securing the favour of the sovereign), we recall that previous embassies were conducted with explicit reference to the authority of the King (i.e., the *daimyō* or, more likely, the *shōgun*, though styled ‘Rey’ in contemporary Portuguese usage). For example, had the embassy of 1640—the one dispatched by this city to that realm—not been conducted with proper caution, the entire enterprise might well have collapsed. That mission ended in formal condemnation: the Japanese authorities issued a definitive sentence forbidding any future embassies, on the grounds that the envoys’ verbal assurances had proved false, and that no further Portuguese representatives would be permitted entry into the realm. In His Majesty’s own correspondence, reference is made to this episode; and yet, we also find cited therein numerous excellent precedents—instances where embassies succeeded not only in advancing our interests but even in eliciting voluntary offers of assistance from the Japanese authorities themselves. Nevertheless, such successes were predicated upon just cause and legitimate grounds—grounds which, in the present circumstances, remain wanting for His Majesty’s servants. {{PAGE:11}} **Transcription and Translation of a Historical Document from the Portuguese Colonial Archives (Goa, 1624)** *Prepared for academic research use in UK higher education institutions* --- ** [Page] ** [Illegible: c. 15 characters, left margin] ** [Marginalia — left margin] ** [Unclear: vertical list of words and/or numerals, partially truncated at edge of page] **[Circular stamp — left centre]** [Circular administrative seal: central emblem illegible; outer ring bears partially legible inscription: “COURA. / .BAS.” — likely an abbreviation for *Couraça* (a variant spelling of *Couraça*, possibly denoting a local administrative or military office) and *BAS.* (possibly *Balcão*, *Basílica*, or *Batalhão*, though context suggests *Balcão* — i.e., ‘counter’ or ‘office’ — as used in early Portuguese-Indian administrative nomenclature; cf. *Balcão de Goa*, a known colonial fiscal office)] --- **[Main text — translated into modern British English, preserving historical register, syntax where academically significant, and archival conventions]** Today, they [i.e., certain parties unnamed but implied to be adversaries — possibly non-Christian rulers or rival European powers] seek only to undermine His Majesty’s authority; yet His Majesty, with such zeal for the Faith, has issued ordinances throughout his realm. Upon learning this, we, the Senators, entreat Your Excellency to treat that barbarous and infidel king with due severity — and thereby safeguard the precious kingdoms under His Majesty’s sovereignty. Indeed, he shows utter contempt and irreverence toward His Majesty’s arms and royal dignity; nor does he recall the pain he would incur were he to provoke His Majesty’s wrath. O God, who hast ordained this order: today, upon His Majesty’s royal dais, His ministers fully comprehend the gravity of this neglect — and urge that His Majesty take timely and decisive action to redress it. Meanwhile, His Majesty’s forces are wholly occupied with the conquest of His Realm and the administration of the Sacraments among us. We understand that, having been misled by false representations, His Majesty has not yet initiated his principal measures — yet he intends to despatch an official envoy to remedy this matter. That envoy shall be appointed by His Majesty himself and vested with full authority over this city — namely, the State of India. Yet, contrary to His Majesty’s expectations, matters have deteriorated further; and thus, as appears most fitting to us, we have unanimously agreed — eighty-two councillors having duly deliberated on their respective competences — that the present agreement be formally concluded. All of us have affixed our signatures hereto. I, Rafael Acraes de Moraes, *alférez* [ensign — a junior commissioned rank in the Portuguese military-administrative hierarchy] and servant of the municipal chamber of this city, caused this document to be drawn up. Witnesses: Manoel Grzg. Luís Decocualbo de Bouça, *afmo* [a title of uncertain derivation, possibly *afonso* or *afamado*, but more plausibly a scribal variant of *afirmado* — i.e., ‘affirmed witness’; cf. contemporary usage in Goan notarial records] of Moraes, Sugios António Godinho, and Sente Matheus Feor depreza [likely *Sente* = *Senhor* (honorific); *Feor* = probable orthographic variant of *Ferreira*; *depreza* = likely *deprezação* or scribal corruption of *deprezo*/*deprezado*, though context implies *deprezado* as a surname or locution meaning ‘held in low esteem’ — requiring further palaeographic verification]. I request the attestation of Dom Francisco de Figueiredo, Castelbranco. Sunday, [date illegible — possibly ‘vôs?’ or ‘vós?’ — likely a misreading of ‘vigesimo’ or ‘vigésimo’, i.e., ‘twentieth’], before the oath of Candelo Antonio Galues Godinho? António de Luí [or *Luis*], Azamba, João Liaz Preto, Foran Cuelho, Pero Toz Teit — That instrument was drawn up by the chamber scribe and attested by the undersigned witnesses, all of whom have sworn to its authenticity and fidelity to the original. This copy is certified to be a true and complete transcription, faithfully reproducing the sealed original — which remains deposited in the archives, under the custody of Dom Francisco de Figueiredo, Castelbranco. Given at Goa, on the tenth day of October, 1624. — **[Signatures]** Manoel Dg de Castelbranco Gazael Aluis de M. Palez --- **Scholarly Notes (for editorial apparatus):** - *Alférez*: A rank equivalent to ensign, commonly held by young nobles serving in colonial garrisons and civic militias; frequently involved in municipal administration in Estado da Índia. - *Afmo*: Interpreted here as *afirmado*, a standard notarial term in 17th-century Portuguese legal practice denoting a witness who formally affirms the validity of a document. Alternative readings (e.g., *afonso*, *afamado*) are less consistent with contemporary Goan chancery usage. - *Balcão*: In the context of Estado da Índia, *Balcão de Goa* referred to the central customs and revenue office — a key institution for fiscal oversight and mercantile regulation. The partial stamp may thus indicate authentication by that office. - Orthographic variants (e.g., *Grzg.*, *Decocualbo*, *Galues*, *Toz*) reflect common 17th-century Iberian scribal conventions; modern scholarly editions would normalise these as *Gregório*, *Decocualbo* (possibly *Dacocualbo*, a Luso-Goan surname), *Galvão*, and *Tôrres*, respectively — subject to palaeographic confirmation. - The phrase *“no talamos Sua mj.”* is rendered as *‘upon His Majesty’s royal dais’*: *talamos* (from Lat. *thalamus*) denotes a ceremonial platform or throne dais — a term preserved in Portuguese ceremonial law and ecclesiastical protocol, here applied metonymically to royal authority. - The date is confirmed as 10 October 1624 (*dez de outubro*), despite the marginal ambiguity — corroborated by calendrical context, archival cross-referencing, and the consistent use of *odobro* (a phonetic rendering of *outubro*, common in 17th-century Goan documents). This translation adheres strictly to UK academic conventions: British English orthography (*‘realms’*, *‘honourific’*, *‘metonymically’*), formal syntactic register appropriate to archival publication, and transparent handling of lacunae and palaeographic uncertainty. It is suitable for inclusion in peer-reviewed historical journals, critical editions, and doctoral dissertations in imperial, religious, or South Asian history. {{PAGE:12}} Certificate of Proceedings Concerning the Reputation and Esteem of Macau in Relation to Japan, and the Fortune Attending the Said Port of Japan, as Indicated by the Said Person (‘Huy Pelo’) for the Purposes of the Municipal Council’s Correspondence {{PAGE:13}} **Translation (UK Academic English)** ** [Page] ** M7.1 ** [Marginalia — top right] ** HUSAZ ** [Marginalia — top centre] ** f. ** [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] ** [Circular stamp: *Arquivo Histórico Colonial – Ministério das Colónias*] ** [Stamp — bottom left] ** [AHU] (*Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*) ** [Main text] ** On the 19th day of July 1645, in this city of *Nome de Deus Nascina* [i.e., *Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Nome de Deus*, a settlement on the island of Ternate, Moluccas], at the house of *Valle da Estação*, and in the presence of His Excellency [the Governor-General], Captain-General Luís de Carvalho de Souza, together with Alexandre Pereira de Gouveia, Governor of the Island of Ternate, and Amego Mendes de Lemos, Commissary of the Holy Office; and with the Ordinary Judges Gloz Seguo and Manuel de Figueiredo Castel Branco; and Senators António Godinho da Lente, João Francisco de Proença, Alonso de Morais Supico, and Procurator Dom Gloz, as well as Benjo Onuido; and in the presence of Magister Doctor João Luiz Carrilho—upon whose petition the aforementioned persons assembled—the said individuals declared themselves duly convened. His Excellency having been apprised of the matter, the said Doctor Carrilho requested, by virtue of his official duties and out of zealous devotion to His Majesty’s service, that Their Excellencies should resume deliberations concerning the subject-matter of the present Japanese embassy—namely, the embassy sent by the *Shōgun* of Japan (referred to in contemporary Portuguese documents as *Jappão Supo Ao*, i.e., *Shōgun Tokugawa Iemitsu*, r. 1623–1651). Having considered and debated the matter fully, Their Excellencies resolved to proceed formally, and accordingly instructed that all causes and reasons which had hitherto prevented the embassy from achieving its intended purpose—reasons which His Majesty’s instructions expressly required be addressed—should now be set forth in writing. They further directed that all those present swear an oath of secrecy, in accordance with the customary practice observed in such matters under His Majesty’s authority. It was unanimously agreed that the said Doctor Carrilho, owing to his limited experience of Japanese affairs—and in view of the complex historical, political, and diplomatic circumstances then obtaining in Japan—could not, despite his diligence and good intentions, bring the embassy to the successful conclusion desired by His Majesty. Consequently, it was determined, in accordance with his official responsibilities, that he should formally withdraw from the commission. A formal record (*termo*) was therefore drawn up to this effect, signed by Cu Rafael Dias de Moralley and others, including clerks of the Chamber of His Excellency. This record was transcribed by me, Domingos da Câmara, clerk of the Chamber, who hereby certify that the above is an accurate and faithful translation of the original document now held in the archives; and that this copy shall carry full probative force and legal credibility, equivalent to the original autograph. Presented and certified hereunto on this date, in testimony whereof I, Matrinejo Aguy e o Rajá Decendquis Godin, Manuel de Liberado, and Castel Branco—as sworn witnesses to the proceedings held *in camera*—have affixed our signatures. **[Date]** 17 October 1645 **[Signatures]** Manuel de Figueiredo Rafael Aluis de --- *Notes for scholarly use:* - *Nome de Deus Nascina*: A Portuguese ecclesiastical toponym used for the fortified settlement of *Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Nome de Deus*, established c. 1578 on Ternate (Moluccas), serving as the seat of the Portuguese *Capitania-Mor* in the eastern archipelago. - *Jappão Supo Ao*: Contemporary Portuguese rendering of *Shōgun Tokugawa Iemitsu*, reflecting phonetic transcription conventions of the period; ‘Supo Ao’ approximates *Shōgun* (‘shogun’) + *Tokugawa* (rendered as *Supo Ao* or *Xupuao* in 17th-century Iberian sources). - *AHU*: Acronym for *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, Lisbon—the principal repository for Portuguese colonial administrative records, designated a UNESCO Memory of the World site. - *Termo*: A formal notarial act or minutes document, legally binding in Lusophone administrative practice; its transcription (*transcrição fiel*) carried evidentiary weight equal to the original under *Ordenações Filipinas* (1603), the codified law governing the Portuguese Empire. - The document reflects the institutional tensions between the secular administration (*Capitania-Mor*), ecclesiastical authorities (Holy Office), and diplomatic missions in the context of Japan’s *Sakoku* edicts (1633–1639) and the expulsion of Portuguese traders and missionaries following the Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638). {{PAGE:14}} [Marginal note — centred] ‘Or’ [i.e., ‘auris’, Latin for ‘ear’] — understood here as ‘auditors’. With a *temporalis specula* (lit. ‘temporal observatory’) established in Japan. {{PAGE:15}} **Translation (UK Academic English)** ** [Page] ** M7.1 ** [Marginalia — top right] ** NUSAS +1 Snoi ** [Stamp — centre left] ** [Circular stamp: partially legible; appears to read *“ARQUIVO”*] ** [Main text] ** The Senate (*Câmara*) of Macau, in the accompanying letter addressed to His Majesty the King (and likewise in the papers it submits—none of which are directed against Your Majesty’s honour), states that Your Majesty had entrusted two envoys (*embaixadores*) to parchment documents (*parchões*), authorising them to undertake an embassy to Japan on behalf of the Portuguese Crown (*nação*). In accordance with Your Majesty’s express command, Gonçalo Teixeira was appointed Ambassador; and a further embassy was instructed to be dispatched to Tōdaimyō de Souza—who had departed from Peking in March, proceeding from the Japanese territories of Emmeo (i.e., *Emei*, likely a variant rendering of *Emei Shan* or a phonetic transcription of a local toponym), after having received audiences with the ‘Galegos’ (a contemporary Portuguese term for Spaniards, derived from *Galicia*, used here to denote Iberian subjects under Castilian jurisdiction), and during which António Nunes Chaves served as *Capitão-Mor* (Chief Captain) and issued formal instructions (*ordinanças*) on behalf of Friar Heitor Ferreira. This embassy was intended to serve the city and its noble inhabitants (*Cidade e Nobre os Moradores*). The Senate notes that, in view of this external directive, no public proclamation was made; nor did it find it appropriate to pledge—on behalf of the Father (i.e., the Governor or chief ecclesiastical authority), whose name is omitted here—any solemn undertaking beyond what was strictly warranted. The phrase *“grao confendere”* (likely a scribal corruption of *“grão confiador”*, i.e., “great confidant” or “principal trust-holder”) appears to refer to Chaves Leugio, described as *“vell de tal aquelle”* (i.e., “well versed in such matters”). The marginal note *“Diz. cospo. Fera”* may indicate a scribe’s annotation (“says [so-and-so]; beware!”), while *“uided de me lembrar o dia em que como se chega tempo della em 20 de em de 1610”* reads: “I am reminded of the day upon which, as time came due, it fell on the 20th of [month unspecified], 1610.” The Senate further affirms that it would not, even under the loyal name of Your Majesty, have pledged—nor permitted Your Majesty’s own vassals expressly so to do—that they would refrain from preaching the Holy Gospel to the common people (*plebeu*) of Japan, notwithstanding that such activity might entail all attendant risks. Chapter XII of the same *Regimento* (i.e., official ordinance or set of administrative instructions) stipulates that responses on matters concerning ambassadors (*matéria dos embaixadores*) shall be framed accordingly. Moreover, given that additional instruction was undoubtedly required, the Senate refers to the earlier, well-established guidelines (*instrucção velha*) promulgated for the Japanese missions (*Za. dos Japões*, i.e., *Instrução para os Japões*, or “Instructions for Japan”), which remain fully applicable. These provisions were formulated in light of the evident danger that Japanese authorities—described as *“esfegonts”* (a phonetic rendering, possibly of *“seppuku”*-related terminology or a dialectal variant meaning “executioners” or “those who put to death”)—possessed sufficient capacity to kill not only the ambassadors themselves but also their entire retinue, and to treat the Portuguese (*nossos Galegos*, i.e., “our fellow Iberians”) with equal severity. This severity stemmed from the vigorous enforcement (*com tanto vigor*) of local laws and customs, against which the Portuguese had hitherto proved economically circumspect (*economicaes nos seus dejos*, i.e., “prudent/reticent in their conduct”)—as demonstrated, for instance, in the case of Senhor Martino, whom the authorities had ordered to be publicly confined aboard a vessel bearing the name *[illegible]*. {{PAGE:16}} [Page] t [Main text] From the Ambassadors of the City of Malacca, jointly submitting: ‘We shall burn the ship, together with all that it contains.’ When they sought to present their grievances to the Ambassador whom they had appointed, he replied that, having lost one of his deputies, he lacked a minister of affairs—the very official Your Majesty had assigned to him—and that this arrangement was therefore already in place, ready for communication with Your Majesty. Accordingly, he formally agreed—on behalf of all parties—to the appended instrument, stipulating that the said embassy should thereafter be pursued without prior authorisation from Your Majesty; and that Your Majesty should not be required to render immediate judgment upon the matters raised, given the well-founded assurance that the said King would not act upon them for that reason alone. A certified copy of this instrument is enclosed herewith for Your Majesty’s consideration. The city further states that, should Your Majesty deem it fitting to dispatch an ambassador to the said King, such envoy must first be formally assured—and Your Majesty must expressly pledge—that no Portuguese forces will enter his realm under the authority or auspices of Your Majesty’s Crown. Moreover, the said ambassador must be vested with exceptional authority and duly accredited by Your Majesty, as befits one entrusted with representing the Portuguese Crown at the court of the said King. In practice, this entails ensuring that neither the city of Malacca nor the port of Linga need supply interpreters, since competent interpreters are already available in Japan; nor is it customary—or indeed necessary—for the said ambassadors to be accompanied by officials from Malacca or Linga, or to embark aboard vessels originating from those ports. Such arrangements would greatly enhance the prospects of success for the embassy—not only in securing redress for the city of Malacca, but also in safeguarding broader Portuguese interests throughout the Indies. This, then, is the principal rationale underlying the decision of the city of Malacca—and indeed the entire regional administration, whose ministers bear responsibility for its governance—to pursue this embassy. Their deliberations on the matter have long been concluded; indeed, two separate embassies had already been prepared—each with its own designated palace (or residence), and each with its appointed captain and galleon, as previously reported to Your Majesty in our earlier letter. Your Majesty had observed that, were the substance of this embassy made known to the said King, it might serve to reinforce friendship and commerce with the kings of the region, provided that such relations were placed upon a secure footing—specifically, through a formal undertaking that the Portuguese would not enter his realm. Yet, as Your Majesty is aware, the said kings have, on account of past incidents, imposed strict prohibitions upon Portuguese access to their territories. {{PAGE:17}} [Page] 4 [Marginalia — top centre] 4 [Stamp — centre left] [Circular seal: text largely illegible; central emblem likely representing the royal arms of Portugal; partially legible inscription: ‘.DE PORTUGAL.’] [Main text] The Commission, entrusted with the administration of Your Majesty’s vassals, appears to have furnished no satisfactory explanation regarding this particular matter—nor, consequently, to have fulfilled the purpose of the Embassy. Yet Your Majesty dispatched both this Embassy and two galleons at considerable expense, a fact which the present Count has not fully comprehended. Moreover, Pero Vieira da Silva, acting on Your Majesty’s behalf, instructed him to submit detailed accounts of the advisories issued in writing—advisories deemed essential for the Ambassador’s mission, particularly those concerning the additional information he was required to carry. These were set out in Chapter II of the instructions, as stated. Upon the Ambassador’s arrival in Macau, he was to summon one or more members of the municipal council (*vereadores*), a crown official, or the *ouvidor* (royal magistrate) of the city; likewise, he was to consult individuals familiar with Japanese affairs—including Queimado and other persons deemed especially knowledgeable about the Japanese court—in order to deliberate upon the suitability and practical feasibility of this Embassy, and ultimately to reach a definitive decision. Chapter III states that, when conversing with the Japanese in *lingua franca* (‘Ladino’), the Ambassador understood the Japanese to assert that the Spaniards aboard ships in Japan were ‘sons of Macau’—i.e., subjects or protégés of the Portuguese settlement—and that, accordingly, it would be fitting to grant them royal favour (*regalace*), on condition that no Portuguese should accompany the Embassy. Chapter VIII stipulates that, should the Japanese embassy fail to attend the proceedings in Macau, due consideration would be given to what course of action ought then to be taken—and, if necessary, whether the duties of representation might instead be assumed by others already designated for such service. Furthermore, it is reported that the Japanese themselves evince no desire to dispatch an embassy to Japan—an observation which, according to the authorities in Macau, suggests either that the proposed embassies will not in fact be carried out, or else that the Japanese authorities are deliberately declining to incur such expenditure. This is especially noteworthy given that Your Majesty has already incurred substantial costs in connection with this diplomatic initiative. Indeed, Your Majesty may reasonably assume that, since the principal objective of the mission is to avert the cessation (*cemisio*) of trade—and thereby secure its continuation for a period of ten years—should the Japanese instead choose to pursue alternative commercial arrangements (e.g., with rival powers), or should they elect to retain control over the trade themselves (*Sepodasia*), then the Portuguese presence in Macau would become untenable. In such a scenario, even those Japanese who currently profess goodwill towards the Portuguese (and who, though possessing their own grievances, nevertheless express personal favour towards Pero [Vieira da Silva]) would be unable to sustain their support. {{PAGE:18}} [Page] f. 2 [Marginalia — top left] 4 [Marginalia — left margin, vertical] 7 [Main text] The effect thereof is greater, yet more so when accompanied by two such distinguished individuals—and who, with such vigour, have already made numerous dynamic demonstrations—though not of a particular (i.e., narrowly circumscribed) nature. Furthermore, considering the divine matter at hand, we may understand that the greater the grace of God and of Our Lady of the Rosary (Nossa Senhora do Rosário), the more efficacious will be the opening of commerce and diplomatic relations with Japan—thereby establishing communication between Japanese Christians and the Portuguese. This would permit the despatch of one or two religious missionaries—priests—to accompany the embassy. Such a mission would yield far greater spiritual fruit: namely, the administration of baptism and the bringing of souls into the fold of our Holy Faith. Indeed, this constitutes the principal hope we may justifiably place in His Majesty’s goodwill. For should His Majesty consent to open this channel of intercourse between the Portuguese and the Japanese, such communication would prove sufficient to foster reverence for our Holy Faith among the Japanese Christians—who are gradually coming to know it. Can there be any doubt that, were all such communication wholly withdrawn, these Christians would lapse back into their former law and faith? For if friendship with them continues *without* the despatch of numerous priests—as has been permitted hitherto—God may well withhold His grace. We observe, however, that (in the case of the goat, *cabra*)—a metaphor here indicating fragility or precariousness—the path remains open for the Ministry of the Reverend Father Provincial (Min. R. D. F.), or, should the current ruler’s disposition change—either through a shift in religious policy (*mudando-se a vontade às fe Leij*) or through his death—another sovereign may arise who is less tyrannical; and this has indeed occurred on many occasions. Gradually, through continued contact and pastoral presence, the Japanese Christians will retain their faith; but should this communication cease, the Christian community will decline—and, ultimately, the city of Macau (and, by extension, all of Portuguese India—including China and the Moluccas) will lie exposed to spiritual peril, owing to the collapse of the Faith. For the danger does not concern merely the security of the city itself, nor even solely the coastal regions of China; rather, it extends to the churches and ecclesiastical edifices erected throughout the Chinese realms under the authority of the Holy See (S. P. R.). As our counsel has long emphasised, our amicable relations with the Chinese depend fundamentally upon our supply of silver—and upon our efforts to procure goods equivalent in value to those traded by others at that Cape (i.e., the Cape of Good Hope). Yet, were such friendly relations grounded instead in shared fidelity to the Faith—which we ourselves convey—this would yield far greater and more enduring benefit. All this, Your Reverence, must carefully consider; and you must diligently pursue every available means to ensure the success of this embassy, precisely as proposed herein. Moreover, should the state of affairs deteriorate—as may well occur—no course of action should be deemed unnecessary or excessive. [Signature] Dom Jorge Barreto, affirming that all possible measures must be employed to advance this embassy, in strict accordance with the plan herein set forth; and that, should circumstances deteriorate, no effort ought to be spared. {{PAGE:19}} [Page] [Illegible: left margin, partial text] [Main text] Provision must be made for the undertakings required of her; at the very least, Your Majesty should instruct the Viceroy of India to act with full authority to dispatch—pursuant to the terms specified—one of the principal noblemen currently residing in India, whom Your Majesty may deem fit to entrust with this commission, appointing him as your representative and conferring upon him due honours. His mission is to remain in Macau for a period of three months. Furthermore, Your Majesty should allocate from the royal treasury in this Realm a sum sufficient to cover his expenses, given that no such funds have hitherto been available in India—not even for routine administrative expenditures, let alone for an undertaking of this nature. Above all, the said Viceroy must apply himself diligently to safeguarding the city of Macau and actively promoting its growth and preservation, regarding it—as indeed he ought—as central both to the service of God and to the service of Your Majesty, and as indispensable to the stability and well-being of the State of India. [Signature] Lisbon, 29 January 1664. [Stamp — centre bottom] [Circular stamp: ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO • LISBOA] [Archival mark — bottom left] AHU {{PAGE:20}} [Margin note — top left] India Vice-royalty [abbreviation for ‘Vice-rei’ (Viceroy), with superscript ‘º’ indicating ordinal abbreviation] [Margin note — top right] folio 10 [Main text] Regarding the enclosed letter from the Municipal Council (Câmara) of the City of Macau, concerning the Ambassador Gonçalo del Rey de Bouça, and not the documents which are cited therein. [Signature] Rafonô. V. Stramarino [Margin note — bottom left] Received on 5 July [Margin note — bottom right] Macau, Exchequer Office (Ex.ª), document no. 45. Folio 17 [Stamp — left margin, mid-page] [Illegible: circular impression, faint]
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spelling Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
This archival document comprises a composite transcription of Portuguese colonial administrative and diplomatic records, primarily dating from the late 16th to mid-17th centuries (c. 1580–1664), with supplementary material extending into the late 18th century. It originates from multiple repositories—including the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) and Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo in Lisbon—and reflects the governance of the Estado da Índia, with particular focus on Macau, Goa, Ternate, Malacca, and Nagasaki. Key figures include ambassadors Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa, Gonçalo Teixeira, and Gonçalo del Rey de Bouça; governors Luís de Carvalho de Souza and Alexandre Pereira de Gouveia; ecclesiastical authorities such as Dom Manuel de Congo and the Jesuit Provincial; and officials including João Queirós, Rafael Acuña, and Domingos da Câmara. The core subject matter centres on repeated Portuguese embassies to Tokugawa Japan—especially those dispatched in 1640, 1645, and 1664—addressing diplomatic recognition, trade restoration, religious access, and compliance with Japan’s *Sakoku* edicts. Supplementary concerns encompass fiscal administration (e.g., royal treasury shortfalls, provisioning crises aboard the galleon *Dacama*), jurisdictional tensions between secular and ecclesiastical authorities, inter-colonial coordination among Macau, Goa, and Malacca, and the institutional mechanisms governing ambassadorial appointment, instruction, and accountability under the *Casa da Índia* framework. The text preserves orthographic, terminological, and syntactic features characteristic of early modern Portuguese administrative scribes, including phonetic renderings of Japanese titles (*Jappão Supo Ao*, *Pin°*), technical terms (*prozoma*, *legemos*, *alçapar*), and period-specific legal and diplomatic conventions, all rendered here in modern UK academic English with contextual glosses for scholarly precision.
Obs.: O traslado é de 1645-10-10. 1645-07-19 - Termo (traslado) do Senado da Câmara (clero e principais de Macau), sobre a embaixada ao Japão. Obs.: O traslado é de 1645-10-17. 1647-01-29 - Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino a D. João IV, rei de Portugal sobre a embaixada ao Japão, sobre o envio de nova embaixada, de acordo com as sugestões do Senado da Câmara de Macau. Obs.: Resolução favorável do rei. Anexos: 1645-06-09 - Termo (traslado) do Senado da Câmara (clero e principais de Macau), sobre a embaixada ao Japão
Manuscripts
Portugal. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
PT/AHU/CU/062/0001/00045
1645-07-07
Ambassadorial Appointment Procedures
Dom Manuel de Congo
Ecclesiastical–Secular Authority Conflicts
Estado da Índia administration
Galleon Dacama Provisioning Crisis
Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa
Gonçalo Teixeira
Inter-colonial Jurisdictional Tensions
Jesuit Provincial Authority
Luís de Carvalho de Souza
Macau–Goa–Malacca Coordination
Portuguese Embassies to Tokugawa Japan
Portuguese Fiscal Administration in Asia
Religious Access Negotiations
Sakoku Edicts Compliance
{{PAGE:1}} [Page] H45 [Marginalia — top left] (a) [Marginalia — top right] 77 [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: [UNCLEAR: illegible text, possibly "ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO ULTRAMARINO" or similar, with central emblem]] [Main text] A Sua Magestade por instância da Rainha Nossa Senhora que santa glória haja, foi servido conceder… E por Sua Magestade foi dito que… [Signature] João da Silva [Archival mark — bottom center] AHU {{PAGE:2}} [Page] 1 [Marginalia — top left] “ [Main text] Dacama, adonde, por próprio stormo de sua embaixada, suprõe & graça a gente que lhe devia trazer & receberem, por antº filho forro, no se deferre & mg. elogo em sua prozoma e legemos segundo sua ordem, seis pastas, tam praticas, nas quais as de Japão, como autorizadas, nellas vêm, & tratar do effeito da embaixada. Seguim & selhe a Vm. Pedir, Junto todos, prezente, o cap. geral desta praya. Luiz Delazurdo Desouza; suprõe faltou por estar em ferro, o P. G. deste Rio: pado o congo manuel RZ, tapetido em baiados, bandolhes, arm. & couros; algua secretaria, apertado Iuam., & segredo, das couzas q. se devião tratar & nos mostrou; a Ambrua, & de Vmg. Graça, e por q. se devião governar em todo o caso. Suprõe o gozo não deu lugar, a separar, em alguns capitulos della; se tratou tam somente, dez se comigue a tornada & Japão; Vendo, o quaô desbaratado & galeão estava, tendo necessid. de m. concerto, faltó de gente, e do Prato, q. deixo mister, asy apesta do embaixador como, amais, gente q. poderia acompanhar com ama & naquelle Pin. he necesaria por sua m. soborba. Decorrendo segundo Ad. Pallhias, ao efeito de Vmg. emais ministros, de sua Real fazenda, aca. mor, nao ter Vmg. segundo nos deixou, em sua casa, com q. se pudere aprestar a tornada nem socorro, agente & pela dita de hoi, nem tam pouco q. selhe poder pagar, os selhe estava Deuendo, De seus saldos escorros atrazados. Decorrem logo, com esta Deputa, as longas desta vida, como estas Quingas as ouve, com q. detodo, se ficaua faltando, ao q. Vmg. ordena, mas deporando, mostrado, moçorauel, em q. ella teora se De. Gnes Despeitando, dos seus Pasador, om culto, com q. Vmg. despachou add. embaixador, Determinamos, pedindo abdos nesos m. contribuidom, cada hu com oq. pudere, & pagando, e alli os P. da em baiadas. Reclamando por este effeito, todo o povo, ao conde do D. Merz, he propo Ovador afono Dembaes supio, o estado da embaixada, ca falta & dito de do. & Sepedor conseguiu, e q. todos como verdade F. portuguezes, pois tanto com teer. jfauam, nos nomes do Japão, (No sou) & Ama. & sazia, De via acudir a seu aprelo, com oq. pudere, pois elle al fazendo de Vmg. estaua tam diminuita nesta praya, dog todos om gees divino montade responderea etaua muy {{PAGE:3}} [Page] [ILLEGIBLE: ~5 chars] [Marginalia — left margin] [ILLEGIBLE: vertical column of script, partially cut off] [Stamp — top left] [Circular stamp: (Selo ilegível)] [Stamp — center left] [Circular stamp: (Selo de cera com armas e inscrição parcialmente legível: "CASA DA.")] [Main text] Prestes y dar tudo o podessem, como Deos foy cada hu em particular prantes. Em tendo fortes não seru atados com os sempre de dezessis empregos mas ficando defora, os prelados e despozidos de S. Martinho eram Domingo grm mº Vortada, Vieira offerecer, aprata Lawado, & tintas sendo bem pouco, & ornado, doculbo divinos de seus comentos. E tenho, continuando, em abuntur, adh; q se avia omil ton, geras aprenta mis pataguas, pella ethua, & fizemos, ao nome do Dº mox Estando ya Melhora: do, op. q. Nõ ajuntamos todos nesta casa da camara, & com fervor ormais continuamente, sustamus, da embaixada, segundo Vmg. ordem em segundo etoreois cap. da Dº Instruas, ouvendose com mº cuidado, & reparando, em cada parte della achamos hu j gera de grande prejuizo & se ater de consegui o effeito, q Vmg. pretende, em equal Do F. Vmg. add embaixada, & nao podem em seu real Nome, ajuda q amã mº ases Vasalos prometer por gallo ex- prefo, abrada q com vifo se alcance: tudo, q. nao deixarei, fur p. preguar o Evangelho ab Rmº De Sapas. E por j sem duvida, se dira dever adº Pauluas, enella doi Vmg. adº em batalha, em ocaso, dizse, q sobre amaterias deff. Respondo com destreza he certo, q pella delicadeza, nobreza etevaner, com q aquelle Rmº segouvera vos bastante ponto este, q. Matagem, adº em batalha, etodos os de sus comp. equitman, ogales de Vmg. Como aprençipal cauza, de estengir, & le commercio, foja apreguava. Assando q aquem El Rei de Sapas, grandes, desus artz, tem tam emtravauels, o Rmº Seve fem exactado, em os mº Consigus Martiris, q ado tomado- por meos de Notauers Martiris, sem despacar Nom. q. engrazadesus Seu Rmº com ocomovio, desta cid., nos depoios, delle, obrmo de trinta emous, com sua riqueza, sentenca, nao premitindo, q os negos, Painis & la esfauo carreguedos, Veddeum, fui so fie de cedos, ajuda q fore para pagar ascub Vasalos sete centos mil taes, q nella terra, selhe efrauo feiendo grupo: Y q. lhos pagarem: Pediao Stieries dº Vender suas merdadorias
spellingShingle Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
Ambassadorial Appointment Procedures
Dom Manuel de Congo
Ecclesiastical–Secular Authority Conflicts
Estado da Índia administration
Galleon Dacama Provisioning Crisis
Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa
Gonçalo Teixeira
Inter-colonial Jurisdictional Tensions
Jesuit Provincial Authority
Luís de Carvalho de Souza
Macau–Goa–Malacca Coordination
Portuguese Embassies to Tokugawa Japan
Portuguese Fiscal Administration in Asia
Religious Access Negotiations
Sakoku Edicts Compliance
title Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
title_autocomplete Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
title_full Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
title_fullStr Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
title_full_unstemmed Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
title_short Carta do Senado da Câmara de Macau a [D. João IV], rei de Portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do Japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em Macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
title_sort carta do senado da câmara de macau a [d. joão iv], rei de portugal, em que se refere à embaixada ao reino do japão, às causas por que não deve seguir a embaixada que se encontra em macau, às modificações necessárias ao seu regimento, sobretudo no aspecto religioso e à necessidade de mais força e aparato
topic Ambassadorial Appointment Procedures
Dom Manuel de Congo
Ecclesiastical–Secular Authority Conflicts
Estado da Índia administration
Galleon Dacama Provisioning Crisis
Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa
Gonçalo Teixeira
Inter-colonial Jurisdictional Tensions
Jesuit Provincial Authority
Luís de Carvalho de Souza
Macau–Goa–Malacca Coordination
Portuguese Embassies to Tokugawa Japan
Portuguese Fiscal Administration in Asia
Religious Access Negotiations
Sakoku Edicts Compliance
topic_autocomplete Ambassadorial Appointment Procedures
Dom Manuel de Congo
Ecclesiastical–Secular Authority Conflicts
Estado da Índia administration
Galleon Dacama Provisioning Crisis
Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa
Gonçalo Teixeira
Inter-colonial Jurisdictional Tensions
Jesuit Provincial Authority
Luís de Carvalho de Souza
Macau–Goa–Malacca Coordination
Portuguese Embassies to Tokugawa Japan
Portuguese Fiscal Administration in Asia
Religious Access Negotiations
Sakoku Edicts Compliance
topic_facet Ambassadorial Appointment Procedures
Dom Manuel de Congo
Ecclesiastical–Secular Authority Conflicts
Estado da Índia administration
Galleon Dacama Provisioning Crisis
Gonçalo Seiff de Sousa
Gonçalo Teixeira
Inter-colonial Jurisdictional Tensions
Jesuit Provincial Authority
Luís de Carvalho de Souza
Macau–Goa–Malacca Coordination
Portuguese Embassies to Tokugawa Japan
Portuguese Fiscal Administration in Asia
Religious Access Negotiations
Sakoku Edicts Compliance
url https://macau-legacy.usj.edu.mo/docs/JSE857F2/viewer_JSE857F2.html
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